Consider the passage in question from "Section One: Essence as Reflection Within Itself":
"Essence issues from being; hence it is not immediately in and for itself but is a result of that movement. Or if essence is taken at first as an immediacy, then it is a specific determinate being confronted by another such; it is only essential, as opposed to unessential, determinate being. But essence is being that has been sublated in and for itself; what confronts it is only illusory being [Schein]. The illusory being, however, is essence's own positing. Essence is first reflection. Reflection determines itself and its determinations are a positedness which is at the same time reflection-into-self. Secondly, we have to consider these determinations of reflection or essentialities. Thirdly, essence as the reflection-into-self of its determining converts itself into ground and passes over into Existence and Appearance." (p.393)
This is not philosophical exposition; it is an incantation, a spell woven from baseless assertions and anthropomorphic fantasies. Hegel treats "essence," "being," "reflection," and "ground" as if they were living organisms, autonomous actors in a cosmic theater, issuing forth, confronting each other, positing, determining, and converting themselves with no human intervention. This is superstition, pure and simple: the attribution of agency to inanimate abstractions, akin to ancient animism where spirits inhabit rocks or winds. But unlike primitive myths, Hegel's version is authoritarian, insisting that this "movement" is the inexorable truth of reality, brooking no dissent from classical logic or empirical verification. Let us rip this apart, clause by clause, revealing the nonsense at its core.
Hegel asserts, "Essence issues from being; hence it is not immediately in and for itself but is a result of that movement." Issues from? As if essence were a progeny birthed by being, emerging through some mystical parturition. What "movement"? Hegel gestures vaguely at a prior dialectical process, but provides no mechanism, no proof, only decree. Essence is not a thing that "issues" anywhere; it is a conceptual distinction we draw to differentiate underlying qualities from superficial appearances. By personifying it as a "result" of an autonomous movement, Hegel commits the fallacy of reification: treating an abstraction as a concrete entity with its own trajectory. This is not logic; it is narrative fiction, where concepts play roles in Hegel's self-scripted drama.
The absurdity escalates: "If essence is taken at first as an immediacy, then it is a specific determinate being confronted by another such; it is only essential, as opposed to unessential, determinate being." Confronted by another? Hegel makes it sound like concepts are living organisms interacting with each other, squaring off in a metaphysical duel. But concepts do not "confront" anything; they are static tools of thought, not belligerent agents. Where is the evidence that essence "confronts" unessential being? There is none— only Hegel's fiat, only his assertions. This language imports the grammar of intentional action into pure abstraction, creating the illusion of dynamism where there is only stasis. It is superstitious nonsense, projecting life onto the lifeless, as if essence were a warrior facing its foe. Rational philosophy demands justification: by what principle does this confrontation occur? Hegel offers nothing but his own word, enforcing submission to his myth.
Then comes the pinnacle of delusion: "But essence is being that has been sublated in and for itself; what confronts it is only illusory being. The illusory being, however, is essence's own positing." Essence's own positing? This is absurd (Hegel speaks as though essence is a living being, capable of self-positing like a deity creating ex nihilo). Positing implies an agent, a poser; but essence is not an agent, it is a category constructed by humans. How does an abstraction "posit" its own illusion? It doesn't, of course! This is verifiable superstition: attributing creative power to a logical term, as if it possessed will or consciousness. Hegel claims illusory being is "essence's own positing," but this is circular: essence posits the illusion that confronts it, which in turn defines essence. Where's the proof? Because all we see is Hegel working with and logically relating concepts; we don't see concepts relating to themselves. This self-referential loop is not a philosophical development; it is intellectual deception, masking the absence of any real argument.
The farce continues: "Essence is first reflection. Reflection determines itself and its determinations are a positedness which is at the same time reflection-into-self." Reflection determines itself? What?! This is not a demonstration; it is an edict. Hegel anthropomorphizes "reflection" as a self-determining entity, as if it were a mind pondering its own navel. But reflection is a human cognitive act (mirroring, analyzing, negating) not an independent force that "determines itself." Where is the proof for this? None is provided; Hegel simply asserts that determinations are "positedness" which is simultaneously "reflection-into-self." This is category confusion at its worst: conflating logical relations with ontological processes. If reflection truly determines itself outside of a thinker's mind, Hegel must explain the mechanism (empirically, logically, or otherwise). He doesn't, because he can't, and neither can anyone else because concepts, words, are not organisms with agency. This is superstition masquerading as profundity, demanding we accept concepts as self-animating gods.
Finally, the climax of incoherence: “Thirdly, essence as the reflection-into-self of its determining converts itself into ground and passes over into Existence and Appearance.” Converts itself into ground? What? What?! Hegel provides no process, no rationale, only a magical transformation. Essence “converts itself” as if it were an alchemist transmuting lead into gold, “passing over” into new forms like a migrating soul. This is not philosophy; it is more akin to occultism, where abstractions undergo mystical metamorphoses without cause or evidence.
The verb “converts” implies agency, intention, and causal power, but “essence” is not a subject. It is a conceptual abstraction, a tool of thought, not a being with will. Yet Hegel treats it as such, manipulating concepts while pretending they relate to themselves, projecting a superstitious vitality onto inert categories.
Worse still, Hegel cannot even make this statement without presupposing the very logical principles he claims to transcend. His sentence covertly relies on:
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Identity: Essence must remain essence (A = A) throughout the change for the transformation to be meaningful at all. If “essence” becomes “ground” without continuity of identity, then it was never essence to begin with.
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Non-Contradiction: For essence to “become” ground, it must first not be ground (¬(A ∧ ¬A)); otherwise, there is no change to describe, only a collapse of distinction.
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Causality: A conversion implies cause and effect. Yet Hegel offers no cause beyond essence’s mystical self-activity, a self-generating miracle with no explanatory power.
These laws (identity, non-contradiction) are the rational scaffolding that makes Hegel’s claims intelligible. But elsewhere, he denounces them: mocking “abstract identity,” elevating contradiction into a virtue, and declaring that essence is, in itself, its own negation (p.412-413). This is not philosophical rigor; it is philosophical duplicity.
Hegel's system is parasitic. It borrows logic to build its arguments, then claims to have transcended logic. It leans on coherence to construct its dialectic, but disavows accountability to coherence when pressed, not discarding logic outright, but shielding itself from its judgment. This is not a higher logic; it is a philosophical theology in disguise, a myth of self-moving abstractions that collapses under the weight of its own contradictions.
Hegel's "Science of Logic" is no science; it is a cult of contradiction, a superstition that erodes reason to enthrone irrational authority. We must refute it not with deference, but with rigor: his sentences are nonsense, self-parodying assertions that collapse under scrutiny.** Philosophy thrives on clarity and proof; Hegel offers obfuscation and faith. His system does not sharpen reason — it dismantles it. To fail to reject it is to risk becoming intellectually disarmed, deceived by illusion, and incapable of resisting irrationality cloaked in pseudo-profundity.
No amount of poetic phrasing can save Hegel's philosophy from itself. Hegel does not illuminate reality; he obscures it behind the fog of contradiction. The defense of reason begins with the refutation of those who seek to dismantle it — and Hegel, though he imagined himself its great reformer, stands at the front of that line.
His philosophy does not deserve reverence.
It deserves demolition.
** A clear examples appears on page 412 of the Science of Logic, where Hegel writes:
“The truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself. The Notion of identity, that it is simple self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection but has come from being itself.”
This is not philosophical argumentation; it's more like syntactic choreography used to mask semantic incoherence. Each clause cancels the last: “self-sameness” is “different from itself,” contradiction is “self-identity,” and everything is simultaneously itself and its opposite, not figuratively, but in its own self. Hegel attempts to declare contradiction as truth by layering abstractions until the reader submits through exhaustion or confusion.
Worse, he smuggles this irrationality in as if it were a discovery, not an invention: “the Notion of identity… has come from being itself.” But being does not speak; it does not produce “Notions” or whisper paradoxes into the ears of philosophers. Hegel attributes agency to abstract categories and reifies grammatical artifacts as metaphysical forces. What results is not insight but a kind of conceptual delirium, where reason is hijacked to justify its own erasure. It is, in every rigorous sense, nonsense.
