Saturday, March 21, 2020

REFUTING AYN RAND'S LOGIC - Jersey Flight



{The present essay was produced for The New School of Polemics}



PREFATORY NOTE: If the reader truly desires to understand the concept of identity, and logical principles in general, he is encouraged to read Hegel's revolutionary work, The Science of Logic, specifically, Book II, Chapter 2, The Determinations of Reflection, as the present polemic is directly derived from it.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 "...Identity is only the determination of simple immediacy, of inert being, whereas contradiction is the root of all movement and life..." Hegel, The Science of Logic pg. 381-382, translated by George di Giovanni, Cambridge University Press 2010 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



“Logic is the art or skill of non-contradictory identification. Logic has a single law, the Law of Identity, and its various corollaries. If logic has nothing to do with reality, it means that the Law of Identity is inapplicable to reality. If so, then: a.things are not what they are; b. things can be and not be at the same time, in the same respect, i.e., reality is made up of contradictions. If so, by what means did anyone discover it? By illogical means. (This last is for sure.) The purpose of that notion is crudely obvious. Its actual meaning is not: “Logic has nothing to do with reality,” but: “I, the speaker, have nothing to do with logic (or with reality).” When people use that catch phrase, they mean either:“It’s logical, but I don’t choose to be logical” or: “It’s logical, but people are not logical, they don’t think—and I intend to pander to their irrationality.” Ayn Rand, Philosophy Who Needs It?, Chapter 2, Philosophical Detection

 

One must read carefully, Miss Rand is not saying that logic is a concept, though this is her actual position, but a "skill."* If one is lacking this "skill," and clearly many are and have been throughout the history of our species, then no matter how valuable logic is, it will have no value to those who lack its skill. In what sense then, can logic be said to exist? Is logic a transcendent concept or a cognitive skill? It's hard to see how Miss Rand can have it both ways, logic as concept and logic as skill? Is this not, from the very outset, a contradiction of her concept of identity?

How can logic have a "single law" ---"and corollaries?" This, on Miss Rand's part, is an admission of plurality, not singularity.  

Does logic have "a single law" or a single concept? Is logic a law or is it based on a law? Is logic a concept or is it based on a concept? Are concepts and laws the same thing? Could Miss Rand, if she was still among the living, give us an example of two identical things? Perhaps she would claim this doesn't matter? What matters is that things are identical to themselves.** But this concept hinges on several qualifications that are fatal to identity:

"If logic has nothing to do with reality...things can be and not be at the same time, in the same respect..."

The first fatality is that of the qualification of time. This is exceedingly problematic because we are asking time to deny itself, to stop itself, we are demanding thought to attach itself to the past notion of an instance, as though that instance, represented the totality of being. But as reality will have it, time is not stagnant, every instance of time (as we observe it in thought) would seem to be an instance of the past, and the past is not the reality of the present.  

The second fatal qualification is the delusion of static being, which is in fact, only an image of being, it is not being itself. Being is not static, but remains in a constant state of flux. In order to demand this of any object, one must deny the variable reality of the object. By not letting the object speak for itself, one distorts it with a concept. To demand therefore, that thought should isolate the moment, in order to deal more easily with the divergence and movement of being, is not only a betrayal of reality's active being, but also a suppression of thought's ability. 

The qualifications needed for identity: a static moment in time, coupled with static being, are quite telling. Why these qualifications? Why must the identity-thinker throw in the phrase, "at the same time in the same respect?" Imagine a man who claimed to be the world's greatest swordsman, one who claimed to be "totality invincible," but then said, "I am only invincible if you fight me at an exact instance in time, and you must remain in a perfectly static pose." Is this not laughable? Then how do we not mock at the qualifications of the so-called law of identity, this most powerful and irrefutable of all laws -- just as long as we add the fictional qualification of frozen time, coupled with the special pleading of static being. My dear reader, is this not laughable?

There are indeed, other qualifications needed to make sense of identity, such as unity and difference, and these qualifications are not identity, but that which makes identity intelligible. The necessity of these qualifications are exceedingly easy to prove. When we say A = A, for example, we are in fact, using three different symbols, we are also presupposing their unity. Hence, the concept of identity requires more than itself to make sense of itself. The concept, is in fact, a tautology of itself. This is because identity is not identical to itself, but presupposes the necessity of other concepts in order to make sense of itself.***        

"If so," says Miss Rand, "then reality is made up of contradictions. If so, by what means did anyone discover it? By illogical means. (This last is for sure.)"

We do not get to choose the nature of reality, we are simply born into it, and if reality is full of contradiction, then this doesn't mean reality ceases to be real! Further, it doesn't mean we have to forgo logic as a tool of value by which to understand and navigate reality. Those who claim it does, confuse the ontology of logic with the value of its function. (Here Miss Rand also commits the either or fallacy, precluding any other options apart from her logical idealism, as the only method by which to approach reality). Case and point, Miss Rand's logic is not comprehensive enough to comprehend reality, so there is a real sense in which our comprehension of reality, does indeed go beyond her logical idealism, hence, she would call it "illogical," not because it actually is, but because it contradicts her idealism. Dialectical logic is not the same as idealistic logic. The former attempts to grasp being within the circumference of its movement, while the latter deceives itself with static images, what it calls "logical," is nothing more than a dead image which it tries to pass off as living reality.   

(It should be noted that contradiction, as absolute negativity, is entirely idealistic, meaning, we are imposing this concept on the object, if the object defies it, it doesn't mean that reality collapses into some kind of nihilism or abject incoherence. This is the false declaration, made by the cult of idealism, in the absence of the authority of its ideals. In other words, what does it really mean to say, that reality is contradictory, according to my idealism -- one then passes sentence against reality. But is the problem my idealism or reality? The nihilistic claim that follows after this idealist declaration is a farce, precisely because it is dictated by one's idealism! Here the idealist is the one attaching nihilism (negativity) to contradiction, which is to say, because he views it through the lens of his idealism he concludes, "that reality is made up of absolute negativity; that intelligence and order come to an end," hence "nihilism." In the absence of idealism he would say, "we observe that being is in motion and contains diversity within itself," he would not call it contradiction, but reality itself. The negativity of contradiction is a derivative of idealism.****)
    
Did we discover the contradictory nature of reality by logical means, specifically by utilizing the concept of identity? This is a question of method, and the first answer is, that we discovered it by observing the motions of bodies in existence, and this observation is never a singularity but always a process of plurality. But Miss Rand, is perhaps, asking about the kind of logic we utilized in the process of this observation? Could it be the concept of identity? Surely not, because the dogma of this tautology asserts that being is a static image, as opposed to a process of becoming, as opposed to matter in motion. This would imply that identity would always discriminate (from the outset) against the non-image of being's inconstant essence. To put it in other terms, this concept dictates that being must be understood as an image, while its becoming and absolute movement, must be rejected in favor of the ideology of the concept which contradicts it.

Here Miss Rand tries to make the same point more directly:

"They proclaim that there is no law of identity, that nothing exists but change, and blank out the fact that change presupposes the concepts of what changes, from what and to what, that without the law of identity no such concept as“change” is possible." Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual, from Galt's Speech pg.127, Signet Edition 1963

Is it true that without the concept of identity no concept of change is possible? This would imply that change was merely an idea, which it is not, change, movement, is first and foremost, the material reality of being, only after this does it become a concept. Further, does my concept of change arise from a concept that precludes its existence? We would be most fascinated to hear how identity stands as the axiom of the concept of change? 


That we discern motion, is not because of identity, but because identity goes beyond itself, entering into the superior realm of dialectics. In other words, the concrete being of identity, which stands as a living plurality, is itself a contradiction of the concept of identity. There is no such thing as singularity in logic; there is no such thing as singular identity, but all identity contains within itself, a diversity of components which contradict the idealist conception of identity.   

Sadly, Miss Rand is not concerned with reality, but with the consistency of her ideas about reality, which is precisely the theological procedure of idealism.

In contrast to Miss Rand, we are not claiming there is no such thing as identity, we are calming, with so many other dialecticians, that identity is not a pure concept without its own presuppositions, most specifically, that of unity and difference. We are also claiming that the object is superior to its concept, and ought to inform the concept by the concrete nature of its being. The concept proceeds from being, even as the concept is directed back at being. As Hegel says, "truth is complete only in the unity of identity with difference, and hence consists only in this unity." Hegel’s Science of Logic pg.414, translated by A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin,1969 (Analytical Table of Contents: paragraph.876)

Is there such a thing as static being or an object not in motion?

Does change presuppose the concepts of what changes, "from what and to what"? Change presupposes the actual existence of change, not a mere concept! But perhaps Miss Rand is asking about our comprehension of this change? Change is not just a concept, it is first and foremost a reality. 


To use identity is to presuppose concepts more primitive than identity itself. If we say, 'the acorn grew into a tree,' it's not simply that we presuppose identity, but we presuppose the presuppositions which make identity possible in the first place. Miss Rand is claiming that identity is the concept by which all other concepts are made intelligible. It seems we could only say this if identity, did not, presuppose concepts beyond itself, we could only say this if identity, was in fact, a singularity. 

If the intelligibility of a concept (such as change) is informed by a plurality of concepts, and if Miss Rand is claiming that all these concepts demonstrate identity, then why do these concepts paint a picture of reality that is contrary to identity? What does it mean, if the negation of identity, is the conclusion of identity? Further, how can identity be the axiom of the concept of change, when it's not even the concept of itself? 

The formation of concepts is not the result of the concept of identity, but the result of many factors (and concepts) working together to comprehend being within the motions of its existence. In order to comprehend the motions of being, it is necessary for identity to go beyond itself, which means it is necessary for identity to begin beyond itself! 

Miss Rand is trying to demonstrate, that a rejection of her concept of identity, must entail its use. Her argument is that change is a concept, which is a product of individual concepts, only made possible by the concept of identity, which then produces the concept of change. But if reality is, from this to that, then clearly the object is not identical to itself, even as this view goes beyond identity's qualification of time, even as this consciousness goes beyond identity itself. The answer is that comprehension of reality, of being, is not a tautological matter of identity, but a concrete matter of dialectics, of the movement of being itself. This is proven by the fact that bare identity distorts reality. In short, the real problem is that Miss Rand is trying to get us to validate the universality of an instance in time, of a static object that doesn't exist, except as an image, as though this dead image comprised living reality. As we have already said, this is a form of abstract idealism. 

There is no such thing as a singular concept, all concepts are made up and constructed from the concrete basis of plural being. This is not mere abstraction. A concept is not one thing, and neither is it the result of one thing. Identity is not one thing, and neither is it the result of one thing. All being is in a constant state of flux, all being contains diversity within itself. 


If we allow ourselves to be deceived by a static image, when being is in a constant state of movement, then we will both begin and end by distorting reality. To say that the comprehension of change is the result of identity, is simply to manifest that one is confused about the nature of reality. Any act of comprehension is itself a plurality, and to claim that two static images of being, brought together, is what accounts for our understanding of change, is to be ignorant of the plural nature of identity itself. 

It's not that identity presupposes unity and difference, per se, but that identity contains unity and difference within itself, within the circumference of its very being! This is why Hegel said, "From the concrete itself or its synthetic proposition, abstraction could indeed extract by analysis the proposition of identity; but then, in fact, it would not have left experience as it is, but altered it; for the fact is that experience contains identity in unity with difference and is the immediate refutation of the assertion that abstract identity as such is something true, for the exact opposite, namely, identity only in union with difference, occurs in every experience." Hegel’s Science of Logic pg.415, translated by A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin,1969 (Paragraph. 878 Analytical Table of Contents)

Here Hegel shatters the myth of singular experience, by noting that experience is always, at every moment, made up of a diversity of components. However, the superstition of the singularity of experience, is the very thing Ayn Rand appeals to in order to justify her idealistic conception of identity. The only thing this proves, is that she's ignorant. Miss Rand goes so far as to repudiate the idea of everything being in a constant state of flux, which puts her directly at odds with the concrete nature of reality. Miss Rand is not explicating reality in her thought, she is using abstract idealism to fight against it.                                
 

"The purpose of that notion is crudely obvious. Its actual meaning is not: “Logic has nothing to do with reality,” but: “I, the speaker, have nothing to do with logic (or with reality).”

But if logic, the principle of identity, as Miss Rand articulates it, rejects the possibility of a reality of motion and contradiction from the outset, then clearly her syllogism is reversed! It's actual meaning is, "reality has nothing to do with my concepts," but: "I, the speaker, Miss Rand, impose my concepts on reality." And this is precisely the ontological reality of Miss Rand's concept of identity, it functions as an a priory construct, distorting one's comprehension of reality. Those who follow it, believing it to be a profound form of thought, have yet to be introduced to the genius of dialectics.

To attempt to simplify all we have argued for polemically: the problem with identity is that it is essentially 1) a contradiction of itself and 2) a concept that is pitted against reality to the detriment of comprehension. The concept ends up dictating a false view of reality, deceiving those who wield it as an absolute totality. And this is precisely what it did in the case of Ayn Rand. As Hegel clarified so very long ago:

"This proposition in its positive expression A = A is, in the first instance, nothing more than the expression of an empty tautology. It has therefore been rightly remarked that this law of thought has no content and leads no further. It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different. They do not see that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different.But further, they do not see that, by clinging to this unmoved identity which has its opposite in difference, they thereby convert it into a one-sided determinateness which, as such, has no truth." Hegel’s Science of Logic pg.413-414, translated by A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin,1969 (Analytical Table of Contents: paragraph. 875-876)





Notes-----------------------------------



*Ayn Rand is correct, logic is first and foremost a cognitive skill. This is the material foundation of all logic. Without this foundation there would be no such thing as logic. Logic is a contingent skill long before it's a concept. All concepts presuppose the material foundation of cognition. Further, cognition itself presupposes a material, historical process of knowledge-transference and progress within the species. To remove this process would be to negate the existence of the cognitive skills that bring forth logic, it would be to negate logic itself. The foundations of logic are inescapably material. The point however, is that this stands in hostile tension to Miss Rand's idealistic notion of logic.


** "The principle of identity does not reveal its one-sidedness or its logical limitation only in the consequences of its application, but already in its immediate form. One says, initially not without reason, that the principle of identity is a tautology, which itself is clearly a tautological statement, for without the principle of identity we would have no concept of tautology at all. What this really means is that the principle of identity alone does not allow us to move on from it to any other content beyond identity. In identifying thinking reflection does not refer to anything else beyond itself; it is not authorized by anything outside itself to think these thoughts and nothing outside it can lead it astray when thinking them. This is equivalent to saying that identity in this initial meaning does not possess determinate being. There exists nothing at all that simply is so determined as the principle of identity prescribes. Leibniz demonstrated this by setting the princesses of Hanover in the Herrenhausen park the problem of finding two leaves that were completely identical to each other. The astonished princesses had to concede that even in all the hedges and trees of such a large park as Herrenhausen, there were no two leaves identical to each other. They were persuaded in this empirical manner that identity belongs wholly in the realm of thought, of ideality and that everything that exists on this earth is not only one but also another. This is why the principle of identity in fact can only be indirectly expressed and illustrated." “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, A Propaedeutic,” pg.251-252, Thomas Hoffmann, translated by David Healan, Brill 2015


***"Identity and difference are thus not two distinct categorical terms of thinking but one and the same: they are ‘identical’ functions of reflection. You cannot identify without differentiating just as you cannot differentiate without identifying. This is why everything determined to be identical is also determined as being different and vice versa—Peter is Peter already to the extent that he is not Paul and the principle of identity itself is what it immediately is to the extent that it is not the principle of, for instance, plurality; to be an identical function of reflection means to be a function of the plurality of reflection.” Ibid. Hoffmann pg.253


**** "…identificational thinking itself is a tremendous abstraction. We have recently begun to become painfully aware of the artificial world man has constructed and imposed on the natural immediacy of the planet earth by force of identificational thinking in its abstractness and its nihilism— for everything built by reflection is built on negation." Ibid. Hoffmann pg.251        

                 

-
-
-