GENERAL THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE OF CRITICAL THEORY

 

It is certain that critical theory is facing a crisis of theory itself. What does this mean? It means that theory has essentially lost itself in theory. This will become evident post-Gaza. Why post-Gaza? Because here, theory was pit against lines of power that it underestimated and failed to detect. The result was that its attempt at praxis turned out to be incompetent; what it portrayed to the world was a praxis of idealism as opposed to resistant power. (I suspect many are not psychologically ready to accept this thesis, unfortunately, these individuals will require a greater display of the force of repressive power).

There will be many, I suspect, hoping to rebound after Gaza, who will embrace the nihilism of deconstruction, thinking that the problem is that critique was not radical enough. While this critical edifice can play a part in dismantling narratives of power, it cannot play a revolutionary part, which is to say, a role of reconstruction, precisely because its critical power derives from a nihilism that undermines itself in this sense.

This is what theory must face:

“…citizens are experiencing their growing political powerlessness because the most politically consequential decisions hardly make it onto a political agenda that they can influence in their role as democratic citizens.” Habermas, Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie Vol.2 p.801

Theory is facing powerlessness. Theory must learn to grapple with this powerlessness if it wants to be effective within the domain of praxis. It must first come to terms with its limitations; its revolutionary delusions and arrogance. If it cannot do this it cannot begin down the vital path of rational reconstruction. Required of it is the ability to *construct* new innovations of resistance. But more than this is required; it must also restructure its social discourse to fit within (be revolutionary within) democratic process and procedure: it must learn to argue and win its case; it must learn to fight officially within the system. 

This is because the revolutionary path, at this point along the development of technological society, merely feeds into the power of the repressive narrative. Those who resist are not only easily crushed, but are also easily framed as reckless anarchists who stand opposed to civilization.

The thing that matters more than anything else is that theory learns to begin from the basis of a sober ontology of power. This means that theory doesn't underestimate repressive power, or romanticize its own power. This cannot be emphasized enough!

The emphasis of theory is bound to shift toward the necessity of dialectic, because dialectic is the very thing that obliterated the epistemology of repressive power, though this consciousness of theoretical power or rational power, has not yet entered into the public sphere. It still only exists at the highest levels of theory (it exists as a kind of privileged consciousness). This needs to change; the critical weapon of dialectic needs to be understood and unleashed within the public sphere. (We must not wield it as ideological hacks, which will only serve to make a caricature out of it).

I suspect that the future of critical theory has to do with it overcoming its own regression, finding its way back to its original, rational path in dialectic. I suspect a hard sobriety will be heaped upon it in the form of repressive power, displays of resistance being crushed by violence. The utopian ideals of theorists will continue to be thwarted as they leap into the public sphere without thought. For many this will mean a slow learning process, just to realize the limits of their power. But this can be avoided by taking heed to thought now and proceeding toward the innovation of new, non-violent forms of resistance. But these forms will fail if they are birthed from subjectivity in the form of emotional reaction. 

The hope of the future doesn't reside with individualism, it resides in qualitative institutionalism, democratic formations, something the spirit of the age has been taught to reject. People are taught to egotistically build up the self and pit it against other "self-made" individuals. Social media has attacked our solidarity. 

There is so much more that can be said, but I think the crucial thing is comprehending the rise of a new, fascistic, state-corporate-power, that stands ready and willing to crush dissent with law and violence. Adding to this is the manipulative role that social media and disinformation play in keeping society divided (successfully thwarting attempts to accurately frame resistance movements). This division stands as an authentic negation to the unity needed to engage in revolutionary action. But I don't see society being at the point of revolution as of yet, this is not a necessity, there are still rational channels that should not be discarded, and insofar as revolutionary theory discards them, it burns the bridge on which it stands. 

Above all, thought is required. And this means we (discipline! impulse control!) allow it to mediate between theory and praxis. The new propaganda goes undetected, and slithers through the domain of geopolitics, but I'm pretty sure we know we have been infected with it when our political projects have deviated from a strategic concern for democracy; when our democratic choices are emotionally directed toward non-democratic ends.

 

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Zizek’s “Christian Atheism” and the Straw Man of Humanism

In his new book “Christian Atheism,” Zizek writes: “The question is: humanism presents itself as universal, all-encompassing, but this universality is already grounded in an exclusion. It is not just that humanism imposes a Western standard of being-human which reduces subaltern Others to a lower level of humanity; Humanism is based on the exclusion of a large group of humans… as non-Human…” p.27

Why Zizek feels the need to engage in this distortion of Humanism is… perhaps, because he wants to insinuate a contrast of superiority for Christianity? 

Here Zizek is thinking of Humanism as being synonymous with Christian fundamentalism as well as Westernism. This is a problem. None of this is reflected in any of the Humanist Manifestos. More importantly, it’s not even presupposed by them. To interpret Humanism thus is to erect a straw man of Humanism.

What then is Humanism? 

In short, it’s the axiom of the value of humans as central, of human life and dignity as central. This doesn’t mean that Humanism lacks an ecology, quite the opposite. Because Humanism is axiomatic, and proceeds by means of reason and evidence, it can be said to be foundational to progress/ because it’s not a superstitious system, its approach to the world is open and reflective, it doesn’t dogmatize, but is a continual process of open learning.

“Humanism is an ethical process through which we all can move, above and beyond the divisive particulars, heroic personalities, dogmatic creeds, and ritual customs of past religions or their mere negation.” Manifesto II

Zizek gives no citations to back up his negative and limited characterization of Humanism. He simply asserts that it’s a system of “exclusion,” when in fact, it’s just the opposite!

The religions of the world have failed, so much so that Zizek is now offering a negative version of Christianity/ why not the positive one? (In contrast, Humanism is not something that needs to be inverted!) 

So far from “reducing” people, Humanism embraces the hope of a world united. “We urge recognition of the common humanity of all people.” Ibid. It is an approach whose time has come. 

The historical religions of the world aren’t epistemologically or ontologically broad enough to cope with the increase of social complexity, but Humanism is, because its foundation is universal. Zizek wants to claim that this universalism contains an exclusion. Fair enough. What then is that exclusion? It’s not Humans as he wants us to believe! (He got it wrong because he doesn’t understand Humanism, or purposely tried to distort it): it’s the exclusion of the non-universal. This alone makes Humanism exceptional among the religions of the world. 

I suspect that Zizek is threatened by Humanism because, even as an Atheist, he’s still too much of a Christian!

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THE RATIONAL CRISIS OF MODERN CRITICAL THEORY

 

Within the domain of modern critical theory, there’s a tremendous need for rational discourse. Modern critical theory presents a dilemma in this sense, because it has disintegrated into subjectivity, into irrationalism. So the dilemma is how to discourse productively within an environment that’s hostile to reason? 

Where critique strikes down the dogma of modern theory (and that’s what modern theory is and has become, dogmatic) subjectivity is asserted as a paramount authority. This was never (and is still not) the mode of discourse practiced by the original line of critical theory - but now the hope of discourse is set up against the conviction of the irrational. The more rational one tries to be the more one seems to provoke a kind of juvenile resentment. Rational procedure is not merely forgotten, it is resisted and despised, but one cannot make progress without it (strange that this is contested - because it implies a self-negation). 

What is most basic and fundamental to critique (reason) has been replaced by the desire of the subject. Modern critical theory is powerless, it amounts to insiders talking among themselves, a kind of esoteric and eccentric tribalism. And while this subjectivity feels powerful to the one wielding it, it lacks the power of universality; it cannot refute or convince (proceed authoritatively within the domain of the public sphere) and so it is in constant retreat from opposition, but opposition is what is most necessary (Zizek, Hegel, Marx, Marcuse, Habermas). 

This is a kind of rational heresy, insofar as it means that critical theory has abandoned dialectic. (In the modern case it’s more likely that it never comprehended it in the first place). What is left is the supremacy of the desire of the subject pursued against all social responsibility; to be productive then, from the vantage of this subjectivity, means to amuse oneself with theory. One must get beyond this subjectivity in order to have authority in the public sphere. (If this is rejected, then one admits that it’s all an insiders game, and if this is the case, then one’s critical theory is dead before it even begins). 

Having exchanged reason for subjectivity, is modern critical theory even capable of discourse?

If one strays from its orthodoxy through opposition, one is branded a heretic; truth now has to do with a kind of confessional agreement that falls in line with the tribe, reason has been removed from the equation. This is exemplified by the complaint of subjectivity offered as a refutation (one should not be fooled by its confidence). No one, in this sense, has more confidence than the irrationalist because he’s oblivious to the limits of his subjectivity.

In order for critical theory to be capable of productive discourse, it must be capable of absorbing opposition; it must be capable of communicating through reason, which is to say, it must overcome the egoism of its subjectivity. 

“The Rational Crisis” is the crisis of the revolt against the intellectual standards of reason. Once these standards are pushed aside in the name of freedom, freedom itself is lost, even though the practitioner of this emotivism is oblivious to the negation. This negation manifests itself at the point of praxis; the point where theory tries to manifest a functional authority within the domain of culture.

Having renounced the standards of reason, the irrationalist has nothing left to substantiate and establish his theory in society, it is an emotionalism void of the hope of any prospect of universalism. This emotivism isn’t aware that it can’t even generate its own objections or complaints. This doesn’t stop it from asserting its own opposition against premises it dislikes, but these are (and can only only be) emotive objections. 

The Rational Crisis means that theory must go back and rediscover its rational foundations before it can proceed into the future. Until it does this, it will fail in the public sphere, manifesting incompetence, unconvincing rational engagement, in both theory and praxis. 

At the root, the subject has to work out the resistance in his psychology, resistance that doesn’t want to adhere to rational standards and resents having to think. (I suspect this is a kind of automated impulse, motivated by a desire for conceptual authority). An identity response is so much easier, but it remains incompetent, both to refute and convince, the culture that it so desperately wants change.

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ABOUT POWER

 

Power is the capacity to effect change. It's an attribute that allows entities, whether individuals, groups, or institutions, to shape outcomes, influence others, and direct the course of events. Power manifests in various forms, from tangible exertion of force to the subtle sway of persuasion. It is the undercurrent of agency and control that propels actions and decisions, shaping the dynamics of relationships and societies. Ultimately, power is the driving force behind the ability to achieve objectives and make an impact in the world around us.    

 

This is an incredibly difficult topic because we don’t want to face the cold nature of power; we don't want to accept the conclusion of a power that has the ability to negate us and our desires; we don't want to see our limits; we don't want to see the power of oppressive power. (Of course, we have to be careful that in the process of recognizing power we don’t throw away our power). I think the point of recognizing power is, in part, to help us expand the potentials of the innovation of power, most specifically, power toward the realization of freedom; the point is to help us overcome oppressive forms of power.

I don’t think we grasp what’s happening in our time. Theory only matters insofar as it motivates and impacts the forces of power. (This doesn't have to be immediate.) Many a good theory has been crushed by power. What we’re seeing in our time is the rise of an Anti-Intellectual Power, and what’s being missed, is that this anti-intellectual force, has power!

I find it a bit of a struggle to articulate this, to actually get the point across, because it's hard to convey power without giving a crude example. One can stand on the street corner and preach about Human Rights, but if there are repressive forces that can censor, stifle and suppress this activity, prevent it from entering into the public sphere, prevent it from having an impact, then those forces have power. Power has ability, it’s capable of realizing its ideal. The power that’s rising doesn’t care about theory, more importantly, it has the power to crush theory. This is the crucial point. We are seeing vast delusion because of a failure to grasp the situation of power. What this means in terms of theory, is that there’s a need for greater innovation and intelligence when it comes to countering and outsmarting power. But we don’t see this necessary intellectual work taking place.

There are incredibly violent counter revolutionary forces in the world at present. These forces are ready to enact extreme violence on those who don’t comport with, or resist, their vision of power. If we don’t grasp the practicality and limits of our idealism, as it goes up against power, it’s very likely our ideals will be crushed by power. Resistance should never be naive, theory should strive for a grasp of totality.

What I find disturbing, is that the consciousness in the world, that should have a grasp on the dangers of power, is acting as though its idealism is sufficient to overcome the violence of power. This consciousness, doesn’t seem to understand, that it doesn’t actually have the power that its idealism makes it feel it has. In order for this to happen, it first has to win the war of ideas, and this has not happened at the level of legislation, enforcement or popularity. There are always coercive forces in society, the question is a matter of what ideals those forces will correspond to, whose purpose will they serve?

What we see in the culture of modern theory and activism is self-deception, that is, “I feel my theory is powerful, I have been convinced, all I need to do is speak my theory and the rest of the world will follow.” This is delusion. (It's bad enough that there are theorists who seem to think that the mere use of certain words entail, not only a justification of their views, but a kind of political victory, as though they have established their sociology through mere identity). Theories of emancipation, though highly enlightened and psychologically mature, are greatly marginalized and idiosyncratic. We are all insiders of the hyper intellectual cult that cares about freedom, the vast majority of the world lives in engineered ignorance, critical consciousness is a rare and endangered species.

The bottom line is that we aren’t doing what we think we’re doing if we aren’t actually shifting the levers of power, or innovating a way to subvert oppressive power to actually bring about an alteration of conditions. We must be more objective and less idealistic in our evaluations of power; more rational and less emotional in the ways we seek to approach power.

 

We are in danger. 

 

Fascistic forces are ready and eager to demonstrate their power through repressive violence. If the best our theory can do is play into the hands of fascist forces, then we’re doing something wrong. 

Show a fascist just how great your conviction for theory is, and he’ll show you just how great his power is to crush your theory and bypass your convictions. It’s irresponsible for resistance not to comprehend the nature of power. Competent theory strives to form praxis from the vantage of totality.

We are living in a paradigm shift of power. The age of regression is upon us. This is easily proven by noting the boldness of genocide and violence in our time. It’s out in the open and proud of itself; it has shaken off the shackles of shame, and discarded the intelligence of conscience, and now it is eager to prove that it can bend the world to its regressive will through violence. (The charge of genocide doesn’t even phase the new paradigm of power.) Tragically, this signifies that the intellectual groundwork has to be laid again, or that it must at least be revived. Our duty against oppressive power, therefore, is first to understand it and then to use this comprehension to innovate ways to circumvent it, turn it against itself, or shift it to the domain of freedom, without being crushed by it. 

 

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NEGATIVE DISCOURSE ON THEOLOGY

 

[1] There is a certain sense in which theology is a master form. How could one possibly claim this? Because it's a form that presupposes itself to be higher than every other form; a form that pretends to deal with the highest conceivable form, and what gives it this power is the fact that many humans (subconsciously) validate its presuppositions of itself. (The linguistic and conceptual function of the term God is that it assumes a hierarchical status).   

[2] There is a way to make use of theology that is unconscious to theology itself, which is to say, as a kind of thought experiment that seeks to contrast hierarchical value, even though the ideal of theology is not a real value but a mere abstraction. One can make use of theology, not in the sense that it's real, but in the sense of searching for higher concepts and their functions.

[3] To assign a construct, such as theology, to a place of epistemological supremacy, is detrimental to the species, precisely because it seeks to dissolve [condemn] life into idealism, because it renders consciousness defenseless against idealism. The ramifications of this are bondage and tyranny through the demarcation of false value. In theology, mankind subjects itself, and is fooled by, its own imagination; ultimately theology is a form of being dominated by the subconscious.      

[4] Theology is a pretend discourse about the highest form; in it, and through it, the theologian is seeking several psychological ends: comfort, power, amusement, relief. 

[5] Above all, theology is the lie of the highest form; the supremacy it presupposes for itself is a supremacy of imagination. (However, this doesn't mean that the idealism of theology can't materialize itself within a body of believers, who then strike out for real supremacy though violence, or even legislation). It is in this way that ideas have power, they do not have power in themselves, they only have power insofar as they are assimilated and enacted by humans, insofar as humans bring them to life with action. 

[6] Theology is also a species of mysticism insofar as it's concerned with "utterances, sayings, oracles, discourse, reasoning," all within the context of an idealized, projected Being or Beings (or Force). The key component is that this being is imaginary. Potentially this means that there is no end to discourse on "God," but that theology, done properly, remains a domain of infinite creativity. This is also one of the reasons why it can provide a continual escape from reality.

[7] Theology is an idealism that man is always trying to impose on reality. This desperation for imposition drives man into the domain of manipulation, and this manipulation is so motivated and energetic... it brings the resources of intelligence to its aid, so much so, that it becomes genius and actually ends up making strange progress through its effort and desperation to convince itself of the truth of its machinations.  

[8] Theology is an endeavor of ignorance that is driven by subconscious desires. The theologian is not actually aware of what he's doing; this unawareness is one of the most crucial, unspoken attributes of theology. It is through this unawareness that the theologian derives his motivation and psychological comfort. What does this mean? It means that theology is really the deployment of imagination as a defense mechanism against existence (theology is, at its root, reactionary).

[9] The worst thing about theology is not that it exists, but the form in which it exists; a form that ends up negating critical consciousness, submerging the subject in pure idealism and then filtering reality through this idealism, which has the effect of sabotaging the social potential of the species. (This is sabotage because it means that man no longer approaches the world as it is, no longer seeks to master nature on nature's terms, to transcend nature, but because of theology, filters the world through idealism, demanding that nature conform to idealism, imposing idealism on everything). Theology is like an a priori disability that gets in the way of man's process with nature (logic can also function this way).   

[10] Value in theology: that theology gives rise to concepts is most interesting, those concepts being derived through assertions and proclamations regarding the supernatural nature of reality, and sometimes these concepts lead to the formation of new concepts, these new concepts then take on new substance or new content, or expand ideas, or possibly even expand consciousness. 

[11] It is important to understand that because theologians are not conscious of their forms, they cannot make the most of them. It's possible for Karl Barth to discourse on the concept of God, but it is not possible for Karl Barth to understand what his discourse means within the broader context of existence (because he does not have a higher philosophical/rational (secular) view to contextualize his own theology). If he was left to the devices of his theology, he would never be able to escape the presuppositions of his theology, and escape he must if he doesn't want to be the irrational victim of his theology. What this really tells us is that theology is a lie in tension with its own non-theological presuppositions; it tries to hide these presuppositions behind the theological premises it deduces from them.  

[12] The admission of theology is a confession that one doesn't have anything else, if one is trying to give theology, or proselytize to theology, or lay down a narrative of theology, it's because one is admitting and confessing that they don't have anything else, their imagination has been exhausted, and so they're trying to offer theology.

[13] If theology is one thing, it is a form of deception, but interestingly enough, theology is not one thing, it is a multitude of things. It is not, just deception, it is also a desire for truth, between this desire and between deception, one finds the essence of theology. 

[14] If theology could say one thing, it would say, "I fool you." This is the ethos of theology; and an important question is, in how many ways does, and has, theology fooled mankind?

 

TOWARD THE ESSENCE OF AN EMANCIPATORY THEOLOGY:

It would never occur to a fundamentalist that there is such a thing as theology beyond and outside the insecurity of fundamentalism. But outside of fundamentalism is when theology gets interesting (and relevant) because it has the potential to transform into a unique discourse that goes beyond itself.

What this looks like in practical terms is that someone, like the Apostle Paul, is viewed as just one theologian among many theologians, one creative mind among many creative minds; (very important): one is free to reject and expand his ideas! Only then can the same mechanisms, which were at work in Paul himself, be permitted to continue their development toward higher levels of Humanism. 

Here's an important maxim of theology: one is only dealing with the vital roots of theology when one has unearthed and identified the philosophical (naturalistic) concepts that lie hidden beneath the surface of theology.

If one is truly concerned with truth, then one cannot evade, leave off, or ignore, the hidden and unspoken, foundational (naturalistic) presuppositions on which theology rests. To do such would simply mean that one was deceived by theology! 

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