GENERAL THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE OF CRITICAL THEORY

 

It is certain that critical theory is facing a crisis of theory itself. What does this mean? It means that theory has essentially lost itself in theory. This will become evident post-Gaza. Why post-Gaza? Because here, theory was pit against lines of power that it underestimated and failed to detect. The result was that its attempt at praxis turned out to be incompetent; what it portrayed to the world was a praxis of idealism as opposed to resistant power. (I suspect many are not psychologically ready to accept this thesis, unfortunately, these individuals will require a greater display of the force of repressive power).

There will be many, I suspect, hoping to rebound after Gaza, who will embrace the nihilism of deconstruction, thinking that the problem is that critique was not radical enough. While this critical edifice can play a part in dismantling narratives of power, it cannot play a revolutionary part, which is to say, a role of reconstruction, precisely because its critical power derives from a nihilism that undermines itself in this sense.

This is what theory must face:

“…citizens are experiencing their growing political powerlessness because the most politically consequential decisions hardly make it onto a political agenda that they can influence in their role as democratic citizens.” Habermas, Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie Vol.2 p.801

Theory is facing powerlessness. Theory must learn to grapple with this powerlessness if it wants to be effective within the domain of praxis. It must first come to terms with its limitations; its revolutionary delusions and arrogance. If it cannot do this it cannot begin down the vital path of rational reconstruction. Required of it is the ability to *construct* new innovations of resistance. But more than this is required; it must also restructure its social discourse to fit within (be revolutionary within) democratic process and procedure: it must learn to argue and win its case; it must learn to fight officially within the system. 

This is because the revolutionary path, at this point along the development of technological society, merely feeds into the power of the repressive narrative. Those who resist are not only easily crushed, but are also easily framed as reckless anarchists who stand opposed to civilization.

The thing that matters more than anything else is that theory learns to begin from the basis of a sober ontology of power. This means that theory doesn't underestimate repressive power, or romanticize its own power. This cannot be emphasized enough!

The emphasis of theory is bound to shift toward the necessity of dialectic, because dialectic is the very thing that obliterated the epistemology of repressive power, though this consciousness of theoretical power or rational power, has not yet entered into the public sphere. It still only exists at the highest levels of theory (it exists as a kind of privileged consciousness). This needs to change; the critical weapon of dialectic needs to be understood and unleashed within the public sphere. (We must not wield it as ideological hacks, which will only serve to make a caricature out of it).

I suspect that the future of critical theory has to do with it overcoming its own regression, finding its way back to its original, rational path in dialectic. I suspect a hard sobriety will be heaped upon it in the form of repressive power, displays of resistance being crushed by violence. The utopian ideals of theorists will continue to be thwarted as they leap into the public sphere without thought. For many this will mean a slow learning process, just to realize the limits of their power. But this can be avoided by taking heed to thought now and proceeding toward the innovation of new, non-violent forms of resistance. But these forms will fail if they are birthed from subjectivity in the form of emotional reaction. 

The hope of the future doesn't reside with individualism, it resides in qualitative institutionalism, democratic formations, something the spirit of the age has been taught to reject. People are taught to egotistically build up the self and pit it against other "self-made" individuals. Social media has attacked our solidarity. 

There is so much more that can be said, but I think the crucial thing is comprehending the rise of a new, fascistic, state-corporate-power, that stands ready and willing to crush dissent with law and violence. Adding to this is the manipulative role that social media and disinformation play in keeping society divided (successfully thwarting attempts to accurately frame resistance movements). This division stands as an authentic negation to the unity needed to engage in revolutionary action. But I don't see society being at the point of revolution as of yet, this is not a necessity, there are still rational channels that should not be discarded, and insofar as revolutionary theory discards them, it burns the bridge on which it stands. 

Above all, thought is required. And this means we (discipline! impulse control!) allow it to mediate between theory and praxis. The new propaganda goes undetected, and slithers through the domain of geopolitics, but I'm pretty sure we know we have been infected with it when our political projects have deviated from a strategic concern for democracy; when our democratic choices are emotionally directed toward non-democratic ends.

 

-

-

-

Zizek’s “Christian Atheism” and the Straw Man of Humanism

In his new book “Christian Atheism,” Zizek writes: “The question is: humanism presents itself as universal, all-encompassing, but this universality is already grounded in an exclusion. It is not just that humanism imposes a Western standard of being-human which reduces subaltern Others to a lower level of humanity; Humanism is based on the exclusion of a large group of humans… as non-Human…” p.27

Why Zizek feels the need to engage in this distortion of Humanism is… perhaps, because he wants to insinuate a contrast of superiority for Christianity? 

Here Zizek is thinking of Humanism as being synonymous with Christian fundamentalism as well as Westernism. This is a problem. None of this is reflected in any of the Humanist Manifestos. More importantly, it’s not even presupposed by them. To interpret Humanism thus is to erect a straw man of Humanism.

What then is Humanism? 

In short, it’s the axiom of the value of humans as central, of human life and dignity as central. This doesn’t mean that Humanism lacks an ecology, quite the opposite. Because Humanism is axiomatic, and proceeds by means of reason and evidence, it can be said to be foundational to progress/ because it’s not a superstitious system, its approach to the world is open and reflective, it doesn’t dogmatize, but is a continual process of open learning.

“Humanism is an ethical process through which we all can move, above and beyond the divisive particulars, heroic personalities, dogmatic creeds, and ritual customs of past religions or their mere negation.” Manifesto II

Zizek gives no citations to back up his negative and limited characterization of Humanism. He simply asserts that it’s a system of “exclusion,” when in fact, it’s just the opposite!

The religions of the world have failed, so much so that Zizek is now offering a negative version of Christianity/ why not the positive one? (In contrast, Humanism is not something that needs to be inverted!) 

So far from “reducing” people, Humanism embraces the hope of a world united. “We urge recognition of the common humanity of all people.” Ibid. It is an approach whose time has come. 

The historical religions of the world aren’t epistemologically or ontologically broad enough to cope with the increase of social complexity, but Humanism is, because its foundation is universal. Zizek wants to claim that this universalism contains an exclusion. Fair enough. What then is that exclusion? It’s not Humans as he wants us to believe! (He got it wrong because he doesn’t understand Humanism, or purposely tried to distort it): it’s the exclusion of the non-universal. This alone makes Humanism exceptional among the religions of the world. 

I suspect that Zizek is threatened by Humanism because, even as an Atheist, he’s still too much of a Christian!

-

-

-

THE RATIONAL CRISIS OF MODERN CRITICAL THEORY

 

Within the domain of modern critical theory, there’s a tremendous need for rational discourse. Modern critical theory presents a dilemma in this sense, because it has disintegrated into subjectivity, into irrationalism. So the dilemma is how to discourse productively within an environment that’s hostile to reason? 

Where critique strikes down the dogma of modern theory (and that’s what modern theory is and has become, dogmatic) subjectivity is asserted as a paramount authority. This was never (and is still not) the mode of discourse practiced by the original line of critical theory - but now the hope of discourse is set up against the conviction of the irrational. The more rational one tries to be the more one seems to provoke a kind of juvenile resentment. Rational procedure is not merely forgotten, it is resisted and despised, but one cannot make progress without it (strange that this is contested - because it implies a self-negation). 

What is most basic and fundamental to critique (reason) has been replaced by the desire of the subject. Modern critical theory is powerless, it amounts to insiders talking among themselves, a kind of esoteric and eccentric tribalism. And while this subjectivity feels powerful to the one wielding it, it lacks the power of universality; it cannot refute or convince (proceed authoritatively within the domain of the public sphere) and so it is in constant retreat from opposition, but opposition is what is most necessary (Zizek, Hegel, Marx, Marcuse, Habermas). 

This is a kind of rational heresy, insofar as it means that critical theory has abandoned dialectic. (In the modern case it’s more likely that it never comprehended it in the first place). What is left is the supremacy of the desire of the subject pursued against all social responsibility; to be productive then, from the vantage of this subjectivity, means to amuse oneself with theory. One must get beyond this subjectivity in order to have authority in the public sphere. (If this is rejected, then one admits that it’s all an insiders game, and if this is the case, then one’s critical theory is dead before it even begins). 

Having exchanged reason for subjectivity, is modern critical theory even capable of discourse?

If one strays from its orthodoxy through opposition, one is branded a heretic; truth now has to do with a kind of confessional agreement that falls in line with the tribe, reason has been removed from the equation. This is exemplified by the complaint of subjectivity offered as a refutation (one should not be fooled by its confidence). No one, in this sense, has more confidence than the irrationalist because he’s oblivious to the limits of his subjectivity.

In order for critical theory to be capable of productive discourse, it must be capable of absorbing opposition; it must be capable of communicating through reason, which is to say, it must overcome the egoism of its subjectivity. 

“The Rational Crisis” is the crisis of the revolt against the intellectual standards of reason. Once these standards are pushed aside in the name of freedom, freedom itself is lost, even though the practitioner of this emotivism is oblivious to the negation. This negation manifests itself at the point of praxis; the point where theory tries to manifest a functional authority within the domain of culture.

Having renounced the standards of reason, the irrationalist has nothing left to substantiate and establish his theory in society, it is an emotionalism void of the hope of any prospect of universalism. This emotivism isn’t aware that it can’t even generate its own objections or complaints. This doesn’t stop it from asserting its own opposition against premises it dislikes, but these are (and can only only be) emotive objections. 

The Rational Crisis means that theory must go back and rediscover its rational foundations before it can proceed into the future. Until it does this, it will fail in the public sphere, manifesting incompetence, unconvincing rational engagement, in both theory and praxis. 

At the root, the subject has to work out the resistance in his psychology, resistance that doesn’t want to adhere to rational standards and resents having to think. (I suspect this is a kind of automated impulse, motivated by a desire for conceptual authority). An identity response is so much easier, but it remains incompetent, both to refute and convince, the culture that it so desperately wants change.

-

-

-