:An informal
exchange between
Philosopher Jersey Flight and
an Aristotelian Apologist:
This exchange
was censored before
it could come to completion.
The so-called, “philosophical
moderators” were petitioned to let the debaters finish the exchange,
but the petition was arrogantly
denied.
JERSEY FLIGHT:
This exchange started when you made the following claim:
"Actually Plato provides a much more useful dialect than Hegel. After
reading Plato and Aristotle, you'll be able to see where Hegel goes wrong in
his dialectics, leading people like dialectical materialists into a violation
of the law of non-contradiction." — Aristotelian Apologist
This assertion has not been sustained.
Hegel's position on being, as you seem to use the term, is that it is not only
inconsequential, but dangerous insofar as it serves to distort essence: "For
here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form, but want to
know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is
that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By this we
understand no more than that things are not to be left in their immediate
state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by something
else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or
curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further that
all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what they
immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality to
another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and back
again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides in
things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence."
You are free to insist that you are talking about the law of identity. You are
also free to insist that your external imposition of negation doesn't imply a
violation of the law, but the law of identity is an entirely positive
formation. As soon as you bring in the negative you have gone beyond identity.
You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being, but it
does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is thought
suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the creation of
abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality.
Hegel commenting on Aristotle's logic: "Now if, according to this point
of view, thought is considered on its own account, it does not make its
appearance implicitly as knowledge, nor is it without content in and for
itself; for it is a formal activity which certainly is exercised, but whose
content is one given to it. Thought in this sense becomes something subjective;
these judgments and conclusions are in and for themselves quite true, or rather
correct – this no one ever doubted; but because content is lacking to them,
these judgments and conclusions do not suffice for the knowledge of the truth."
"So long as I maintain the separation between what is said about the
object's identity, and the object's real identity, there is no problem."
— Aristotelian Apologist
The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the
non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's
real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what
you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless
category.
“Just because the abstract formation I put forward, describing the
identity of the object, is not the object itself, does not mean that there is
not an object, with its own identity.” — Aristotelian Apologist
My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it distorts
our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its movement not
its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your categories from
the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena. I suppose you could assign
multiple abstractions to an object if you so desired, but the danger is always
the same: distortion of the comprehension of reality itself.
“Yes, you continue to assert that Hegel demonstrated "identity"
to be faulty, or contradictory, but you have yet to produce the argument. The
argument you have here does nothing.” — Aristotelian Apologist
In concise form, you will have to connect the dots through careful
contemplation:
"Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical
with itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the
same time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is
nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. The propositional form
itself already contradicts it, since a proposition promises a distinction between
subject and predicate as well as identity; and the identity-proposition does
not furnish what its form demands." Hegel
----------ARISTOTELIAN APOLOGIST REPLY----------
"For here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form,
but want to know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of
philosophy is that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By
this we understand no more than that things are not to be left in their
immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by
something else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of
rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further
that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what
they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality
to another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and
back again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that
abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence."
Hegel
This passage demonstrates how this so-called distortion of essence is a feature
of Hegel's misunderstanding of the Aristotelian concept, "essence"
and nothing else. As I explained to you already, Aristotle defined two senses
of "form". The one is the human abstraction, and this is how we come
to know the essence of things. The other is the form of the material thing
itself. Each material thing is a particular, an individual with a form proper
to itself. This form is distinct from the essence of the thing, which is the
form which human beings know in abstraction, because it consists of
accidentals, whereas the essence does not. Do you apprehend that difference?
The essence does not contain the accidentals which inhere within the form of
the material object. Both are "forms", yet "forms" in two
distinct senses of the word.
So the following statement reveals Hegel's misunderstanding, "The
immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain
behind which the essence is concealed...there is something that abides in
things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." The essence of
a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form
which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and
determines as the essential properties of the thing. What is concealed is the
independent "form" of the thing, complete with the accidentals which
the human being does not necessarily perceive. And this independent form
constitutes the identity of the thing. That this is the proper interpretation
is evident from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, who did much work expounding on
the difference between the forms of human abstraction (essences), and the
independent "Forms".
Hegel, with this use of "essence" puts us right back into the
confusion of Plato's Timaeus. "Form" as "essence", is a
universal. The problem which confronted Plato was the question of how a
particular could come into existence from a universal form. He thought it
necessary to assume this, because things, like human beings for instance, come
into existence as a determinate type. So the human form, as a universal, must
be prior to the particular, the individual human being. He was stumped because
the medium between the universal and the particular was seen as matter, but the
universal form could not account for the existence of the particulars of the
material individual. Aristotle got beyond this problem by assigning all such
universal forms (essences) as the product of human abstraction, therefore
posterior to the things themselves, while also positing a new type of form, the
form of the individual. which substantiates a thing's "identity".
Hegel, in not upholding this distinction confuses identity with essence.
“You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being,
but it does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is
thought suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the
creation of abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality.” —
Jersey Flight
That's right, formal logic deals with essences, not with actual things. But
dialectics is not formal logic. How do you suppose that a person might create
useful abstract categories without an appropriate understanding of reality?
Creation of suitable abstract categories can only follow from a comprehension
of reality.
“The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the
non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's
real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what
you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless
category.” — Jersey Flight
Right, there is a distinction to be upheld, between the form of the thing,
within the human mind, the abstraction, and the form of the thing in reality.
The "non-real identity" is the identity given to the thing by the
human mind, the abstraction, the essence. It is "non-real", because
it is lacking in the accidentals which are a part of the identity of the
individual thing.
“My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it
distorts our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its
movement not its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your
categories from the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena.” —
Jersey Flight
This is not what Hegel says. The "movement" you refer to here is
called by Hegel "becoming". It is not called "the actual
being" in Hegel's dialectics. That is the point I'm trying to impress on
you, "Being" is subsumed within the category of becoming,
"movement". That's how Hegel can argue against Aristotle's concept of
identity. There is no such thing as beings in the real, actual world, only
becoming, because Hegel has done away with any independent Forms. All forms are
dependent on the human mind, as essences, and there is no true form or being
concealed behind how the thing appears to us, only movement, becoming. A thing
only has being through human apprehension. Other than this it is just a
becoming.
“Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical with
itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same
time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing
but the law of the abstract understanding.” — Hegel
See, this is Hegel's misrepresentation, a straw man. The law of identity says
that a thing has an identity unto itself. It says nothing about abstract
understanding. It is a law against the abuse of abstraction reasoning. It says
nothing about what abstract understanding is, or how it ought proceed, only
what it is not, i.e. a thing's identity. It was created by Aristotle as a tool
against sophists who claimed that the human abstraction (essence) of a thing is
the thing's identity. This sophistic claim denies the possibility of human
mistake as to identity. That is why we must uphold a distinction between a
thing's true identity, its own particular and unique form, and the identity
which we assign to it in abstraction (essence). Without this distinction there
can be no such thing as human knowledge being mistaken, because what we say
about the thing is what is true about it.
“Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the
law of the abstract understanding.” — Hegel
Let's say that the law of identity is an ideal. As such, it is proposed as a
limitation, or rule for abstraction. As a proposal, or proposition, it might be
judged for truth or falsity and rejected or accepted accordingly. What I am
arguing is that Hegel's rejection is unjustified, being based in a faulty
dialectic, consisting of a misunderstanding of the Aristotelian conceptions of
"form" and "essence", evidenced by [your own] quotes.
Furthermore, if we reject the law of identity there are consequences which need
to be respected. Initially, the assumption that there are particular,
determinate individuals, beings or objects, in the real, or actual world, is
unsubstantiated, unsupported and unjustified. So it makes no sense, as
hypocrisy or self-contradiction, to both deny the law of identity and also talk
about "actual being". Without the law of identity, or an adequate
replacement, the claim of "actual being" is completely invalid.
“The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a proposition
promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and
the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands.” — Hegel
This is another example of Hegel's misrepresentation of Aristotelian
principles. A thing, for Aristotle consists of both matter and form. A thing's
identity is form alone. Therefore we have the required distinction between
subject (the thing as matter and form), and what is predicated of the thing,
identity (its form). It is this separation of a thing's true, real form
("identity" rather than human abstraction), from the material thing,
which allows Christian theologians to conceive of immaterial Forms, which are
prior to, and necessary for, as the cause of existence, of material things.
Aristotelian principles disallow matter without form, but not form without
matter.
----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------
There are some from my own school of thought who would call
this exchange "a fruitless endeavor," but I do not agree with this,
and this is why: it is insufficient to prejudice the accuracy of one's position
merely because one has convictions as to the nature of its truth. I reject
this. I believe philosophy is best served as honest and diligent minds come
into collision with each other. Further, those who say this, not putting forth
the effort to defend their own views, are in danger of forfeiting truth to the
victory of error. (Of course, this assumes their views are true). It is clear
to me that what is required of serious thinkers is not merely to validate the
cravings of their own egos, or to bask in their convictions, but to search out
the nature of truth, even if its comprehension causes them the greatest
psychological distress. It is hard for me to respect thinkers that are not
willing to subject their ideas to coarse criticism. This does not mean one
should apply themselves to every contrarian under the sun, but that qualitative
objections should be discerned, sought out, and engaged. It greatly saddens me
that so many dialectical thinkers have retreated to the Ivory Tower of theory.
These thinkers do not fail to write books proclaiming the formation of their
ideas, but when it comes to defending them, they fly off and hideaway or
dismiss the seriousness of their opponent's objections through the sheer
arrogance of their convictions. Not I dear reader, I will do my best to apply
thought where it deserves to be applied. I believe there are few things so
valuable to the thinker than the resistance of other minds.
*********
The first distinction I should like to make is that being is an actual,
concrete thing, not a mere concept or word. Words are objects that we create in
order to make sense of being. We do not discover them, unless by
"discover" one is talking about cultural integration.
"Each material thing is a particular, an individual with a form proper
to itself. This form is distinct from the essence of the thing, which is the
form which human beings know in abstraction, because it consists of
accidentals, whereas the essence does not." – Aristotelian Apologist
Isn't it actually the case that no material thing is a particular? You are in
fact the one assigning this abstract identity to the object. Even the concept
"particular" is not itself particular. Diversity and movement is
found everywhere in being.
"Hegel argues that these three concepts [particular, individual,
universal], though they seem quite distinct, are intimately bound up with each
other. The understanding, however, does not see this and holds the three
strictly separated. The understanding sees universals as externally related to
particulars. In its extreme form, this may issue in an ontological separation
between them, as in Plato’s philosophy, where universals or ‘forms’ are held to
exist in a different reality altogether separate from their particular
exemplars. Hegel rejects any such approach, and shows how in a real sense it is
quite impossible to think the universal, particular, and individual apart from
each other. For instance, if the universal is thought to be absolutely separate
from individuals, and unique in its own right, then isn’t the universal an
individual? Further, if an individual is understood as absolutely separate from
universals, doesn’t it become an empty abstraction (i.e., a kind of universal)
without specific quality? Hegel argues that the concepts of universal,
particular and individual mutually determine one another." The Hegel
Dictionary, Glenn Alexander Magee, Continuum International Publishing Group
p.255
"The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in
the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the
human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the
thing." – Aristotelian Apologist
It seems to me this is the crux of everything you are saying. How can you say
the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim
to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing? Further,
it seems the way you make use of these determinations, extracted images, I will
not yet call them "properties," is to wield them as totalities and
finalities against the movement and diversity of being. This seems
exceedingly problematic to me, but there is more... what the mind apprehends is
precisely the immediacy of an object, unless one goes beyond this mere
apprehension (which takes one beyond bare identity) one cannot inform essence
with totality from the narrow category of identity. Here you are trying to
smuggle in content that cannot be furnished by bare identity alone. The fact that
you are doing this, and that you must do this, only stands to demonstrate the
accuracy of Hegel's critique of Aristotle.
"What is concealed is the independent "form" of the thing,
complete with the accidentals which the human being does not necessarily
perceive." – Aristotelian Apologist
This seems to contradict your previous premise, when you said "the essence
of a thing is not concealed," and while I note the use of a new term to
overcome the limitations of your identity position ("accidentals"), I
would also note that the actual concretion of what you are doing here seems to
contradict your description. I think this is the part that really matters; I
think it's the part that exposes the technique of your idealism, which appears
to me as a form of sophistry. It seems you are trying to walk two roads at once
in an attempt to retain the appearance of consistency for your formal position
on identity, but when we actually examine the concrete process of your
determination and formation, we find that it negates your description of
identity. What you are actually doing, which is to say, what you must do, in order to furnish being with
adequate content, forces you to go beyond the so-called law of identity.
"... formal logic deals with essences, not with actual things. But
dialectics is not formal logic. How do you suppose that a person might create
useful abstract categories without an appropriate understanding of reality?
Creation of suitable abstract categories can only follow from a comprehension
of reality." – Aristotelian Apologist
The point of dialectics is that you cannot arrive at an accurate essence
(understanding of reality) through identity, but must make use of unity and difference;
these not only negate the narrow Aristotelian formation of identity, but go
beyond it. Just because one produces a formalism, through the method which you
are here defending, doesn't make it accurate or comprehensive. One could in
fact, understand reality in such a way that they extract error from it, thus
leading to an erroneous formalism. That is to say, a comprehension of reality
can only follow from a dialectical process.
"...if we reject the law of identity there are consequences which need
to be respected. Initially, the assumption that there are particular,
determinate individuals, beings or objects, in the real, or actual world, is
unsubstantiated, unsupported and unjustified." – Aristotelian
Apologist
Here your idealism shines through with vibrant colors. It is not a matter of
"rejecting," I think this might be the problem in your
characterization, it is a matter of incompletion, a lack of totality, Hegel
demonstrates that the principle, as Aristotle forms it, is neither conscious
nor consistent with itself.
Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity
presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different
symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the
symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which
are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is
no identity without them; where there is identity there you already have the
negation of Unity and Difference.
You claim that if the Aristotelian formation is rejected that we cannot make
sense of objects in reality, but this presupposes that we actually form our
concepts through the narrow prism of identity, but we don't, this is the naive
idealistic assumption, it is akin to the idealist drinking his own Kool-Aid.
Hegel proved that every occurrence of identity is making use of other
principles, namely, unity and difference.
I am well aware of the fact that you will likely claim I am attacking a
strawman of your position. If this is actually the case then my argument has
not made contact with your discourse. However, I think the reason you claim
this, is because the thing you are claiming is not the same as what you are
doing. You are saying that I am not making contact with your position because I
am not validating your description of the process, but like Hegel, I am
claiming that your actual process of identity is in tension with your formal
description.
----------ARISTOTELIAN
APOLOGIST REPLY----------
“The
first distinction I should like to make is that being is an actual, concrete
thing, not a mere concept or word” — Jersey
Flight
You need to explain your use of "being", because it makes no sense to
me. You are not using it as a noun, to talk about "a being", or
individual "beings", so I assume that it is used either as a verb, or
as an adjective like "existence" is used as an adjective when we say
that a thing has existence or being. Either way, you'd be talking about the
concept of "being", not a concrete thing which would be a being. If
"being" refers to an activity which many things are engaged in, then
this is a concept. If "being" refers to a property, like existence,
which things have, then again this is a concept. So it really makes no sense
for you to use "being" in the way that you do, and insist that you
are referring to an actual concrete thing, this would be "a being".
And if "being" refers to some activity which things are involved in, then
clearly this is conceptual, because each activity of each individual thing is
distinct from the activity of every other thing, so to generalize and say that
all these distinct activities have something in common which you call
"being", is to conceptualize.
“I am well aware of the fact that you will likely claim I am
attacking a strawman of your position. If this is actually the case then my
argument has not made contact with your discourse.” — Jersey Flight
Yes, you have not really made contact with my discourse. I have stressed that
Aristotle distinguishes two types of "form", one being the abstracted
essence of a thing, and the other being the form which a material object has
inherent within itself. Until you recognize this distinction, understand it,
and either proceed from this, or refute it and offer something better, then you
will just be attacking the straw man.
“You claim that if the Aristotelian formation is rejected
that we cannot make sense of objects in reality, but this presupposes that we actually
form our concepts through the narrow prism of identity, but we don't, this is
the naive idealistic assumption, it is akin to the idealist drinking his own
Kool-Aid. Hegel proved that every occurrence of identity is making use of other
principles, namely, unity and difference.” — Jersey Flight
This is not the case at all. We do not produce concepts through
"identity" as defined by the law of identity. We produce concepts in
the mind, through abstractions, essences, logic, and other mental processes.
The law of identity just serves to remind us that what we say about things, in
conceptualization, may not be the truth about the thing. And if we think that
the identity we like to give to the thing is the thing's true identity, then we
are making such a mistake. So "identity" is not a principle by which
we would construct concepts, rather we would deconstruct, by acknowledging that
the so-called reality which we describe in words and meaning, concepts, is just
an illusion, grounded in a false identity which recognizes the similarity
between things rather than the differences between things.
“The point of dialectics is that you cannot arrive at an
accurate essence (understanding of reality) through identity, but must make use
of unity and difference, these not only negate the narrow Aristotelian
formation of identity, but go beyond it. Just because one produces a formalism,
through the method which you are here defending, doesn't make it accurate or
comprehensive. One could in fact understand reality in such a way that they
extract error from it, thus leading to an erroneous formalism. That is to say,
a comprehension of reality can only follow from a dialectical process.” — Jersey Flight
As I just explained, the law of identity is not a principle by which we arrive
at essences. It was formulated as a tool against the mistaken arguments of the
sophists. It is a principle by which we demonstrate mistaken
conceptualizations, not a principle to be used for the production of concepts.
So your reference to unity and difference are not relevant in this context.
“Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the
principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires
three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely
within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and
Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of
identity. There is no identity without them, where there is identity, there you
already have the negation of Unity and Difference.” — Jersey Flight
This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are
required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this
forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in
a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself.
One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what
A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer
"diversity", "unity", and "difference" from
"a thing is the same as itself".
“Here your idealism shines through with vibrant colors. It
is not a matter of "rejecting," I think this might be the problem in
your characterization, it is a matter of incompletion, a lack of totality,
Hegel demonstrates that the principle, as Aristotle forms it, is neither
conscious nor consistent with itself.” — Jersey Flight
I don't see how a principle could be conscious, and I'm still waiting for you
to produce the demonstration you've told me Hegel made. So far you've only
shown me how Hegel misunderstood the law of identity, and attacked a straw man.
“Isn't it actually the case that no material thing is a
particular?”
— Jersey Flight
I don't know what you could possibly mean here. We know material things as
particulars, individuals. That chair is a particular, so is the table, and my
computer. How could there possibly be a material thing which is something other
than a particular thing? Care to explain?
"Hegel argues that these three concepts [particular,
individual, universal], though they seem quite distinct, are intimately bound
up with each other. The understanding, however, does not see this and holds the
three strictly separated. The understanding sees universals as externally
related to particulars. In its extreme form, this may issue in an ontological
separation between them, as in Plato’s philosophy, where universals or ‘forms’
are held to exist in a different reality altogether separate from their
particular exemplars. Hegel rejects any such approach, and shows how in a real
sense it is quite impossible to think the universal, particular, and individual
apart from each other. For instance, if the universal is thought to be
absolutely separate from individuals, and unique in its own right, then isn’t
the universal an individual? Further, if an individual is understood as
absolutely separate from universals, doesn’t it become an empty abstraction
(i.e., a kind of universal) without specific quality? Hegel argues that the
concepts of universal, particular and individual mutually determine one
another."
The Hegel Dictionary, Glenn Alexander Magee, Continuum International Publishing
Group p.255
Sure, the concept of particular is related to the concepts of individual, and
also universal. But still, we understand material things as particulars, or
individuals, and we understand universals as concepts. So this passage does
nothing to refute the distinction between particular and universal. Just
because we have a concept of what a particular is, and a concept of what a
universal is, and these concepts are related as concepts are, doesn't mean that
there is not a difference between what is understood by "particular",
and what is understood by "universal". One is understood to be a
material thing, while the other is understood to be a concept.
“It seems to me this is the crux of everything you are
saying. How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the
thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine"
it from the thing?”
— Jersey Flight
Do you understand the duality of "form" which I described above?
Here's an example. When I see a chair in front of me, there is an image in my
mind, we can call this the form of the chair. But the form of the chair, which
exists within my mind, is not the same as the form which the material object I
am seeing has. The material object I am seeing has molecules, atoms, etc.,
which are not evident in the image in my mind. So the form of the chair, which
exists within my mind, is not the same as the form of the material object which
I am calling a chair. These are two distinct "forms" of the very same
thing. One is the abstraction, from which we might produce, concepts, and
essences, the other is the form which is proper to the chair, constituting its
identity.
So the essence of a thing is present to a human mind, as the concept of that
thing, or type of thing, and is therefore not concealed. What is concealed, is
the thing's true form, or identity, due to the deficiencies of our capacities
of sense. Nevertheless, through sensation we do determine "a form" of
the thing, and we may proceed to produce an essence, we just do not apprehend
"the form", in the sense of the thing's true identity.
“This seems exceedingly problematic to me, but there is
more... what the mind apprehends is precisely the immediacy of an object,
unless one goes beyond this mere apprehension (which takes one beyond bare
identity) one cannot inform essence with totality from the narrow category of
identity. Here you are trying to smuggle in content that cannot be furnished by
bare identity alone. The fact that you are doing this, and that you must do
this, only stands to demonstrate the accuracy of Hegel's critique of Aristotle.” — Jersey
Flight
As I said, we do not use identity to produce concepts and essences, we use the
appearance of the thing to us, how the thing appears to us, its image etc., to
produce such conceptualizations, and this is not "identity". So you
are really attacking a straw man here. In no way am I arguing that identity
provides the content for conceptualization. I am arguing the exact opposite, an
unabridged gap between identity and conceptualization, such that
"identity" in the sense defined by the law of identity, does not even
enter into conceptualization..
“This seems to contradict your previous premise, when you
said "the essence of a thing is not concealed," and while I note the
use of a new term to overcome the limitations of your identity position
("accidentals"),” — Jersey Flight
It only seems like contradiction because you are not recognizing the duality of
"form" which I've been talking about, and trying to get you to
apprehend.
“It seems you are trying to walk two roads at once...” — Jersey Flight
There are two roads, two distinct types of "form". When you come to
apprehend what I am saying, what Aristotle was saying, then make your point.
But don't just keep hitting the straw man.
“What you are actually doing, which is to say, what you must
do, in order to furnish being with adequate content, forces you to go beyond
the so-called law of identity.” — Jersey Flight
Of course, being is conceptual, while identity is within the thing itself. So
identity doesn't even enter into the content of being, or any such
conceptualization. The thing itself cannot get into the content of our minds.
But your straw man is to claim that I pretend to use identity as some sort of
content or foundation for conceptualization. That's not the case, and that's
why it's a straw man.
----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------
There is too much sophistry in your
reply. You did not answer my question: 'How can you say the essence of a
thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to
"apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?'
----------ARISTOTELIAN APOLOGIST REPLY----------
“There is too much
sophistry in your reply. You did not answer my question: 'How can you say the
essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to
"apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?'” — Jersey Flight
I didn't say "from the thing". That is just your materialist
interpretation, like saying that the image of the chair in my mind when I see a
chair "comes from the chair". It does not. It is created by, and
therefore caused by, my mind. You interpret from a perspective completely
different from mine, then instead of trying to understand what I am saying, you
create a straw man from your faulty interpretation, to knock down. You are not
in this discussion to understand, but to discredit names like "idealism".
So you represent me with your straw man named "idealist" and knock it
down, pretending that you are knocking me down.
You just cannot get out of your determinist/materialist way of seeing things,
to be able to understand what I am saying. Do you recognize two distinct types
of forms, the form which the object called "chair" has, within
itself, and the form of it which exists in my mind when I see it?
If the form in my mind came from the chair, it could not be mistaken. It would
be taken necessarily from the chair, and therefore could not be anything but a
correct representation of the chair. However, this is not the case, mistakes
abound, because the form in the mind is created by my mind, not taken from the
chair. And that is why the form in my mind must be understood as distinct from
the form in the material object
Do you understand the nature of representation? One thing, like a symbol for
example, represents something else. The symbol is not taken from the other
thing, nor is it necessarily a facsimile or even a likeness of the thing which
is represented.
----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------
So as to remove my own errors from this exchange and promote
a healthy environment of discourse: When I said, "there is too much
sophistry in your reply." Even if this is true it is not the way to
approach the topic. I should not have said this. I will do my best from this
point on to respond accordingly.
"You interpret from a perspective completely different from mine, then
instead of trying to understand what I am saying, you create a straw man from
your faulty interpretation, to knock down." – Aristotelian Apologist
I am trying to think in terms of your own premises, I am just trying to do it
critically as opposed to affirmatively. I am not trying to invent premises to
attack.
You said, "The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it
abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction,
what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of
the thing." – Aristotelian Apologist
I asked you, 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in
the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and
"determine" it from the thing?'
You then said, "I didn't say "from the thing"."
This is correct, you said, "of the thing."
The question still remains, from what then are you apprehending and determining
properties? If the mind constructs the form of a Snark would this mean a Snark
has existence? Further, where does the mind even get the properties to
construct the idea of a Snark?
"...the image of the chair in my mind when I see a chair "comes
from the chair". It does not. It is created by, and therefore caused by,
my mind." – Aristotelian Apologist
Do you then say that the chair has no existence beyond your mind?
(And I should like to make it clear; this is exactly the position of idealism,
of which you are indeed proving yourself to be most consistent. Idealism states
that there is no reality beyond the mind, which is to say, even though it tries
to posture away from this and violates it repeatedly in the course of action,
it is the actual conclusion and solipsism of the position).
Now this seems like a direct contradiction of what is stated above, an example
of the posturing I alluded to:
"Do you recognize two distinct types of forms, the form which the
object called "chair" has, within itself, and the form of it which
exists in my mind when I see it?" – Aristotelian Apologist
I recognize that objects exist outside my mind. Chairs exist regardless of
whether or not I call them chairs. A chair has a form that exists independent
of my mind. My mind interacts with my environment in order to comprehend it.
Without a concrete, objective world, my mind would not be able to form
concepts. If I were to say, "Stones have no existence outside my
mind," and Socrates decides to pelt me in the head with one, this would be
an immediate refutation of my idealism.
"If the form in my mind came from the chair, it could not be
mistaken." – Aristotelian Apologist
I do not understand how you arrived at this conclusion?
"It would be taken necessarily from the chair, and therefore could not
be anything but a correct representation of the chair." – Aristotelian
Apologist
Why do you here assume that your act of "taking" would be (and must
be) one of perfection?
(It is clear to me that this demonstrates the superiority of Hegel's approach
over that of Aristotle, because Hegel did not see this process as an automatic
transference of perfection, but that it is mediated by thought, hence, the
logic by which thought mediates must be more comprehensive than the narrow
categories provided by Aristotle. Further, Hegel saw that an unmediated
understanding leads to a distortion of reality).
"However, this is not the case, mistakes abound, because the form in
the mind is created by my mind, not taken from the chair. And that is why the
form in my mind must be understood as distinct from the form in the material
object." – Aristotelian Apologist
I see a serious dilemma here. If the form of the mind is created by the mind
then what is the chair? How can the mind create the form of a chair without the
concrete existence of a chair to "apprehend" and "determine"
its content? How do you know that it (the chair) doesn't play a role in this
process?
Your argument seems to be that the existence of "mistakes" is proof
that your idealism is true? This seems very much like a non-sequitur. How can
you even determine when something is a "mistake" if there is no
difference between your mind's idea of a chair and an actual chair?
It seems to me that by speaking this way you are going beyond your idealist
position: "I have, for days now been trying to get Jersey to recognize
the distinction between the form in the mind, and the form of the material
object."
I do not see how there can be "material objects" from the basis of
your position? If you are referring to "forms" your mind produces,
then you are neither referring to "material" or "objects"
but mental abstractions. You then have no right to use the term, ‘material
objects.’
It seems very much like you are just asserting these sweeping metaphysical
premises into being without a way to substantiate them, like you are
constructing your own imaginary world out of abstract premises. If everything
is reduced to your mind and objects have no independent being, then wouldn't
that leave you trapped in your own mind? If you can't make a distinction
between what your "mind creates" and what actually exists, then it
seems to me you cannot escape the conclusion that this entire discourse is just
a "creation" of your mind.
BACK TO THE ACTUAL TOPIC: THE LAW OF IDENTITY:
I said, 'Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle
of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three
different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the
symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which
are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is
no identity without them, where there is identity, there you already have the
negation of Unity and Difference.'
You replied,
"This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and
identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is
to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to
formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the
same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind
that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you
infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from
"a thing is the same as itself"."
The symbolic form is, as a matter of fact, made up of three different symbols.
The A to the left is not the same as the A to the right and the = is required
to form the concept of the "tautology." Hegel's point is not that the
law of identity specifically states these attributes (unity and difference) but
that the law not only presupposes them, but makes use of them within the
movement of its own being. What Hegel is pointing out in the law of identity is
"the lack of awareness of the negative movement..." When you say this
"doesn't make sense to you," that is correct, because you're not
considering the law of identity as it is in the actual movement of its being,
hence you are oblivious to its negation. Dialectic comprehends contradiction as
it emerges from the object, it does not try to bring it from the outside, and
neither does it see it as coming from the outside. This is how Hegel was able
to comprehend the contradictory nature of the law of identity.
What's most interesting is that you have actually validated Hegel's position
throughout this exchange because you have admitted that the law is too narrow
to deduce content. Hegel says, "This proposition in its positive
expression A = A is, in the first instance, nothing more than the expression of
an empty tautology. It has therefore been rightly remarked that this law
of thought has no content and leads no further."
----------ARISTOTELIAN
APOLOGIST REPLY-----------
“I am trying to think
in terms of your own premises, I am just trying to do it critically as opposed
to affirmatively. I am not trying to invent premises to attack.” — Jersey Flight
OK, so I'll repeat the principal premise. Aristotle distinguishes two types of
"form", one being the abstracted essence of a thing, an idea,
formula, or definition, and the other being the form which a material object
has inherent within itself. Whenever you go astray of this premise, I will
point it out to you.
“The question still
remains, from what then are you apprehending and determining properties? If the
mind constructs the form of a Snark would this mean a Snark has existence?
Further, where does the mind even get the properties to construct the idea of a
Snark?” — Jersey Flight
I don't see how "existence" is relevant, we haven't defined that term
in this discussion, so it appears like you want a digression. I'm sure you are
aware that the mind creates things, some imaginary, perhaps like a
"Snark". Some might pass from being imaginary, to be material, like
when an architect plans and then has a building constructed. I really don't
know where a mind gets its creative ideas, but I don't see how the fact that I
don't know how a mind can be creative could be used as evidence that a mind is
not creative. Obviously minds are creative, whether or not we know how the
creative activity works.
“Do you then say that
the chair has no existence beyond your mind?” — Jersey Flight
No, this would be contrary to the principal premise stated
above.
“(And I should like
to make it clear, this is exactly the position of idealism, of which you are
indeed proving yourself to be most consistent. Idealism states that there is no
reality beyond the mind, which is to say, even though it tries to posture away
from this and violates it repeatedly in the course of action, it is the actual
conclusion and solipsism of the position).” — Jersey Flight
Again, contrary to the principal premise stated above, and so nothing but a
straw man.
“Now this seems like
a direct contradiction of what is stated above, an example of the posturing I
alluded to:” — Jersey Flight
Correction, it's a direct contradiction of your straw man interpretation.
“I recognize that
objects exist outside my mind.” — Jersey Flight
So do I recognize that objects exist outside my mind,, as is stated in my
principal premise, and also is supported by the law of identity, "a thing
is the same as itself".
“I do not understand
how you arrived at this conclusion?” — Jersey Flight
Let me explain. If the form of the chair comes from the chair and goes into my
mind, then what exists in my mind is the same form as what came from the chair.
Since the form is the same form, then there can be no mistake. If the form in
my mind is different than the form in the chair, then it cannot be true that the
form in my mind came from the chair because it is a different form. If there is
a form which comes from the chair, and it is mediated, or altered in any way,
then this different form comes to be in my mind, and it is not the same form as
what came from the chair, so we cannot say that the form in the mind came from
the chair, because the mediated form is a different form. This is the nature of
"form". Any change in form, constitutes a distinct and different
form.
“Why do you here
assume that your act of "taking" would be (and must be) one of
perfection?” — Jersey Flight
For the reason stated above. Any difference of form constitutes a different
form. If the form of that chair in my mind is not exactly as the form within
the material object (chair in this case), I cannot say that the form comes from
the object. It is a different form, therefore this particular form must
originate from a different source.
“(It is clear to me that this
demonstrates the superiority of Hegel's approach over that of Aristotle, because
Hegel did not see this process as an automatic transference of perfection, but
that it is mediated by thought, hence, the logic by which thought mediates must
be more” — Jersey Flight
Actually Hegel's position is consistent with Aristotle on this point. It is
your idiosyncratic perspective (straw man) which creates the difference. If
there was a transferal of form from the object to the mind, as you suggest,
then perfection would be necessary. Since there is not perfection Hegel sees
this perspective or proposition, i.e. unmediated understanding, as a distortion
of reality. That there is mediation of thought, indicates that the form in the
mind is different from the form in the object, and therefore not the same form.
Therefore what I've argued above, that the form does not come from the object,
is consistent with Hegel. Neither Hegel's nor Aristotle's approach is superior
on this matter, because they both say the same thing in different ways.
“I see a serious dilemma
here. If the form of the mind is created by the mind then what is the chair?
How can the mind create the form of a chair without the concrete existence of a
chair to "apprehend" and "determine" its content?” — Jersey Flight
I guess you do not recognize that minds create things. Would you think that
it's a serious dilemma that an architect can design a building without ever
seeing the building? This is one area where Aristotle is far superior to Hegel,
his exposition of final cause, which is derived from Plato's dialectics
concerning "the good".
“How do you know that it (the
chair) doesn't play a role in this process?” — Jersey Flight
I didn't say that the chair doesn't play a role, I said that the form in the
mind doesn't come from the chair, it is created by the mind. This is consistent
with Hegel's "mediated" by thought. And, when you recognize that a
difference in form implies that the two different forms are not the same form,
you will conclude that the form in the mind did not come from the chair, but
was created by the mind.
“Your argument seems to be
that the existence of "mistakes" is proof that your idealism is true?
This seems very much like a non-sequitur. How can you even determine when
something is a "mistake" if there is no difference between your mind's
idea of a chair and an actual chair?” — Jersey Flight
Another failure to respect the principal premise for the sake of a straw man.
“I do not see how there can
be "material objects" from the basis of your position? If you are
referring to "forms" your mind produces, then you are neither
referring to "material" or "objects" but mental
abstractions. You then have no right to use the term, material objects.” — Jersey Flight
I have no idea what you're trying to say here but it appears like another
failure to respect the principal premise. That premise states that a material
object has a form, and the form which the material object has is distinct from
the forms which are in my mind. Material objects are taken for granted by the
premise, so if you perceive my perspective as denying the possibility of
material objects, you need to demonstrate this, not just appeal to your straw
man named "idealism", and knock it down as if you were hitting me.
“It seems very much like you
are just asserting these sweeping metaphysical premises into being without a
way to substantiate them, like you are constructing your own imaginary world
out of abstract premises. If everything is reduced to your mind and objects
have no independent being, then wouldn't that leave you trapped in your own
mind? If you can't make a distinction between what your "mind
creates" and what actually exists, then it seems to me you cannot escape
the conclusion that this entire discourse is just a "creation" of
your mind.”
— Jersey Flight
Failure to respect the principal premise.
“When you say this
"doesn't make sense to you," that is correct, because you're not
considering the law of identity as it is in the actual movement of its being,
hence you are oblivious to its negation.” — Jersey Flight
I think I've addressed this for you already, in the other thread. A material
"thing" is changing as each moment of time passes. Nevertheless, we
say that it remains the same thing. This changing activity is what you call
"the actual movement of its being". The material thing has a new form
at each passing moment, yet it maintains its identity as the same thing. What
is negated is certain attributes, not the identity of the material being.
Negation, as a dialectic of attributes, what a thing has and has not, does not
suffice to refute the law of identity.
“Hegel's point is not that
the law of identity specifically states these attributes (unity and difference)
but that the law not only presupposes them, but makes use of them within the
movement of its own being.” — Jersey Flight
So this is Hegel's faulty representation of the law of identity; the one which
can be struck down with negation, but it's just a straw man. Identity does not
presuppose any attributes. The only presuppositions are "a thing",
and "same", neither of which is an attribute.. If Hegel introduces
"the movement of its own being" here, then he is talking about
attributes which are negated, not the thing nor its identity.
“What's most interesting is
that you have actually validated Hegel's position throughout this exchange
because you have admitted that the law is too narrow to deduce content.” — Jersey Flight
That's right, the law of identity is not at all intended to produce conceptual
content. It is applied as an aid to judging truth and falsity of conceptual
content. So it would be better described as a principle of skepticism. The
problem though is when people like you, and perhaps Hegel, represent it as if
it is supposed to produce conceptual content, then denounce it as inadequate
for that endeavour. All this demonstrates is a misunderstanding of it, on your
part.
----------JERSEY
FLIGHT REPLY----------
Discoursing on the Law of Identity:
Quoting you: "Any difference of form constitutes a different
form."
"The material thing has a new form at each passing moment, yet it
maintains its identity as the same thing." – Aristotelian Apologist
If its form has changed, then according to your logic, how can you say "it
maintains its identity as the same?" For you have said that any difference
constitutes a new form. "New" is not the same as "same."
"I recognize that objects exist outside my mind..." This
premise serves as the absolute negation of your idealism, insofar as it must
give way to the authority of the material form. This is why consistent
idealists must deny the existence of the material world, the admission of the
premise ends up nullifying the authority of their abstraction. After this
admission abstraction is sublated to the concretion of the object. As soon as
one posits a world beyond the mind, one has deferred to an authority beyond the
mind.
Is identity different from itself? Identity is saying that it is not different
from itself, this is the negative side of the determination of identity. The
positive side says that everything is identical to itself. One cannot posit
identity without equally positing difference (because one cannot make a
determination without negation) there is no such thing as identity without
difference, and this is because identity is saying that it is not difference, unless
you claim that identity is different from itself? Here it will not work merely
to reassert the positive side of identity, because you are already, in the same
instance as you posit identity, saying that it is not different from itself,
you just don't realize it.
This is why Hegel says, "a determinateness of being is essentially a
transition into its opposite..." What you are trying to do is retain a
determination, while rejecting the inescapable transition which casts identity
into its negation. You have exactly manifested and proven Hegel's point.
"Identity does not presuppose any attributes. The only presuppositions
are "a thing", and "same", neither of which is an
attribute." – Aristotelian Apologist
A thing is itself, this is the positive side. A thing is not different from
itself, this is the negative side. You do not have identity with only one side
of the determination. Both sides taken together, equal unity; identity contains
itself as well as unity and difference. The mere positive formation is simply
ignorant of itself.
"If Hegel introduces "the movement of its own
being" here, then he is talking about attributes which are negated, not
the thing nor its identity." – Aristotelian Apologist
Hegel does not show that identity has contradiction outside itself, but that
this contradiction is contained within the nature of identity itself. All of
the determinations brought forth by Hegel are instances of the same identity.
This thinking is exceedingly difficult for Aristotelians to grasp, precisely
because their comprehension has been deluded by idealistic premises which
artificially divide and distort the objects of being. Instead of allowing the
object to dictate and unfold its properties and attributes, the Aristotelian
logic dictates axiomatically how the object should be viewed and divided. This
leads to a narrow distortion of reality:
"…identificational thinking itself is a tremendous
abstraction. We have recently begun to become painfully aware of the artificial
world man has constructed and imposed on the natural immediacy of the planet
earth by force of identificational thinking in its abstractness and its
nihilism— for everything built by reflection is built on negation." "Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, A Propaedeutic,” pg.251, Thomas Hoffmann, translated
by David Healan, Brill 2015
"Any difference of form constitutes a different form. If the form of
that chair in my mind is not exactly as the form within the material object
(chair in this case), I cannot say that the form comes from the object."
– Aristotelian Apologist
It seems to me, and I could be wrong, that there is a kind of strawman posited
here. You say, "if the form of the chair is not exact..." this seems
problematic, why the criteria of exactitude? The answer you give is because of
the first part of the syllogism. "Any difference, new form." What I
don't understand is why the movement and transition of an object should
preclude its influence on our comprehension of it? It is merely your
authoritarian and idealistic assumption that perceptual information taken from
the chair must equal exactitude. I do not believe you can sustain this, but I
am open to your defense.
Isn't the actual conclusion simply that you could not say your ideas of the
chair were exact, and not that the information you assess from the physical
object, has no bearing on your formation of it?
I confess that the question of subject and object is one of the most difficult
areas in all of philosophy. I do not believe you have conquered it with this
simple, idealistic syllogism. The latest discoveries in neuroscience are
actually informing us that our perception is the result of our social
interaction, it is both mind and the world, what amounts to a most astounding
discovery, "action comes before perception." But this is not a
dualism, to posit such would be to reduce the plurality of mind and world to
idealistic categories.
----------ARISTOTELIAN
APOLOGIST REPLY----------
“If its form has
changed, then according to your logic, how can you say "it maintains its
identity as the same?" For you have said that any difference constitutes a
new form. "New" is not the same as "same.” — Jersey Flight
In Aristotelian physics, temporal continuity is provided for by matter. Matter
is the underlying thing which persists through change, as the form of the thing
changes. Because the identity of the thing persists, despite changes to its
form, we must associate identity with matter, not with form.
“This premise serves
as the absolute negation of your idealism, insofar as it must give way to the
authority of the material form. This is why consistent idealists must deny the
existence of the material world, the admission of the premise ends up
nullifying the authority of their abstraction. After this admission abstraction
is sublated to the concretion of the object. As soon as one posits a world
beyond the mind, one has deferred to an authority beyond the mind.” — Jersey Flight
When did I say I was idealist? That is your straw man. And since I accept the
existence of the material world, which is contrary to your notion of idealism,
you now ought to see that it is a straw man. Or, perhaps I really am idealist,
and your notion of idealism is a straw man. Choose your poison.
“Is identity
different from itself? Identity is saying that it is not different from itself,
this is the negative side of the determination of identity.” — Jersey Flight
We went through this already, perhaps in the other thread.
"Same" and "different" are not proper opposites when
"same" is used as it is in the law of identity. Difference is
included within same, because the same thing has a changing form, and therefore
is different from one moment to the next, despite maintaining its identity as
the same thing. This is represented as the difference between subject and
predicate which I described earlier. The subject may persist as the same
subject, despite having predications negated at different times. So the subject
remains the same, as in same subject, despite difference being a part of it,
due to changing predications, when the subject represents an object.
Therefore "different" is not applicable when referring to the subject
itself, because difference is a feature of what is predicated. To represent the
law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself"
is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and
that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity
associates "same" with matter.
“This is why Hegel
says, "a determinateness of being is essentially a transition into its
opposite..." What you are trying to do is retain a determination, while
rejecting the inescapable transition which casts identity into its negation.
You have exactly manifested and proven Hegel's point.” — Jersey Flight
Negation and transition are formal, identity is material. Do you recognize this
distinction between form and matter in Aristotle?
“Hegel does not show
that identity has contradiction outside itself, but that this contradiction is
contained within the nature of identity itself. All of the determinations
brought forth by Hegel are instances of the same identity. This thinking is
exceedingly difficult for Aristotelians to grasp, precisely because their
comprehension has been deluded by idealistic premises which artificially divide
and distort the objects of being. Instead of allowing the object to dictate and
unfold its properties and attributes, the Aristotelian logic dictates
axiomatically how the object should be viewed and divided.” — Jersey Flight
This very clearly demonstrates a misunderstanding of the law
of identity. Identity is given to the object itself, and the object is
represented in logic as the subject. All contraries are related to what is
predicated of the subject, so it makes no sense to say that contradiction is
within identity itself. Contradiction is in what is said about the object, but
identity is within the object.
If the law of identity were itself contradictory, then you might demonstrate
this. But it's not. So it makes no sense to say that contradiction is within
identity, because the law of identity puts identity into the object itself, and
contradiction is always within what is said about the object.
“It seems to me, and
I could be wrong, that there is a kind of strawman posited here. You say,
"if the form of the chair is not exact..." this seems problematic,
why the criteria of exactitude?” — Jersey Flight
The need for "exactitude" is quite clear. Any
difference is a difference, hence two distinct forms. Two similar forms are
different forms, not one form.
“What I don't
understand is why the movement and transition of an object should preclude its
influence on our comprehension of it? It is merely your authoritarian and
idealistic assumption that perceptual information taken from the chair must
equal exactitude. I do not believe you can sustain this, but I am open to your
defense.” — Jersey Flight
I did not preclude influence, that is your straw man. What I
insist, is that perceptual information received from, or taken from, the chair,
does not mean that the form of the chair in my mind, as an image, is even
similar to, let alone the same form, as what inheres within the material chair.
That is the argument. There is a form in the material chair itself, directly
related to the chair's identity, and there is a form "of" the chair
in my mind, as an image. These two forms, though they might both be called
"the form of the chair", are completely distinct. And only the form
which inheres within the material chair is directly related to the identity of
that object, because the form in my mind "of the chair", is what you
called mediated.
“Isn't the actual
conclusion simply that you could not say your ideas of the chair were exact,
and not that the information you assess from the physical object, has no
bearing on your formation of it?” — Jersey Flight
The point is that these are two distinct forms, the form which inheres within
the material chair, and the form of the chair which is in my mind.. We could
only call them the same form, and thereby claim that the form in my mind is
directly related to the identity of the chair, if there was such exactitude.
There is not such exactitude, therefore the identity of the chair remains
within the chair, and not in my mind.
“I confess that the
question of subject and object is one of the most difficult areas in all of
philosophy. I do not believe you have conquered it with this simple, idealistic
syllogism. The latest discoveries in neuroscience are actually informing us
that our perception is the result of our social interaction, it is both mind
and the world, what amounts to a most astounding discovery, "action comes
before perception." But this is not a dualism, to posit such would be to
reduce the plurality of mind and world to idealistic categories.” — Jersey Flight
There is though, a duality of form. How else can you account for the form of
the chair in your mind, as an image, and the fact that the material chair has a
form itself, which makes it the particular thing that it is? For the reasons
explained, we cannot say that these two forms are the same form. Therefore we
ought to conclude that each perceived object has a duality of form, the form
which is proper to the identity of the object, and the form that is proper to
the mind which perceives it which we often call the "form of the
object" .
----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------
Best to begin at the beginning: As a matter of fact, if you
had no eyes, no ears, no hands to feel, only your mind to think, you could not
arrive at an understanding or form of a chair. But chairs are real things, they
exist independent of the human mind, this premise is the swift destruction of
your position. This is true because all that you say about the chair and its
form hinges on the actual existence of a chair coupled with your sensory
ability to detect it. If you remove this premise, if you subtract the
concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would
not arrive at an understanding of a chair. Matter is the substance of mind,
remove this and there is nothing left.
"To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not
different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to
oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal
definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with
matter." – Aristotelian Apologist
The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity
different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that
identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its
actual being. When I thought of this objection by Hegel, it crossed my mind that
perhaps he was just engaging in sophistry, trying to artificially attach
difference to identity. But the thing is; identity is actually saying this!
Hegel is not making it up. To prove it, look what happens if you deny it,
surely you will not say that identity is different from itself? This would
destroy identity.
Hegel is correct, identity contains unity and difference. Back to the symbolic
form: A = A is an instance of three different symbols. Taken
together (unity) they are said to form the law of identity. Everything
you need to prove that Hegel's dialectical clarification is correct is
contained right in the symbolic form. When I brought this up before your reply
was as follows:
"This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and
identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is
to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to
formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the
same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind
that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you
infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from
"a thing is the same as itself"." – Aristotelian Apologist
The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order
to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's
opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of
identity. Why this structure, why not another?
One can deduce the same properties from the informal articulation: a thing is
the same as itself. Here you have multiple different words combined together to
construct the law, and here's the vital point, you cannot construct this law
without making use of these different terms combined in unity.
When you try to bring in the predicate to rescue this law all you are doing is
going beyond what is actually contained in the identity premise. You must admit
that the predicate introduces negation. Well friend, this is not contained in
Aristotle's formulation of the law. Once again, your predicate attempt would
imply A = -A.
At every turn you are going beyond the premise of this law in order to rescue
it from itself, the only difference is that you are claiming that all your
actions are still contained within the premise of the law.
""Same" and "different" are not proper opposites
when "same" is used as it is in the law of identity." –
Aristotelian Apologist
The point is not that they are opposites. Same is saying that it is not
different from itself, it is also never an isolated word but requires the unity
of difference to distinguish itself.
"Difference is included within same, because the same thing has a
changing form, and therefore is different from one moment to the next, despite
maintaining its identity as the same thing." – Aristotelian Apologist
It does not actually maintain its identity, this is an ideal we project. But
that is a different point. We are here discussing the law of identity.
Difference is posited in the same instance as you posit "same." It is
already contained within the concept, within the very being of sameness. This
is Hegel's point. In dialectics contradiction always emerges from
being.
"This is represented as the difference between subject and predicate
which I described earlier. The subject may persist as the same subject, despite
having predications negated at different times. So the subject remains the
same, as in same subject, despite difference being a part of it, due to changing
predications, when the subject represents an object." – Aristotelian
Apologist
This is just an idealistic formulation of reality. In reality the subject is
changing, but more importantly, the subject itself is not separated from
difference or unity. If it was, it could not distinguish itself, could not
determine itself.
"Therefore "different" is not applicable when referring to
the subject itself, because difference is a feature of what is
predicated." – Aristotelian Apologist
This is false, as proven above through the symbolic form, it is already part of
the subject's being.
"To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not
different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to
oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal
definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with
matter." – Aristotelian Apologist
It is not to oppose "different" with "same," as from the
outside, it is merely to draw out what the premise already contains.
It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is
what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in
order to derive the value you need from it.
----------ARISTOTELIAN
APOLOGIST REPLY-----------
It seems like most your points are either repeating a
question I've already addressed, or trending toward absurdity. There is however
one point where we might have some agreement, so I'll start with that and see
if we can find a way to advance.
“It does not actually
maintain its identity, this is an ideal we project. But that is a different
point. We are here discussing the law of identity.” — Jersey Flight
Yes, it is an ideal we project, but that's exactly what the law of identity is,
an ideal. It is very similar, and closely related to the concept of matter, an
ideal. We notice that despite the fact that the world is continually changing,
there is consistency. The changes are not random, there is continuity of
existence from one moment to the next, so Aristotle posited "matter"
to account for this continuity. If the forms of things in the world are
changing from one moment to the next, there must be something which dictates
the possibility of change, this potential is attributed to matter. Why do some
aspects of the world appear to persist while others do not? Whatever it is
which answers the reason for this, it must be something substantial, and in
modern terms it is expressed as mass or inertia. This concept is employed to
answer the question of why do some forms change from one moment to the next,
while others persist in time. You can see how "matter" is an ideal.
Likewise, you can see how the law of identity is an ideal. Suppose one were to
describe the world (its form) at each moment in time. Each moment it would be a
different form. However, we can name a particular aspect, and say that this
aspect is not changing. So we might say that this aspect has identity, as a
temporally extended thing. But this is just a projected ideal, because parts of
this thing (accidentals) are changing, and we must overlook these changing
parts in order to say that this thing is not changing. The point is, that we
observe consistency, and see very clearly that some aspects of the world are
not changing as time passes, but when we try to formalize this, state the form
that is not changing, we cannot accurately represent this because there is
always aspects of that thing, which the formalized statement refers to, which
are changing. So these are said to be accidentals, but we still haven't
accurately isolated the thing which is not changing, because we just disregard
the accidentals. So Aristotle posited matter, and matter as an ideal, is
supposed to account for those temporally extended, unchanging aspects of the
world, which we give identity to as existing things.
Having said that, let me proceed to the rest of your points.
“Best to begin at the
beginning: As a matter of fact, if you had no eyes, no ears, no hands to feel,
only your mind to think, you could not arrive at an understanding or form of a
chair. But chairs are real things, they exist independent of the human mind,
this premise is the swift destruction of your position. This is true because
all that you say about the chair and its form hinges on the actual existence of
a chair coupled with your sensory ability to detect it. If you remove this
premise, if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave
only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair. Matter is
the substance of mind, remove this and there is nothing left.” — Jersey Flight
This claim is unsupported, and actually sort of absurd. You have no way of
saying what type of form a mind with no senses could come up with. So if such a
mind created a form, and called it a chair, then just because it's not the same
form of a chair that your mind would come up with, does not mean that it's not
the form of a chair. What validates your understanding of "a chair"
as better than this mind's understanding of "a chair". All you are
doing is denying Descartes' "brain in a vat", as incapable of
creating forms without sensing, but you have no principles to support such a
denial.
“The easy way to
refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from
itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not
saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being. When
I thought of this objection by Hegel, it crossed my mind that perhaps he was
just engaging in sophistry, trying to artificially attach difference to
identity. But the thing is, identity is actually saying this! Hegel is not
making it up. To prove it, look what happens if you deny it, surely you will
not say that identity is different from itself? This would destroy identity.”
— Jersey Flight
This is an absurdity as well. We are not talking about whether identity is the
same as itself, we are talking about whether a thing is the same as itself. So
you just go off on an unintelligible tangent here, assuming that identity is a
thing. But identity is not a thing, it is something that we say a thing has, a
thing has identity. And, the law of identity states that the thing is the same
as itself. We are not saying that the thing's identity is the same as the
thing's identity, that would be redundant. We are saying that the thing's
identity is such that the thing is the same as itself. The law of identity is
something (a law) which is applied to things by human beings. To ask whether
identity is the same as itself is to reify identity, making identity the thing
rather than something the thing has.
“The answer is that
you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the
law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is
an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this
structure, why not another?” — Jersey Flight
There is another structure. It's the proposition "A thing is the same as
itself". There's more than three different symbols here. The fact that
Hegel can represent this as A=A does not mean that A=A is the only way that the
law of identity can be represented. I'm sure that other people can think of
other ways to represent it. Suppose I say Z represents "a thing is the
same as itself. Then I've represented the law of identity with one symbol, no
different symbols with unity. Hegel's decision to represent the law of identity
with three symbols is simply arbitrary. So this argument of Hegel's is against
a straw man. And all that babble about difference and unity is just an
irrelevant distraction. What needs to be done is to address the meaning of the
law, not the symbolization of it. What the law talks about is identity, and it
defines identity as a thing being the same as itself. This talk about unity and
difference is irrelevant, having no real bearing on the issue.
“At every turn you
are going beyond the premise of this law in order to rescue it from itself, the
only difference is that you are claiming that all your actions are still
contained within the premise of the law.” — Jersey Flight
Actually, it's you and Hegel who went beyond the premise of the law, by
bringing in negation. I only pointed out that negation is relative to
predication, not to the subject itself. So I pointed out how Hegel has gone
beyond the premise, just like he does in talking about the three symbols,
difference and unity. He brings in all sorts of irrelevancies, to cloud the issue,
in a ploy of sophistry, instead of addressing the meaning of the proposition
itself.
“The point is not
that they are opposites. Same is saying that it is not different from itself,
it is also never an isolated word but requires the unity of difference to
distinguish itself.” — Jersey
Flight
Here you go, beyond the stated proposition. There is nothing within the law of
identity which indicates that "different" is opposite to
"same". And, as I already explained to you more than once, as
"same" is used in the law of identity, "different" is
necessarily included within same, and therefore cannot be opposite. A thing is
different from how it was, from one minute to the next, therefore it is
different from itself. Yet it maintains its identity as being the same as
itself. Therefore being different from itself is included within being the same
as itself, such that a thing is both different from itself, and the same as
itself. It is very clear that different is not opposed to same, as
"same" is used in the law of identity.
“This is just an
idealistic formulation of reality. In reality the subject is changing, but more
importantly, the subject itself is not separated from difference or unity. If
it was, it could not distinguish itself, could not determine itself.” — Jersey Flight
Yes, for sure, it is an idealistic formulation of reality, as explained at the
beginning of the post. The problem though, is that we have no other way to
account for the consistency and temporal continuity of existence, so we posit
ideals such as "matter", and "identity", to fill that void
in our understanding of reality.
“It is not to oppose
"different" with "same," as from the outside, it is merely
to draw out what the premise already contains.” — Jersey Flight
That's absurd. The premise says nothing about difference. I "draw
out" the premise in the way that it was meant to be drawn out, to show
that difference is included within the identity of the changing thing. You
"draw out" the premise by defining different as opposed to same, with
the intent of rejecting the premise. Obviously it is you who draws out the
premise in the wrong direction, because opposing same and different is
unnecessary. Clearly observation shows us how one thing can be both the same as
itself and different from itself, due to the nature of change and temporal
extension.
“It doesn't matter
what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually
contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive
the value you need from it.” — Jersey Flight
Right, and this law contains nothing about difference or unity. Therefore your
attempt to relate these concepts to that law, in a way which is inconsistent
with the law, is nothing but an attempt to reject the law through the use of semantics.
But we can define words in such a way so as to make any law or proposition
appear as if it ought to be rejected. However, what is at issue here is the law
itself, and the meaning of it. And we need to understand its meaning before
determining whether we ought or ought not reject it, and then we may proceed to
define words consistent with it, to uphold it, or inconsistent with it to
uphold the intent to reject it. Defining words with the intent of proving a
proposition wrong is a pointless exercise. Understanding the proposition so
that you can decide whether it ought or ought not be proven wrong is something
more meaningful.
----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------
Yes, it is an ideal we project, but that's exactly what
the law of identity is, an ideal." – Aristotelian Apologist
Even as an ideal the concept is not merely made up of a one-sided
determination. In order to make sense of a 'part' one must make use of the
concept 'whole.' What, after all, would the 'inner' be without the 'outer'?
This is Hegel's reasoning when it comes to identity.
I said: 'if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and
leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair.'
You said: "This claim is unsupported, and actually sort of absurd. You
have no way of saying what type of form a mind with no senses could come up
with." – Aristotelian Apologist
My claim is that your concept of a chair presupposes, not only the existence of
a chair independent of your mind, but also your senses. I would go even further
and claim that this is self-evident, if you went deaf and blind tomorrow your
ability to form concepts would immediately be restricted because it would be
much harder to take in information.
I said: 'The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is
identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to
say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial
of its actual being.'
You replied: "We are not talking about whether identity is the same as
itself, we are talking about whether a thing is the same as itself. So you just
go off on an unintelligible tangent here, assuming that identity is a thing.
But identity is not a thing, it is something that we say a thing has, a thing
has identity. And, the law of identity states that the thing is the same as
itself. We are not saying that the thing's identity is the same as the thing's
identity, that would be redundant. We are saying that the thing's identity is
such that the thing is the same as itself. The law of identity is something (a
law) which is applied to things by human beings. To ask whether identity is the
same as itself is to reify identity, making identity the thing rather than
something the thing has." – Aristotelian Apologist
In the first instance identity is a formal claim. It is a statement about an
object. The problem with this statement is that it is very specific and very
narrow; the problem is that it negates itself. You are claiming that a thing is
not different from itself, which is just the negative side of the identity
position. Hegel puts it this way: "It is thus the empty identity that
is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and
are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and
difference are different. They do not see that in this very assertion they are
themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity
is different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to
be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not
externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be
different."
He is correct, the identity position is, and must say this, in order to protect
itself from the difference it is saying it is not. When you say a thing is
itself you are at the same time saying that it is not different from itself,
this is Hegel's masterful point, the contradiction emerges from identity
itself.
I said: 'The answer is that you have three different symbols combined
together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion.
This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic
structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another?'
You replied: "There is another structure. It's the proposition "A
thing is the same as itself". There's more than three different symbols
here. The fact that Hegel can represent this as A=A does not mean that A=A is
the only way that the law of identity can be represented. I'm sure that other
people can think of other ways to represent it. Suppose I say Z represents
"a thing is the same as itself. Then I've represented the law of identity
with one symbol, no different symbols with unity." – Aristotelian
Apologist
This is where our exchange finally begins to narrow. Here you failed to
comprehend the literalness of Hegel's argument. You, as a matter of fact,
cannot bring the law of identity into being with the symbol of Z, this solitary
symbol articulates nothing. In order to bring the law of identity into
conceptual being you must make use of identity, difference and unity. In every
occurrence of identity you must make use of... must identify... different
symbols that are taken together in unity. This is a material fact
regarding the existence of the concept of identity. Try to articulate the law
of identity without making use of unity and difference; you will not be able to
do it. I hope you will not kick against this my friend but join me in celebrating
the genius of Hegel's discovery. What mind could go up against Aristotle in
this sense? No one! He held his ground for two thousand years. But Hegel, how
did he do it (!), comes along and breaks down Aristotle's thoughts into
their finer dialectical components, not fallaciously, but on Aristotle's own
terms. This is truly astounding and it marks a turning point in philosophical
history!
"What needs to be done is to address the meaning of the law, not the
symbolization of it." – Aristotelian Apologist
Of course, but its meaning is derived from its formation. The premise is not
supposed to violate itself. Hegel proves that its determination inevitably
casts it into negation.
"Actually, it's you and Hegel who went beyond the premise of the law,
by bringing in negation." – Aristotelian Apologist
Hegel is not bringing negation from the outside; he is demonstrating that it is
already contained in the law. This is proven by the fact that the Aristotelian
formation states that identity and difference are different, that is, a thing
is not different from itself.
" Clearly observation shows us how one thing can be both the same as
itself and different from itself, due to the nature of change and temporal
extension." – Aristotelian Apologist
As Hegel says: "...the truth is rather that a consideration of
everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its
self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its
difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self
this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for
this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself."
I said: 'It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does,
what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to
go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it.'
You said: "Right, and this law contains nothing about difference or
unity. Therefore your attempt to relate these concepts to that law, in a way
which is inconsistent with the law, is nothing but an attempt to reject the law
through the use of semantics."
The point I'm about to make is exceedingly important. It was my hunch that
Aristotelians would reply to Hegel's position by claiming that it was 'just
semantics.' But this doesn't work because the law of identity is itself
semantical! There is no way around this; logic is perhaps the most vital part
of semantics. One cannot state a semantical law and then complain when it is
refuted by semantics. Hegel's genius on essence has yet to be discovered by our
species, it's a beautiful, untapped area of philosophy that carries philosophy
into the future.
As Hegel said about those who hold to the Aristotelian position on identity: "Thinking
that keeps to external reflection and knows of no other thinking but external
reflection, fails to attain to a grasp of identity in the form just expounded,
or of essence, which is the same thing. Such thinking always has before it only
abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it, difference. In its opinion,
reason is nothing more than a loom on which it externally combines and
interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the woof of difference; or,
also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts especially identity and
then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness
and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness when abstraction is
made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing
of likeness. These assertions and opinions about what reason does must be
completely set aside, since they are in a certain measure merely historical;
the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in
its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and
self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is
self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of
these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own
self the opposite of itself. The Notion of identity, that it is simple
self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection but has come
from being itself. Whereas, on the contrary, that identity that is aloof from difference,
and difference that is aloof from identity, are products of external reflection
and abstraction, which arbitrarily clings to this point of indifferent
difference."
----------ARISTOTELIAN
APOLOGIST REPLY----------
“My claim is that
your concept of a chair presupposes, not only the existence of a chair
independent of your mind, but also your senses. I would go even further and
claim that this is self-evident, if you went deaf and blind tomorrow your
ability to form concepts would immediately be restricted because it would be
much harder to take in information.” — Jersey Flight
This is a false assumption you make. You could explain what a chair is, to a
person who has never sensed a chair, and that person could have a concept of a
chair without sensing a chair.. Furthermore, the fact that architects,
designers, and creators, produce conceptions prior to the material existence of
the thing conceived, indicates that what appears to you as
"self-evident", is actually a falsity.
“In the first
instance identity is a formal claim. It is a statement about an object. The
problem with this statement is that it is very specific and very narrow; the
problem is that it negates itself.” — Jersey Flight
Again, this is a falsity. The law of identity is a universal statement, a
generality. It states that a thing is the same as itself. This applies to all
things. It is not a statement about an object, it is a statement about all
objects.
“You are claiming
that a thing is not different from itself, which is just the negative side of
the identity position.” — Jersey
Flight
I've already dealt with this objection. A thing is the same as itself, but it
is also different from itself. It changes with the passage of time, therefore
it is different from how it was. Your proposal, to oppose or negate,
"same" with "different" is unjustified in this context. The
thrust of your argument seems to be to say that "different" is the
opposite of "same", but this is not true in the context of the law of
identity. Clearly a thing is both the same as itself, and different from
itself, so we have no premise to allow us to say that "same as
itself" means "not different from itself". You are just adding
this premise, that different is the opposite of same, to create a straw man.
"It is thus the
empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be
something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but
that identity and difference are different. They do not see that in this very
assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are
saying that identity is different from difference; since this must at the same
time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that
identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to
be different." —Hegel
See, Hegel demonstrates in this passage, that he sort of grasps what you are
missing. Difference inheres within identity. To be the same is also to be
different. Therefore it is a misrepresentation to represent difference as the
negation of same, difference is a part of being the same.
Let me try another approach for you. I'm sure you are aware of the concept of
"similar" What does it mean to you, if two things are said to be
similar? To me, it means that some aspects of the things are the same, and some
aspects are different. We cannot say that the two things are different, in an
unqualified or absolute sense, because we need to account for why we are
calling them "similar". So in some way, they appear to have aspects
which are the same, yet also aspects which are different. This is why
difference cannot be used to negate sameness, they are both distinct aspects of
the same concept, "similar". They are not the opposites of each other
though because the aspects which are same cannot be the aspect which are
different. Therefore "same" and "different" represent two
distinct categories within the concept "similar".
“He is correct, the
identity position is, and must say this, in order to protect itself from the
difference it is saying it is not. When you say a thing is itself you are at
the same time saying that it is not different from itself, this is Hegel's
masterful point, the contradiction emerges from identity itself.” — Jersey Flight
As I've explained, many times now, this is a false assumption. When someone
says that a thing is the same as itself, they are not saying that it is not
different from itself. I am a thing, and I am the same as myself. But clearly I
am different from the way I was last year, despite being the same person last
year and this year. So when I say that I am the same person that I was last
year, I am not saying that I am not different from how I was last year. Clearly
I am different, yet the same. So it is just your unwarranted, and unjustified
straw man, which represents being the same as being not different, this is not
consistent with the law of identity.
“You, as a matter of
fact, cannot bring the law of identity into being with the symbol of Z, this
solitary symbol articulates nothing.” — Jersey Flight
This again is false. Why can't I say Z represents "a thing is the same as
itself", just like Hegel says A=A represents "a thing is the same as
itself"? The symbols used to represent a proposition can be arbitrary.
“In order to bring
the law of identity into conceptual being you must make use of identity,
difference and unity. In every occurrence of identity you must make use of...
must identify... different symbols that are taken together in unity. This is a
material fact regarding the existence of the concept of identity.” — Jersey Flight
This is not true at all. "A thing is the same as itself" represents
one idea which can be represented with one symbol, just like the single word
"square" represents "equilateral rectangle". The fact that
the idea represented by the symbol is a complex idea does not necessitate that
the idea requires more than one symbol to represent it. This is not a matter of
me trying to wiggle out of Hegel's criticism, it is simply the way that symbols
and ideas relate to each other. One symbol may represent a vast complexity of
ideas, structured and existing as one idea represented by that symbol. Take a
word (one symbol) which is an acronym, like radar, for example. The one word
stands for a whole complexity of ideas, represented as one idea, by that one
word. So this whole talk about "different symbols which are taken together
in unity" is irrelevant speculation. It's like arguing that each letter
within a word must stand for something on its own. Hegel's claims here have no
basis in reality, and his insertion of "difference" and
"unity" into the concept of identity through an analysis of those
symbols which he uses to represent the law of identity, is just unsupported
speculation.
Imagine if I represented the law of identity with Z. Then I proceeded to argue
that because the law of identity is represented with Z, and Z is the final
letter in the alphabet, then there must be finality within the concept. You
cannot draw a conclusion about the meaning of the concept represented, by doing
a physical analysis of the symbols used to represent it. Plato demonstrated
this with an extensive analysis of the sounds of many different words, in one
of his dialogues. He tried to show how the sound of the word is correlated to
the idea represented by the word. But he didn't get very far, and it was
demonstrated that it's very unreliable to attempt to determine anything useful
about what is represented by a symbol through a physical analysis of the
symbol.
“Try to articulate
the law of identity without making use of unity and difference, you will not be
able to do it.” — Jersey Flight
This is blatantly false. "A thing is the same as itself" says nothing
about difference or unity. How can you even make such a statement and try to
maintain some semblance of honesty?
“But Hegel, how did
he do it (!), comes along and breaks down Aristotle's thoughts into their finer
dialectical components, not fallaciously, but on Aristotle's own terms.” — Jersey Flight
Sorry, but unity and difference do not enter into the law of identity, so these
are Hegel's terms for identity, and clearly a straw man.
“Of course, but its
meaning is derived from its formation.” — Jersey Flight
The meaning is not derived from the symbolic formation, as you've represented,
it is derived from the complex formation of ideas. It is pointless to attack
the symbolic structure, rather than the structure of ideas.
“Hegel is not
bringing negation from the outside; he is demonstrating that it is already
contained in the law. This is proven by the fact that the Aristotelian
formation states that identity and difference are different, that is, a thing
is not different from itself.” — Jersey Flight
That two things are different doesn't mean that one is the opposite of the
other, they might be different categories. Yes, identity is different from
difference, but this does not mean that same is defined as "not
different". Colour is different from sound, but this does not mean that
colour is defined as "not sound". It is only when you define
"same" as "not different", which is a definition not
supported by the law of identity, that negation is produced. So, the negation
is brought in from outside, with this faulty definition of "same" (as
not different), a definition which is inconsistent with the way that
"same" is used in the law of identity.
As Hegel says: "...the
truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its
own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and
self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is
self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of
these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self
the opposite of itself."
Nice quote, this is a fine example. Notice, "everything is in its
self-sameness different from itself". That's exactly what I've been
saying, difference is included within identity, so that the thing is the same
as itself and also different from itself. Now, Hegel claims that this is
contradiction, but it is not contradictory. It is only contradictory if you
define "same" as "not different". But nothing necessitates
this definition. In fact it is very clear that this definition is unacceptable,
because it would create contradiction in this way. Therefore it is quite
evident that Hegel introduces this definition for the purpose of creating
contradiction, so that he can refer to the law of identity as
"self-contradictory". It is not though, Hegel creates that contradiction
by defining "same" as "not-different", when same and
different are actually different categories and cannot be directly related to
each other in this way.
Hegel might even recognize that same and different belong to distinct
categories, as he says " this movement of transition of one of these
categories into the other". So he also ought to recognize that to bring
same and different into the same category, so that they become contraries, is
to make a category mistake.
“The point I'm about
to make is exceedingly important. It was my hunch that Aristotelians would
reply to Hegel's position by claiming that it was 'just semantics.' But this
doesn't work because the law of identity is itself semantical! There is no way
around this, logic is perhaps the most vital part of semantics. One cannot
state a semantical law and then complain when it is refuted by semantics.
Hegel's genius on essence has yet to be discovered by our species, it's a
beautiful, untapped area of philosophy that carries philosophy into the future.”
— Jersey Flight
Hegel's argument is not semantics at all. It is a matter of analyzing the
physical structure of the proposition, its symbols, and attempting to make a
conclusion about the meaning from this physical analysis of the symbols. I'm sure
you must recognize the fault here. One cannot take a word like
"word", and analyze the constituent parts individually,
"w", "o", "r", "d", and their relations
to each other within that word expecting to determine something useful about
the meaning. Nor can you do as Plato tried, and analyze the individual
syllables within a word, expecting to determine the meaning this way. Likewise,
you cannot represent a proposition with symbols, then expect to determine
something meaningful about the proposition by analyzing the relations between
those symbols.
As Hegel said about those who hold to the Aristotelian
position on identity: "Thinking
that keeps to external reflection and knows of no other thinking but external
reflection, fails to attain to a grasp of identity in the form just expounded,
or of essence, which is the same thing. Such thinking always has before it only
abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it, difference. In its opinion,
reason is nothing more than a loom on which it externally combines and
interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the woof of difference; or,
also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts especially identity and
then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness
and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness when abstraction is
made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing
of likeness. These assertions and opinions about what reason does must be
completely set aside, since they are in a certain measure merely historical;
the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in
its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and
self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is
self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of
these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own
self the opposite of itself. The Notion of identity, that it is simple
self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection but has come
from being itself. Whereas, on the contrary, that identity that is aloof from
difference, and difference that is aloof from identity, are products of
external reflection and abstraction, which arbitrarily clings to this point of
indifferent difference."
See Hegel understands the Aristotelian notion of identity. The category mistake
he makes though, is to allow difference to move into the category of same,
making these two opposite of each other, rather than categorically distinct.
This category mistake is what allows the self-sameness which is different from
itself to be called self-contradictory.
----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------
" You could explain what a chair is, to a person who
has never sensed a chair, and that person could have a concept of a chair
without sensing a chair."
– Aristotelian Apologist
This is
correct, you can use another person's senses to obtain the information and then
relay it through restricted sensory means, but this seeks to solve the problem
by 1) validating my point, as the person that is relaying the information is
doing so because there is a chair that they can sense and 2) this would still
require some kind of sensory capacity on the part of the blind-deaf person, in
this case, the sense of touch.
"Furthermore, the fact that architects, designers, and
creators, produce conceptions prior to the material existence of the thing
conceived, indicates that what appears to you as "self-evident", is
actually a falsity."
– Aristotelian Apologist
That they
produce concepts prior to the material existence of the thing is not what is up
for debate, that they could do this (as pure mind) without some kind of sensory
capacity, social orientation or experience of the world; that is the context of
the debate. If there is damage to the brain they will likely not be able to do
this.
"Again, this is a falsity. The law of identity is a
universal statement, a generality. It states that a thing is the same as
itself. This applies to all things. It is not a statement about an object, it
is a statement about all objects." – Aristotelian Apologist
I accept this.
Just like the argument I am making against the Aristotelian position; it's not
that what I said is false, it's just too narrow.
"The thrust of your argument seems to be to say that
"different" is the opposite of "same", but this is not true
in the context of the law of identity." – Aristotelian Apologist
No, the
argument is that identity always makes use of difference in order to
distinguish itself as identity. More directly, difference is contained within
the category of identity.
"Clearly a thing is both the same as itself, and
different from itself, so we have no premise to allow us to say that "same
as itself" means "not different from itself"." – Aristotelian Apologist
Identity is and
must say that it is not different from itself that's why it claims identity
with itself.
"Difference inheres within identity. To be the same is
also to be different. Therefore it is a misrepresentation to represent
difference as the negation of same, difference is a part of being the
same."
– Aristotelian Apologist
Unless I'm
misunderstanding you, what you have here articulated is Hegel's position:
difference inheres within identity. The argument is not that difference negates
"same," but that the plural attributes that make up identity as a
concept of knowledge, negate the formal position of identity, thereby casting
the positive determination into negation. The conclusion is that the so-called
law of identity negates itself the very moment it posits its determinateness.
Giovanni has
coined a term here to simplify Hegel's position; he calls it "significant
determination."
"The conclusion is that significant determination – as
contrasted with the mere stringing together in an object of determinations that
remain external both to each other and to the object itself – requires that one
say, in one and the same respect, opposing things of the one object. This,
however, is to court contradiction." Identity and
Contradiction, George di Giovanni, contained in, The Bloomsbury Companion to
Hegel 2013, pg.262
Further, it's
exceedingly difficult for me to see how you are still talking about the law of
identity within the Aristotelian formation? I have cited Hegel affirming this
position that difference is contained within identity, it's time for you to
cite Aristotle; it must be known that you are not presenting your own
idiosyncratic formation.
"So in some way, they appear to have aspects which are
the same, yet also aspects which are different. This is why difference cannot
be used to negate sameness, they are both distinct aspects of the same concept,
"similar". They are not the opposites of each other though because
the aspects which are same cannot be the aspect which are different. Therefore
"same" and "different" represent two distinct categories
within the concept "similar"." – Aristotelian Apologist
Hegel has
demonstrated the exact opposite, this is why he said, "Such thinking
always has before it only abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it,
difference. In its opinion, reason is nothing more than a loom on which it
externally combines and interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the
woof of difference; or, also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts
especially identity and then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now
a positing of likeness and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness
when abstraction is made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is
made from the positing of likeness."
"When someone says that a thing is the same as itself,
they are not saying that it is not different from itself." – Aristotelian Apologist
This is because
you are stuck in a one-sided determination. You are not actually thinking about
what is entailed in the concept of "itself," in identity. You are
only considering the positive formation, the negative side is also part of the
concept, if you deny this you destroy the law. A one-sided determination is
incomplete and does not qualify as knowledge.
But something
more important occurs to me here: you are equivocating because you are talking
about a specific thing as opposed to the general law, which is the very
distinction you made above. Equivocating back and forth this way allows you to
evade the force of the criticism against it.
"When someone says that a thing is the same as itself,
they are not saying that it is not different from itself." – Aristotelian Apologist
You are
correct, they are saying it is the same as itself, but this means that it
cannot be different from itself. One doesn't have to formally assert the
negative for it to be contained within the completeness of the concept.
"I am a thing, and I am the same as myself. But clearly
I am different from the way I was last year, despite being the same person last
year and this year. So when I say that I am the same person that I was last
year, I am not saying that I am not different from how I was last year." – Aristotelian
Apologist
This is an equivocation;
we are talking about a general law. Nevertheless, even here you are still
saying that you are not different from yourself. You are confusing Hegel's
critique of identity by mistaking it as something external to identity. The
difference is not contained in the fact that you change, but in the fact that
difference must be present in the identity you make of yourself, in order to
make a significant determination of yourself.
"Why can't I say Z represents "a thing is the same
as itself", just like Hegel says A=A represents "a thing is the same
as itself"?"
– Aristotelian Apologist
You failed to
comprehend my argument; my argument was that you cannot 'bring identity into
being' with the solitary symbol of Z. You are failing to grasp the fact that Z
only makes sense because you have articulated the law using different symbols.
My reply to you is, show me how you can bring the law of identity into being
with the symbol Z? You cannot do it, because, as a matter of fact, you need
many different symbols to articulate the law! You can only say that Z
represents the law because you have articulated it with more symbols than Z, if
this was not the case, you would not be able to say what Z represents. I don't
think you are following this argument. We are not talking about representation
of the law; we are talking about what is required to bring the law into being!
"A thing is the same as itself" says nothing about
difference or unity. How can you even make such a statement and try to maintain
some semblance of honesty?"
– Aristotelian Apologist
My friend,
please pay attention: "(1) A (2) thing (3) is (4) the (5) same (6) as (7)
itself."
Is (1) the same
symbol as (2), is (3) the same symbol as (4)? Can you articulate the law
without using different symbols? Further you are not saying that these symbols
are articulating many things, you take them together in unity to form a
concept.
"It is pointless to attack the symbolic structure,
rather than the structure of ideas." – Aristotelian Apologist
Not in the case
of identity, it is claiming the highest authority of truth for itself;
therefore it incurs the highest burden of proof for itself. More to the point,
identity is made up of its symbolic structure in the most precise way, the
articulation is crucial as evidenced by this exchange. What we find, when we
examine the symbolic structure of identity, is that identity is itself made up
of more determinations than identity. We find that the Aristotelian formation
of identity is a misrepresentation of identity's dialectical being. This was
Hegel's genius discovery.
"That two things are different doesn't mean that one is
the opposite of the other, they might be different categories." – Aristotelian Apologist
Disassociated
categories are what Kant contrives to deal with the reality of contradiction.
It seems to me
that this is the heart of your objection. You are claiming that Hegel's
position is accurate, which is most interesting, you are just saying that he is
making a categorical mistake. This doesn't work because (Hegel's discovery) a
category cannot consist, and does not consist, in a one-sided determination. All
of the attributes that form the concept must be contained within the category
in order for it to be a concept of knowledge, otherwise it is nothing but a
one-sided determination lacking in totality.
"Yes, identity is different from difference, but this
does not mean that same is defined as "not different"." – Aristotelian Apologist
This argument
is literally a straw man. Hegel does not discuss the term “same” in the context
of identity. You are trying to introduce a new point (Red Herring) to create more
space for the ever encroaching collapse of your position. You are attempting to
argue that the concept “same” saves Aristotle’s position of identity; you are
trying to walk two paths; one where you affirm Hegel’s point that identity is
different from difference, but then try to save identity by making use of the
concept “same.” However, once you admit that identity is different from
difference you cannot simply save identity by introducing the term, “same.”
"Colour is different from sound, but this does not
mean that colour is defined as "not sound". " -- Aristotelian
Apologist
What you are
missing here is that sound is not part of the significant determination of
color. This cannot be said in the case of identity and difference.
"That's exactly what I've been saying, difference is
included within identity, so that the thing is the same as itself and also different
from itself. Now, Hegel claims that this is contradiction, but it is not
contradictory. It is only contradictory if you define "same" as
"not different". But nothing necessitates this definition." – Aristotelian Apologist
Friend, are you
truly thinking about this, specifically in relation to the so-called law of
identity? Here you admit that difference is included in identity and then have
the audacity to assert (and we need to be very specific here) that this does
not contradict the law of identity! This is because you hold it to be a
category outside of identity, but this is Hegel's point, as he says, you
"do not see" that difference is part of identity, you do not have one
without the other.
"... same and different are actually different categories
and cannot be directly related to each other in this way." – Aristotelian Apologist
Same would not
be a significant determination without difference. What you are again doing is
asserting the error of a one-sided determination which is incompetent to
produce knowledge.
"Hegel might even recognize that same and different
belong to distinct categories, as he says " this movement of transition of
one of these categories into the other". " – Aristotelian Apologist
Category in
this sense does not mean knowledge; it simply means a part that is in need of
further determination.
"One cannot take a word like "word", and
analyze the constituent parts individually, "w", "o",
"r", "d", and their relations to each other within that
word expecting to determine something useful about the meaning." – Aristotelian Apologist
That would depend on what kind of authority you were trying
to deduce from the use of this word and how you were trying to deduce it. In
the case of the law of identity it is not a refutation of Hegel's argument to
merely say, 'you cannot do this.' Tell me, what happens if the argument is
accurate? This is where we locate the motivation for the prohibition against
the argument. However, the law of identity is precisely the kind of semantical thing
that validates the use of this kind of argument. Further, we do learn something
by noting that a word is not a solitary unit but is made up of different
syllables. This fact speaks to the accuracy of Hegel's position: identity is
made up of difference taken in unity.
"The category
mistake he makes though, is to allow difference to move into the category of
same, making these two opposite of each other, rather than categorically
distinct." – Aristotelian Apologist
This new law of category you are stating is not the law of
identity and you must substantiate it. At present you are making an
authoritarian claim, Hegel in contrast, is making an argument that transcends
the artificial construction of a category that ends up distorting reality. You
have yourself confessed many times that the law of identity is just an ideal,
you have confessed that reality is in flux, how then can you say his logic is
wrong because it defies your static idealism, and instead, more carefully
organizes itself along the lines of reality?
You do not refute Hegel by merely asserting that
"identity," "difference" and "same" are three
distinct categories, and this is because Hegel proves that identity contains
difference within itself, not merely as something from the outside. The
contradiction that emerges cannot simply be resolved by arbitrarily creating
categories that allow you to retain your idealism as a form of denial against
reality.
This is what's going on here:
You are holding reality hostage to your logical categories,
imposing your presuppositions on reality, or to state it another way, you are
denying reality on the basis of idealism. You are saying that Hegel's position
must be wrong "because it would refute my ideals about reality." Hegel’s
thought is the exact opposite of this kind of biased procedure; it’s a
courageous attempt to allow reality to speak for itself, even if it results in
the negation of one’s desired ideals. That identity negates itself, that
Aristotle is wrong, is not Hegel’s psychological desire, but the conclusion one
is forced to embrace through a more complete dialectical analysis of Aristotle’s
dogmatic categories.
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