THESES ON THE SUICIDE OF WALTER BENJAMIN

 

[1] Is philosophy always an attempt at escape until it enters into the consciousness of dialectic?

[2] It was at the point of self-negation that Benjamin started his disposition as a philosopher: romanticism could no longer get in the way. When death comes knocking, abstraction falls away, this means thought, untrammeled by social categories, can begin.   

[3] The intellectual is constantly striving to transcend the impoverished and desperate conditions of existence, sometimes this succeeds, but where barbarism has its way, there thought is smothered by stupidity, the end result is a loss of intelligence to the species, man reverts to being bludgeoned, not only by nature, but also by his own psychology. 

[4] The calculation made by the philosopher, when it comes to suicide, is a matter of quality, which is to say, a life of suffering is not worth living. "To learn how to philosophize is to learn how to die." There is no such thing as the absolute value of life, all life is contingent on the quality of material conditions, where these are lacking, life cannot justify itself. Self-negation is the wise decree of intelligence in the absence of the possibility of life's quality.

[5] One who not only chooses to die but follows through with it by their own hand... the temptation is to call this "weakness" or "stupidity." It is no such thing! Socrates demonstrated that there are worse things than death, things we would rather die than have happen to us. Death is not the ultimate evil, an existence full of suffering is the Ultimate Evil! 

[6] It is most interesting that thought can deliver freedom into the hands of the thinker by making him aware of the futility and impoverishment of conditions, so much so that intelligence reaches the conclusion that life is not worth living; the conclusion that danger lies ahead. Intelligence lands on the strong conclusion of self-negation, and this is neither sickness or madness.  

[7] Coercion is the thing that forced Benjamin's hand. What kind of coercion? It was the threat of being treated as an object without dignity; the threat of being deprived of all the things that make life worth living. At bottom it was the threat of barbarism, a domain where reason and evidence no longer inform life, but where they are constantly smothered and suppressed. In this domain impulse reigns supreme, it operates without thought as a mediator.

[8] No one actually wants to die, they just don't want to suffer. Suicide is not necessarily where the laws of nature drive us, it is where the tyranny of man drives us. So much human suffering is unnecessary, what makes it necessary is man's greed and drive for power. But that is not all, idealism is also a malignant force in the world, often originating in a pathology of denial -- man cannot face reality.

[9] Men consider death the Ultimate Evil, but this is backward; a life subject to a tyrannical system, suffocated, impoverished, malnourished, deprived of the access it needs to obtain unto quality, this is the Ultimate Evil. Every person that commits suicide, because they were crushed by the heartless gears of a mad system, validates this truth. Death is not the Ultimate Evil, that belongs to the unnecessary suffering of life!  

[10] Benjamin knew it would come to an end. How does the world look through the eyes of intelligence? Like a madhouse wherein one must find the nearest exit to avoid a horrific fate. Deceive yourself no longer, man's games only matter if they lead to an increase in the quality of his existence. Philosophy: games for the sake of games are not good enough, these only work as long as one has favorable material or physical conditions.  

[11] Most thinkers seem to begin with the superstitious premise of life's unconditional value. All this means is that they can't think the worst and then go beyond it. This "beyond" is important because it carries the affirmation of life. This beyond is not mysticism, it's not the supernatural, it's simply man using his intelligence to ensure that life is an experience of quality. But if one cannot think the worst then how can they overcome it? Where thought cannot go, there it invents delusions. Benjamin was faced with the imminent prospect of tremendous suffering. He had to make a choice against life to spare himself from an experience of suffering. One must learn it in all boldness: this is perhaps the highest act of intelligence. 

[12] It takes great courage to end life on the basis of probable knowledge. Here the abstract games of skeptics do not work, too much was on the line for Benjamin, he had to make a choice based on probability. It's only the moral idealist who demands that the subject carry on regardless of circumstances. Those who are bent on validating the value of life at all costs, even when it no longer has value, are the most brutal inquisitors on the earth. Because these people fear death so greatly, therefore they cannot allow it to take place in others. Thus do they call it a thing that is fake: "a moral evil."

[13] Those who command that we must live to the bitter end are literally insane -- they are also dangerous! What these people are really saying is that we should be forced to suffer in order to quiet their fears, in order to validate their delusions. Make no mistake, such idealists are dangerous tyrants that have inflicted the worst suffering on our species, all in an attempt to uphold their idealism. How many have had to suffer until virus or worm had sucked out the last breath? And yet their demise was inevitable, their suffering could have been lessened if man was able to view the worst. Death is not the ultimate evil!

[14] What happens to theory at the point of self-negation? No matter how hard it fought to resist praxis, it is now forced to enter into praxis. The real problem is that so much theory leads to death, that which escapes this inevitable conclusion has either introduced the lie of mysticism to comfort itself, or it has obtained unto material quality (or the possibility of such). The former is a form of denial while the latter is a form of authentic hope. 

[15] The tyranny of idealism reached its climax in the concentration camps of Germany, where prisoners were not allowed to take their own lives. This is always the climax of idealism, which amounts to the abstract assertion of life's value regardless of life's quality.

[16] In self-negation Benjamin was a hero to himself against the tyranny of existence. He displayed an intelligence that runs higher than the impulse of nature.

[17] The central question of self-negation is the question of peaceful-negation. Intelligence arrives at its climax in the question of how to live a life of quality, but it reaches its summation in the question of peaceful self-negation.  

 

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HEGEL VERSUS ARISTOTLE: A DEBATE ON THE LAW OF IDENTITY

 

:An informal exchange between 

Philosopher Jersey Flight and 

an Aristotelian Apologist:

 

This exchange was censored before 

it could come to completion. 

The so-called, “philosophical moderators” were petitioned to let the debaters finish the exchange, 

but the petition was arrogantly denied. 

 

JERSEY FLIGHT:

This exchange started when you made the following claim:

"Actually Plato provides a much more useful dialect than Hegel. After reading Plato and Aristotle, you'll be able to see where Hegel goes wrong in his dialectics, leading people like dialectical materialists into a violation of the law of non-contradiction." — Aristotelian Apologist

This assertion has not been sustained.

Hegel's position on being, as you seem to use the term, is that it is not only inconsequential, but dangerous insofar as it serves to distort essence: "For here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form, but want to know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By this we understand no more than that things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality to another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and back again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence."

You are free to insist that you are talking about the law of identity. You are also free to insist that your external imposition of negation doesn't imply a violation of the law, but the law of identity is an entirely positive formation. As soon as you bring in the negative you have gone beyond identity. You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being, but it does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is thought suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the creation of abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality.

Hegel commenting on Aristotle's logic: "Now if, according to this point of view, thought is considered on its own account, it does not make its appearance implicitly as knowledge, nor is it without content in and for itself; for it is a formal activity which certainly is exercised, but whose content is one given to it. Thought in this sense becomes something subjective; these judgments and conclusions are in and for themselves quite true, or rather correct – this no one ever doubted; but because content is lacking to them, these judgments and conclusions do not suffice for the knowledge of the truth."

"So long as I maintain the separation between what is said about the object's identity, and the object's real identity, there is no problem." — Aristotelian Apologist

The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless category.

“Just because the abstract formation I put forward, describing the identity of the object, is not the object itself, does not mean that there is not an object, with its own identity.” — Aristotelian Apologist

My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it distorts our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its movement not its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your categories from the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena. I suppose you could assign multiple abstractions to an object if you so desired, but the danger is always the same: distortion of the comprehension of reality itself.

“Yes, you continue to assert that Hegel demonstrated "identity" to be faulty, or contradictory, but you have yet to produce the argument. The argument you have here does nothing.” — Aristotelian Apologist

In concise form, you will have to connect the dots through careful contemplation:

"Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical with itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands." Hegel


----------ARISTOTELIAN APOLOGIST REPLY----------


"For here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form, but want to know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By this we understand no more than that things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality to another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and back again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." Hegel


This passage demonstrates how this so-called distortion of essence is a feature of Hegel's misunderstanding of the Aristotelian concept, "essence" and nothing else. As I explained to you already, Aristotle defined two senses of "form". The one is the human abstraction, and this is how we come to know the essence of things. The other is the form of the material thing itself. Each material thing is a particular, an individual with a form proper to itself. This form is distinct from the essence of the thing, which is the form which human beings know in abstraction, because it consists of accidentals, whereas the essence does not. Do you apprehend that difference? The essence does not contain the accidentals which inhere within the form of the material object. Both are "forms", yet "forms" in two distinct senses of the word.

So the following statement reveals Hegel's misunderstanding, "The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed...there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing. What is concealed is the independent "form" of the thing, complete with the accidentals which the human being does not necessarily perceive. And this independent form constitutes the identity of the thing. That this is the proper interpretation is evident from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, who did much work expounding on the difference between the forms of human abstraction (essences), and the independent "Forms".

Hegel, with this use of "essence" puts us right back into the confusion of Plato's Timaeus. "Form" as "essence", is a universal. The problem which confronted Plato was the question of how a particular could come into existence from a universal form. He thought it necessary to assume this, because things, like human beings for instance, come into existence as a determinate type. So the human form, as a universal, must be prior to the particular, the individual human being. He was stumped because the medium between the universal and the particular was seen as matter, but the universal form could not account for the existence of the particulars of the material individual. Aristotle got beyond this problem by assigning all such universal forms (essences) as the product of human abstraction, therefore posterior to the things themselves, while also positing a new type of form, the form of the individual. which substantiates a thing's "identity". Hegel, in not upholding this distinction confuses identity with essence.

“You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being, but it does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is thought suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the creation of abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality.” — Jersey Flight

That's right, formal logic deals with essences, not with actual things. But dialectics is not formal logic. How do you suppose that a person might create useful abstract categories without an appropriate understanding of reality? Creation of suitable abstract categories can only follow from a comprehension of reality.

“The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless category.” — Jersey Flight

Right, there is a distinction to be upheld, between the form of the thing, within the human mind, the abstraction, and the form of the thing in reality. The "non-real identity" is the identity given to the thing by the human mind, the abstraction, the essence. It is "non-real", because it is lacking in the accidentals which are a part of the identity of the individual thing.

“My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it distorts our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its movement not its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your categories from the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena.” — Jersey Flight


This is not what Hegel says. The "movement" you refer to here is called by Hegel "becoming". It is not called "the actual being" in Hegel's dialectics. That is the point I'm trying to impress on you, "Being" is subsumed within the category of becoming, "movement". That's how Hegel can argue against Aristotle's concept of identity. There is no such thing as beings in the real, actual world, only becoming, because Hegel has done away with any independent Forms. All forms are dependent on the human mind, as essences, and there is no true form or being concealed behind how the thing appears to us, only movement, becoming. A thing only has being through human apprehension. Other than this it is just a becoming.

“Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical with itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding.” — Hegel


See, this is Hegel's misrepresentation, a straw man. The law of identity says that a thing has an identity unto itself. It says nothing about abstract understanding. It is a law against the abuse of abstraction reasoning. It says nothing about what abstract understanding is, or how it ought proceed, only what it is not, i.e. a thing's identity. It was created by Aristotle as a tool against sophists who claimed that the human abstraction (essence) of a thing is the thing's identity. This sophistic claim denies the possibility of human mistake as to identity. That is why we must uphold a distinction between a thing's true identity, its own particular and unique form, and the identity which we assign to it in abstraction (essence). Without this distinction there can be no such thing as human knowledge being mistaken, because what we say about the thing is what is true about it.

“Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding.” — Hegel

Let's say that the law of identity is an ideal. As such, it is proposed as a limitation, or rule for abstraction. As a proposal, or proposition, it might be judged for truth or falsity and rejected or accepted accordingly. What I am arguing is that Hegel's rejection is unjustified, being based in a faulty dialectic, consisting of a misunderstanding of the Aristotelian conceptions of "form" and "essence", evidenced by [your own] quotes.

Furthermore, if we reject the law of identity there are consequences which need to be respected. Initially, the assumption that there are particular, determinate individuals, beings or objects, in the real, or actual world, is unsubstantiated, unsupported and unjustified. So it makes no sense, as hypocrisy or self-contradiction, to both deny the law of identity and also talk about "actual being". Without the law of identity, or an adequate replacement, the claim of "actual being" is completely invalid.

“The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands.” — Hegel

This is another example of Hegel's misrepresentation of Aristotelian principles. A thing, for Aristotle consists of both matter and form. A thing's identity is form alone. Therefore we have the required distinction between subject (the thing as matter and form), and what is predicated of the thing, identity (its form). It is this separation of a thing's true, real form ("identity" rather than human abstraction), from the material thing, which allows Christian theologians to conceive of immaterial Forms, which are prior to, and necessary for, as the cause of existence, of material things. Aristotelian principles disallow matter without form, but not form without matter.

 

----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------

 

There are some from my own school of thought who would call this exchange "a fruitless endeavor," but I do not agree with this, and this is why: it is insufficient to prejudice the accuracy of one's position merely because one has convictions as to the nature of its truth. I reject this. I believe philosophy is best served as honest and diligent minds come into collision with each other. Further, those who say this, not putting forth the effort to defend their own views, are in danger of forfeiting truth to the victory of error. (Of course, this assumes their views are true). It is clear to me that what is required of serious thinkers is not merely to validate the cravings of their own egos, or to bask in their convictions, but to search out the nature of truth, even if its comprehension causes them the greatest psychological distress. It is hard for me to respect thinkers that are not willing to subject their ideas to coarse criticism. This does not mean one should apply themselves to every contrarian under the sun, but that qualitative objections should be discerned, sought out, and engaged. It greatly saddens me that so many dialectical thinkers have retreated to the Ivory Tower of theory. These thinkers do not fail to write books proclaiming the formation of their ideas, but when it comes to defending them, they fly off and hideaway or dismiss the seriousness of their opponent's objections through the sheer arrogance of their convictions. Not I dear reader, I will do my best to apply thought where it deserves to be applied. I believe there are few things so valuable to the thinker than the resistance of other minds.

*********

The first distinction I should like to make is that being is an actual, concrete thing, not a mere concept or word. Words are objects that we create in order to make sense of being. We do not discover them, unless by "discover" one is talking about cultural integration.    

"Each material thing is a particular, an individual with a form proper to itself. This form is distinct from the essence of the thing, which is the form which human beings know in abstraction, because it consists of accidentals, whereas the essence does not." – Aristotelian Apologist

Isn't it actually the case that no material thing is a particular? You are in fact the one assigning this abstract identity to the object. Even the concept "particular" is not itself particular. Diversity and movement is found everywhere in being.

"Hegel argues that these three concepts [particular, individual, universal], though they seem quite distinct, are intimately bound up with each other. The understanding, however, does not see this and holds the three strictly separated. The understanding sees universals as externally related to particulars. In its extreme form, this may issue in an ontological separation between them, as in Plato’s philosophy, where universals or ‘forms’ are held to exist in a different reality altogether separate from their particular exemplars. Hegel rejects any such approach, and shows how in a real sense it is quite impossible to think the universal, particular, and individual apart from each other. For instance, if the universal is thought to be absolutely separate from individuals, and unique in its own right, then isn’t the universal an individual? Further, if an individual is understood as absolutely separate from universals, doesn’t it become an empty abstraction (i.e., a kind of universal) without specific quality? Hegel argues that the concepts of universal, particular and individual mutually determine one another." The Hegel Dictionary, Glenn Alexander Magee, Continuum International Publishing Group p.255    

"The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing." – Aristotelian Apologist

It seems to me this is the crux of everything you are saying. How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing? Further, it seems the way you make use of these determinations, extracted images, I will not yet call them "properties," is to wield them as totalities and finalities against the movement and diversity of being.  This seems exceedingly problematic to me, but there is more... what the mind apprehends is precisely the immediacy of an object, unless one goes beyond this mere apprehension (which takes one beyond bare identity) one cannot inform essence with totality from the narrow category of identity. Here you are trying to smuggle in content that cannot be furnished by bare identity alone. The fact that you are doing this, and that you must do this, only stands to demonstrate the accuracy of Hegel's critique of Aristotle.  

"What is concealed is the independent "form" of the thing, complete with the accidentals which the human being does not necessarily perceive." – Aristotelian Apologist

This seems to contradict your previous premise, when you said "the essence of a thing is not concealed," and while I note the use of a new term to overcome the limitations of your identity position ("accidentals"), I would also note that the actual concretion of what you are doing here seems to contradict your description. I think this is the part that really matters; I think it's the part that exposes the technique of your idealism, which appears to me as a form of sophistry. It seems you are trying to walk two roads at once in an attempt to retain the appearance of consistency for your formal position on identity, but when we actually examine the concrete process of your determination and formation, we find that it negates your description of identity. What you are actually doing, which is to say, what you must do, in order to furnish being with adequate content, forces you to go beyond the so-called law of identity.

"... formal logic deals with essences, not with actual things. But dialectics is not formal logic. How do you suppose that a person might create useful abstract categories without an appropriate understanding of reality? Creation of suitable abstract categories can only follow from a comprehension of reality." – Aristotelian Apologist

The point of dialectics is that you cannot arrive at an accurate essence (understanding of reality) through identity, but must make use of unity and difference; these not only negate the narrow Aristotelian formation of identity, but go beyond it. Just because one produces a formalism, through the method which you are here defending, doesn't make it accurate or comprehensive. One could in fact, understand reality in such a way that they extract error from it, thus leading to an erroneous formalism. That is to say, a comprehension of reality can only follow from a dialectical process.  

"...if we reject the law of identity there are consequences which need to be respected. Initially, the assumption that there are particular, determinate individuals, beings or objects, in the real, or actual world, is unsubstantiated, unsupported and unjustified." – Aristotelian Apologist

Here your idealism shines through with vibrant colors. It is not a matter of "rejecting," I think this might be the problem in your characterization, it is a matter of incompletion, a lack of totality, Hegel demonstrates that the principle, as Aristotle forms it, is neither conscious nor consistent with itself.   

Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is no identity without them; where there is identity there you already have the negation of Unity and Difference.

You claim that if the Aristotelian formation is rejected that we cannot make sense of objects in reality, but this presupposes that we actually form our concepts through the narrow prism of identity, but we don't, this is the naive idealistic assumption, it is akin to the idealist drinking his own Kool-Aid. Hegel proved that every occurrence of identity is making use of other principles, namely, unity and difference.

I am well aware of the fact that you will likely claim I am attacking a strawman of your position. If this is actually the case then my argument has not made contact with your discourse. However, I think the reason you claim this, is because the thing you are claiming is not the same as what you are doing. You are saying that I am not making contact with your position because I am not validating your description of the process, but like Hegel, I am claiming that your actual process of identity is in tension with your formal description.   

 

----------ARISTOTELIAN APOLOGIST REPLY----------

 

“The first distinction I should like to make is that being is an actual, concrete thing, not a mere concept or word” — Jersey Flight

You need to explain your use of "being", because it makes no sense to me. You are not using it as a noun, to talk about "a being", or individual "beings", so I assume that it is used either as a verb, or as an adjective like "existence" is used as an adjective when we say that a thing has existence or being. Either way, you'd be talking about the concept of "being", not a concrete thing which would be a being. If "being" refers to an activity which many things are engaged in, then this is a concept. If "being" refers to a property, like existence, which things have, then again this is a concept. So it really makes no sense for you to use "being" in the way that you do, and insist that you are referring to an actual concrete thing, this would be "a being". And if "being" refers to some activity which things are involved in, then clearly this is conceptual, because each activity of each individual thing is distinct from the activity of every other thing, so to generalize and say that all these distinct activities have something in common which you call "being", is to conceptualize.

“I am well aware of the fact that you will likely claim I am attacking a strawman of your position. If this is actually the case then my argument has not made contact with your discourse.” — Jersey Flight

Yes, you have not really made contact with my discourse. I have stressed that Aristotle distinguishes two types of "form", one being the abstracted essence of a thing, and the other being the form which a material object has inherent within itself. Until you recognize this distinction, understand it, and either proceed from this, or refute it and offer something better, then you will just be attacking the straw man.

“You claim that if the Aristotelian formation is rejected that we cannot make sense of objects in reality, but this presupposes that we actually form our concepts through the narrow prism of identity, but we don't, this is the naive idealistic assumption, it is akin to the idealist drinking his own Kool-Aid. Hegel proved that every occurrence of identity is making use of other principles, namely, unity and difference.” — Jersey Flight

This is not the case at all. We do not produce concepts through "identity" as defined by the law of identity. We produce concepts in the mind, through abstractions, essences, logic, and other mental processes. The law of identity just serves to remind us that what we say about things, in conceptualization, may not be the truth about the thing. And if we think that the identity we like to give to the thing is the thing's true identity, then we are making such a mistake. So "identity" is not a principle by which we would construct concepts, rather we would deconstruct, by acknowledging that the so-called reality which we describe in words and meaning, concepts, is just an illusion, grounded in a false identity which recognizes the similarity between things rather than the differences between things.

“The point of dialectics is that you cannot arrive at an accurate essence (understanding of reality) through identity, but must make use of unity and difference, these not only negate the narrow Aristotelian formation of identity, but go beyond it. Just because one produces a formalism, through the method which you are here defending, doesn't make it accurate or comprehensive. One could in fact understand reality in such a way that they extract error from it, thus leading to an erroneous formalism. That is to say, a comprehension of reality can only follow from a dialectical process.” — Jersey Flight

As I just explained, the law of identity is not a principle by which we arrive at essences. It was formulated as a tool against the mistaken arguments of the sophists. It is a principle by which we demonstrate mistaken conceptualizations, not a principle to be used for the production of concepts. So your reference to unity and difference are not relevant in this context.

“Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is no identity without them, where there is identity, there you already have the negation of Unity and Difference.” — Jersey Flight

This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from "a thing is the same as itself".

“Here your idealism shines through with vibrant colors. It is not a matter of "rejecting," I think this might be the problem in your characterization, it is a matter of incompletion, a lack of totality, Hegel demonstrates that the principle, as Aristotle forms it, is neither conscious nor consistent with itself.” — Jersey Flight

I don't see how a principle could be conscious, and I'm still waiting for you to produce the demonstration you've told me Hegel made. So far you've only shown me how Hegel misunderstood the law of identity, and attacked a straw man.

“Isn't it actually the case that no material thing is a particular?” — Jersey Flight

I don't know what you could possibly mean here. We know material things as particulars, individuals. That chair is a particular, so is the table, and my computer. How could there possibly be a material thing which is something other than a particular thing? Care to explain?

"Hegel argues that these three concepts [particular, individual, universal], though they seem quite distinct, are intimately bound up with each other. The understanding, however, does not see this and holds the three strictly separated. The understanding sees universals as externally related to particulars. In its extreme form, this may issue in an ontological separation between them, as in Plato’s philosophy, where universals or ‘forms’ are held to exist in a different reality altogether separate from their particular exemplars. Hegel rejects any such approach, and shows how in a real sense it is quite impossible to think the universal, particular, and individual apart from each other. For instance, if the universal is thought to be absolutely separate from individuals, and unique in its own right, then isn’t the universal an individual? Further, if an individual is understood as absolutely separate from universals, doesn’t it become an empty abstraction (i.e., a kind of universal) without specific quality? Hegel argues that the concepts of universal, particular and individual mutually determine one another." The Hegel Dictionary, Glenn Alexander Magee, Continuum International Publishing Group p.255

Sure, the concept of particular is related to the concepts of individual, and also universal. But still, we understand material things as particulars, or individuals, and we understand universals as concepts. So this passage does nothing to refute the distinction between particular and universal. Just because we have a concept of what a particular is, and a concept of what a universal is, and these concepts are related as concepts are, doesn't mean that there is not a difference between what is understood by "particular", and what is understood by "universal". One is understood to be a material thing, while the other is understood to be a concept.

“It seems to me this is the crux of everything you are saying. How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?” — Jersey Flight

Do you understand the duality of "form" which I described above? Here's an example. When I see a chair in front of me, there is an image in my mind, we can call this the form of the chair. But the form of the chair, which exists within my mind, is not the same as the form which the material object I am seeing has. The material object I am seeing has molecules, atoms, etc., which are not evident in the image in my mind. So the form of the chair, which exists within my mind, is not the same as the form of the material object which I am calling a chair. These are two distinct "forms" of the very same thing. One is the abstraction, from which we might produce, concepts, and essences, the other is the form which is proper to the chair, constituting its identity.

So the essence of a thing is present to a human mind, as the concept of that thing, or type of thing, and is therefore not concealed. What is concealed, is the thing's true form, or identity, due to the deficiencies of our capacities of sense. Nevertheless, through sensation we do determine "a form" of the thing, and we may proceed to produce an essence, we just do not apprehend "the form", in the sense of the thing's true identity.

“This seems exceedingly problematic to me, but there is more... what the mind apprehends is precisely the immediacy of an object, unless one goes beyond this mere apprehension (which takes one beyond bare identity) one cannot inform essence with totality from the narrow category of identity. Here you are trying to smuggle in content that cannot be furnished by bare identity alone. The fact that you are doing this, and that you must do this, only stands to demonstrate the accuracy of Hegel's critique of Aristotle.” — Jersey Flight

As I said, we do not use identity to produce concepts and essences, we use the appearance of the thing to us, how the thing appears to us, its image etc., to produce such conceptualizations, and this is not "identity". So you are really attacking a straw man here. In no way am I arguing that identity provides the content for conceptualization. I am arguing the exact opposite, an unabridged gap between identity and conceptualization, such that "identity" in the sense defined by the law of identity, does not even enter into conceptualization..

“This seems to contradict your previous premise, when you said "the essence of a thing is not concealed," and while I note the use of a new term to overcome the limitations of your identity position ("accidentals"),” — Jersey Flight

It only seems like contradiction because you are not recognizing the duality of "form" which I've been talking about, and trying to get you to apprehend.

“It seems you are trying to walk two roads at once...” — Jersey Flight

There are two roads, two distinct types of "form". When you come to apprehend what I am saying, what Aristotle was saying, then make your point. But don't just keep hitting the straw man.

“What you are actually doing, which is to say, what you must do, in order to furnish being with adequate content, forces you to go beyond the so-called law of identity.” — Jersey Flight

Of course, being is conceptual, while identity is within the thing itself. So identity doesn't even enter into the content of being, or any such conceptualization. The thing itself cannot get into the content of our minds. But your straw man is to claim that I pretend to use identity as some sort of content or foundation for conceptualization. That's not the case, and that's why it's a straw man.

 

----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------

 

 There is too much sophistry in your reply. You did not answer my question: 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?'

 

----------ARISTOTELIAN APOLOGIST REPLY----------  

 

“There is too much sophistry in your reply. You did not answer my question: 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?'” — Jersey Flight

I didn't say "from the thing". That is just your materialist interpretation, like saying that the image of the chair in my mind when I see a chair "comes from the chair". It does not. It is created by, and therefore caused by, my mind. You interpret from a perspective completely different from mine, then instead of trying to understand what I am saying, you create a straw man from your faulty interpretation, to knock down. You are not in this discussion to understand, but to discredit names like "idealism". So you represent me with your straw man named "idealist" and knock it down, pretending that you are knocking me down.

You just cannot get out of your determinist/materialist way of seeing things, to be able to understand what I am saying. Do you recognize two distinct types of forms, the form which the object called "chair" has, within itself, and the form of it which exists in my mind when I see it?

If the form in my mind came from the chair, it could not be mistaken. It would be taken necessarily from the chair, and therefore could not be anything but a correct representation of the chair. However, this is not the case, mistakes abound, because the form in the mind is created by my mind, not taken from the chair. And that is why the form in my mind must be understood as distinct from the form in the material object

Do you understand the nature of representation? One thing, like a symbol for example, represents something else. The symbol is not taken from the other thing, nor is it necessarily a facsimile or even a likeness of the thing which is represented.

 

----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------

 

So as to remove my own errors from this exchange and promote a healthy environment of discourse: When I said, "there is too much sophistry in your reply." Even if this is true it is not the way to approach the topic. I should not have said this. I will do my best from this point on to respond accordingly.

"You interpret from a perspective completely different from mine, then instead of trying to understand what I am saying, you create a straw man from your faulty interpretation, to knock down." – Aristotelian Apologist

I am trying to think in terms of your own premises, I am just trying to do it critically as opposed to affirmatively. I am not trying to invent premises to attack.  

You said, "The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing." – Aristotelian Apologist

I asked you, 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?'

You then said, "I didn't say "from the thing"."

This is correct, you said, "of the thing."

The question still remains, from what then are you apprehending and determining properties? If the mind constructs the form of a Snark would this mean a Snark has existence? Further, where does the mind even get the properties to construct the idea of a Snark?

"...the image of the chair in my mind when I see a chair "comes from the chair". It does not. It is created by, and therefore caused by, my mind." – Aristotelian Apologist

Do you then say that the chair has no existence beyond your mind?

(And I should like to make it clear; this is exactly the position of idealism, of which you are indeed proving yourself to be most consistent. Idealism states that there is no reality beyond the mind, which is to say, even though it tries to posture away from this and violates it repeatedly in the course of action, it is the actual conclusion and solipsism of the position).

Now this seems like a direct contradiction of what is stated above, an example of the posturing I alluded to:

"Do you recognize two distinct types of forms, the form which the object called "chair" has, within itself, and the form of it which exists in my mind when I see it?" – Aristotelian Apologist

I recognize that objects exist outside my mind. Chairs exist regardless of whether or not I call them chairs. A chair has a form that exists independent of my mind. My mind interacts with my environment in order to comprehend it. Without a concrete, objective world, my mind would not be able to form concepts. If I were to say, "Stones have no existence outside my mind," and Socrates decides to pelt me in the head with one, this would be an immediate refutation of my idealism.    

"If the form in my mind came from the chair, it could not be mistaken." – Aristotelian Apologist

I do not understand how you arrived at this conclusion?

"It would be taken necessarily from the chair, and therefore could not be anything but a correct representation of the chair." – Aristotelian Apologist

Why do you here assume that your act of "taking" would be (and must be) one of perfection?

(It is clear to me that this demonstrates the superiority of Hegel's approach over that of Aristotle, because Hegel did not see this process as an automatic transference of perfection, but that it is mediated by thought, hence, the logic by which thought mediates must be more comprehensive than the narrow categories provided by Aristotle. Further, Hegel saw that an unmediated understanding leads to a distortion of reality).

"However, this is not the case, mistakes abound, because the form in the mind is created by my mind, not taken from the chair. And that is why the form in my mind must be understood as distinct from the form in the material object." – Aristotelian Apologist

I see a serious dilemma here. If the form of the mind is created by the mind then what is the chair? How can the mind create the form of a chair without the concrete existence of a chair to "apprehend" and "determine" its content? How do you know that it (the chair) doesn't play a role in this process?

Your argument seems to be that the existence of "mistakes" is proof that your idealism is true? This seems very much like a non-sequitur. How can you even determine when something is a "mistake" if there is no difference between your mind's idea of a chair and an actual chair?

It seems to me that by speaking this way you are going beyond your idealist position: "I have, for days now been trying to get Jersey to recognize the distinction between the form in the mind, and the form of the material object."

I do not see how there can be "material objects" from the basis of your position? If you are referring to "forms" your mind produces, then you are neither referring to "material" or "objects" but mental abstractions. You then have no right to use the term, ‘material objects.’     

It seems very much like you are just asserting these sweeping metaphysical premises into being without a way to substantiate them, like you are constructing your own imaginary world out of abstract premises. If everything is reduced to your mind and objects have no independent being, then wouldn't that leave you trapped in your own mind? If you can't make a distinction between what your "mind creates" and what actually exists, then it seems to me you cannot escape the conclusion that this entire discourse is just a "creation" of your mind. 


BACK TO THE ACTUAL TOPIC: THE LAW OF IDENTITY:


I said, 'Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is no identity without them, where there is identity, there you already have the negation of Unity and Difference.'

You replied,

"This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from "a thing is the same as itself"." 

The symbolic form is, as a matter of fact, made up of three different symbols. The A to the left is not the same as the A to the right and the = is required to form the concept of the "tautology." Hegel's point is not that the law of identity specifically states these attributes (unity and difference) but that the law not only presupposes them, but makes use of them within the movement of its own being. What Hegel is pointing out in the law of identity is "the lack of awareness of the negative movement..." When you say this "doesn't make sense to you," that is correct, because you're not considering the law of identity as it is in the actual movement of its being, hence you are oblivious to its negation. Dialectic comprehends contradiction as it emerges from the object, it does not try to bring it from the outside, and neither does it see it as coming from the outside. This is how Hegel was able to comprehend the contradictory nature of the law of identity.     

What's most interesting is that you have actually validated Hegel's position throughout this exchange because you have admitted that the law is too narrow to deduce content. Hegel says, "This proposition in its positive expression A = A is, in the first instance, nothing more than the expression of an empty tautology. It has therefore been rightly remarked that this law of thought has no content and leads no further."

 

----------ARISTOTELIAN APOLOGIST REPLY----------- 

 

“I am trying to think in terms of your own premises, I am just trying to do it critically as opposed to affirmatively. I am not trying to invent premises to attack.” — Jersey Flight

OK, so I'll repeat the principal premise. Aristotle distinguishes two types of "form", one being the abstracted essence of a thing, an idea, formula, or definition, and the other being the form which a material object has inherent within itself. Whenever you go astray of this premise, I will point it out to you.

“The question still remains, from what then are you apprehending and determining properties? If the mind constructs the form of a Snark would this mean a Snark has existence? Further, where does the mind even get the properties to construct the idea of a Snark?” — Jersey Flight

I don't see how "existence" is relevant, we haven't defined that term in this discussion, so it appears like you want a digression. I'm sure you are aware that the mind creates things, some imaginary, perhaps like a "Snark". Some might pass from being imaginary, to be material, like when an architect plans and then has a building constructed. I really don't know where a mind gets its creative ideas, but I don't see how the fact that I don't know how a mind can be creative could be used as evidence that a mind is not creative. Obviously minds are creative, whether or not we know how the creative activity works.

“Do you then say that the chair has no existence beyond your mind?” — Jersey Flight

No, this would be contrary to the principal premise stated above.

“(And I should like to make it clear, this is exactly the position of idealism, of which you are indeed proving yourself to be most consistent. Idealism states that there is no reality beyond the mind, which is to say, even though it tries to posture away from this and violates it repeatedly in the course of action, it is the actual conclusion and solipsism of the position).” — Jersey Flight

Again, contrary to the principal premise stated above, and so nothing but a straw man.

“Now this seems like a direct contradiction of what is stated above, an example of the posturing I alluded to:” — Jersey Flight

Correction, it's a direct contradiction of your straw man interpretation.

“I recognize that objects exist outside my mind.” — Jersey Flight

So do I recognize that objects exist outside my mind,, as is stated in my principal premise, and also is supported by the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself".

“I do not understand how you arrived at this conclusion?” — Jersey Flight

Let me explain. If the form of the chair comes from the chair and goes into my mind, then what exists in my mind is the same form as what came from the chair. Since the form is the same form, then there can be no mistake. If the form in my mind is different than the form in the chair, then it cannot be true that the form in my mind came from the chair because it is a different form. If there is a form which comes from the chair, and it is mediated, or altered in any way, then this different form comes to be in my mind, and it is not the same form as what came from the chair, so we cannot say that the form in the mind came from the chair, because the mediated form is a different form. This is the nature of "form". Any change in form, constitutes a distinct and different form.

“Why do you here assume that your act of "taking" would be (and must be) one of perfection?” — Jersey Flight

For the reason stated above. Any difference of form constitutes a different form. If the form of that chair in my mind is not exactly as the form within the material object (chair in this case), I cannot say that the form comes from the object. It is a different form, therefore this particular form must originate from a different source.

“(It is clear to me that this demonstrates the superiority of Hegel's approach over that of Aristotle, because Hegel did not see this process as an automatic transference of perfection, but that it is mediated by thought, hence, the logic by which thought mediates must be more” — Jersey Flight

Actually Hegel's position is consistent with Aristotle on this point. It is your idiosyncratic perspective (straw man) which creates the difference. If there was a transferal of form from the object to the mind, as you suggest, then perfection would be necessary. Since there is not perfection Hegel sees this perspective or proposition, i.e. unmediated understanding, as a distortion of reality. That there is mediation of thought, indicates that the form in the mind is different from the form in the object, and therefore not the same form. Therefore what I've argued above, that the form does not come from the object, is consistent with Hegel. Neither Hegel's nor Aristotle's approach is superior on this matter, because they both say the same thing in different ways.

“I see a serious dilemma here. If the form of the mind is created by the mind then what is the chair? How can the mind create the form of a chair without the concrete existence of a chair to "apprehend" and "determine" its content?” — Jersey Flight

I guess you do not recognize that minds create things. Would you think that it's a serious dilemma that an architect can design a building without ever seeing the building? This is one area where Aristotle is far superior to Hegel, his exposition of final cause, which is derived from Plato's dialectics concerning "the good".

“How do you know that it (the chair) doesn't play a role in this process?” — Jersey Flight

I didn't say that the chair doesn't play a role, I said that the form in the mind doesn't come from the chair, it is created by the mind. This is consistent with Hegel's "mediated" by thought. And, when you recognize that a difference in form implies that the two different forms are not the same form, you will conclude that the form in the mind did not come from the chair, but was created by the mind.

“Your argument seems to be that the existence of "mistakes" is proof that your idealism is true? This seems very much like a non-sequitur. How can you even determine when something is a "mistake" if there is no difference between your mind's idea of a chair and an actual chair?” — Jersey Flight

Another failure to respect the principal premise for the sake of a straw man.

“I do not see how there can be "material objects" from the basis of your position? If you are referring to "forms" your mind produces, then you are neither referring to "material" or "objects" but mental abstractions. You then have no right to use the term, material objects.” — Jersey Flight

I have no idea what you're trying to say here but it appears like another failure to respect the principal premise. That premise states that a material object has a form, and the form which the material object has is distinct from the forms which are in my mind. Material objects are taken for granted by the premise, so if you perceive my perspective as denying the possibility of material objects, you need to demonstrate this, not just appeal to your straw man named "idealism", and knock it down as if you were hitting me.

“It seems very much like you are just asserting these sweeping metaphysical premises into being without a way to substantiate them, like you are constructing your own imaginary world out of abstract premises. If everything is reduced to your mind and objects have no independent being, then wouldn't that leave you trapped in your own mind? If you can't make a distinction between what your "mind creates" and what actually exists, then it seems to me you cannot escape the conclusion that this entire discourse is just a "creation" of your mind.” — Jersey Flight

Failure to respect the principal premise.

“When you say this "doesn't make sense to you," that is correct, because you're not considering the law of identity as it is in the actual movement of its being, hence you are oblivious to its negation.” — Jersey Flight

I think I've addressed this for you already, in the other thread. A material "thing" is changing as each moment of time passes. Nevertheless, we say that it remains the same thing. This changing activity is what you call "the actual movement of its being". The material thing has a new form at each passing moment, yet it maintains its identity as the same thing. What is negated is certain attributes, not the identity of the material being. Negation, as a dialectic of attributes, what a thing has and has not, does not suffice to refute the law of identity.

“Hegel's point is not that the law of identity specifically states these attributes (unity and difference) but that the law not only presupposes them, but makes use of them within the movement of its own being.” — Jersey Flight

So this is Hegel's faulty representation of the law of identity; the one which can be struck down with negation, but it's just a straw man. Identity does not presuppose any attributes. The only presuppositions are "a thing", and "same", neither of which is an attribute.. If Hegel introduces "the movement of its own being" here, then he is talking about attributes which are negated, not the thing nor its identity.

“What's most interesting is that you have actually validated Hegel's position throughout this exchange because you have admitted that the law is too narrow to deduce content.” — Jersey Flight

That's right, the law of identity is not at all intended to produce conceptual content. It is applied as an aid to judging truth and falsity of conceptual content. So it would be better described as a principle of skepticism. The problem though is when people like you, and perhaps Hegel, represent it as if it is supposed to produce conceptual content, then denounce it as inadequate for that endeavour. All this demonstrates is a misunderstanding of it, on your part.

 

----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------

 

Discoursing on the Law of Identity:

Quoting you: "Any difference of form constitutes a different form."

"The material thing has a new form at each passing moment, yet it maintains its identity as the same thing." – Aristotelian Apologist

If its form has changed, then according to your logic, how can you say "it maintains its identity as the same?" For you have said that any difference constitutes a new form. "New" is not the same as "same."

"I recognize that objects exist outside my mind..." This premise serves as the absolute negation of your idealism, insofar as it must give way to the authority of the material form. This is why consistent idealists must deny the existence of the material world, the admission of the premise ends up nullifying the authority of their abstraction. After this admission abstraction is sublated to the concretion of the object. As soon as one posits a world beyond the mind, one has deferred to an authority beyond the mind.        

Is identity different from itself? Identity is saying that it is not different from itself, this is the negative side of the determination of identity. The positive side says that everything is identical to itself. One cannot posit identity without equally positing difference (because one cannot make a determination without negation) there is no such thing as identity without difference, and this is because identity is saying that it is not difference, unless you claim that identity is different from itself? Here it will not work merely to reassert the positive side of identity, because you are already, in the same instance as you posit identity, saying that it is not different from itself, you just don't realize it.

This is why Hegel says, "a determinateness of being is essentially a transition into its opposite..." What you are trying to do is retain a determination, while rejecting the inescapable transition which casts identity into its negation. You have exactly manifested and proven Hegel's point. 

"Identity does not presuppose any attributes. The only presuppositions are "a thing", and "same", neither of which is an attribute." – Aristotelian Apologist

A thing is itself, this is the positive side. A thing is not different from itself, this is the negative side. You do not have identity with only one side of the determination. Both sides taken together, equal unity; identity contains itself as well as unity and difference. The mere positive formation is simply ignorant of itself.

"If  Hegel introduces "the movement of its own being" here, then he is talking about attributes which are negated, not the thing nor its identity." – Aristotelian Apologist

Hegel does not show that identity has contradiction outside itself, but that this contradiction is contained within the nature of identity itself. All of the determinations brought forth by Hegel are instances of the same identity. This thinking is exceedingly difficult for Aristotelians to grasp, precisely because their comprehension has been deluded by idealistic premises which artificially divide and distort the objects of being. Instead of allowing the object to dictate and unfold its properties and attributes, the Aristotelian logic dictates axiomatically how the object should be viewed and divided. This leads to a narrow distortion of reality:

"…identificational thinking itself is a tremendous abstraction. We have recently begun to become painfully aware of the artificial world man has constructed and imposed on the natural immediacy of the planet earth by force of identificational thinking in its abstractness and its nihilism— for everything built by reflection is built on negation." "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, A Propaedeutic,” pg.251, Thomas Hoffmann, translated by David Healan, Brill 2015

"Any difference of form constitutes a different form. If the form of that chair in my mind is not exactly as the form within the material object (chair in this case), I cannot say that the form comes from the object." – Aristotelian Apologist

It seems to me, and I could be wrong, that there is a kind of strawman posited here. You say, "if the form of the chair is not exact..." this seems problematic, why the criteria of exactitude? The answer you give is because of the first part of the syllogism. "Any difference, new form." What I don't understand is why the movement and transition of an object should preclude its influence on our comprehension of it? It is merely your authoritarian and idealistic assumption that perceptual information taken from the chair must equal exactitude. I do not believe you can sustain this, but I am open to your defense. 

Isn't the actual conclusion simply that you could not say your ideas of the chair were exact, and not that the information you assess from the physical object, has no bearing on your formation of it?  

I confess that the question of subject and object is one of the most difficult areas in all of philosophy. I do not believe you have conquered it with this simple, idealistic syllogism. The latest discoveries in neuroscience are actually informing us that our perception is the result of our social interaction, it is both mind and the world, what amounts to a most astounding discovery, "action comes before perception." But this is not a dualism, to posit such would be to reduce the plurality of mind and world to idealistic categories.  

 

----------ARISTOTELIAN APOLOGIST REPLY----------

 

“If its form has changed, then according to your logic, how can you say "it maintains its identity as the same?" For you have said that any difference constitutes a new form. "New" is not the same as "same.” — Jersey Flight

In Aristotelian physics, temporal continuity is provided for by matter. Matter is the underlying thing which persists through change, as the form of the thing changes. Because the identity of the thing persists, despite changes to its form, we must associate identity with matter, not with form.

“This premise serves as the absolute negation of your idealism, insofar as it must give way to the authority of the material form. This is why consistent idealists must deny the existence of the material world, the admission of the premise ends up nullifying the authority of their abstraction. After this admission abstraction is sublated to the concretion of the object. As soon as one posits a world beyond the mind, one has deferred to an authority beyond the mind.” — Jersey Flight

When did I say I was idealist? That is your straw man. And since I accept the existence of the material world, which is contrary to your notion of idealism, you now ought to see that it is a straw man. Or, perhaps I really am idealist, and your notion of idealism is a straw man. Choose your poison.

“Is identity different from itself? Identity is saying that it is not different from itself, this is the negative side of the determination of identity.” — Jersey Flight

We went through this already, perhaps in the other thread. "Same" and "different" are not proper opposites when "same" is used as it is in the law of identity. Difference is included within same, because the same thing has a changing form, and therefore is different from one moment to the next, despite maintaining its identity as the same thing. This is represented as the difference between subject and predicate which I described earlier. The subject may persist as the same subject, despite having predications negated at different times. So the subject remains the same, as in same subject, despite difference being a part of it, due to changing predications, when the subject represents an object.

Therefore "different" is not applicable when referring to the subject itself, because difference is a feature of what is predicated. To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with matter.

“This is why Hegel says, "a determinateness of being is essentially a transition into its opposite..." What you are trying to do is retain a determination, while rejecting the inescapable transition which casts identity into its negation. You have exactly manifested and proven Hegel's point.” — Jersey Flight

Negation and transition are formal, identity is material. Do you recognize this distinction between form and matter in Aristotle?

“Hegel does not show that identity has contradiction outside itself, but that this contradiction is contained within the nature of identity itself. All of the determinations brought forth by Hegel are instances of the same identity. This thinking is exceedingly difficult for Aristotelians to grasp, precisely because their comprehension has been deluded by idealistic premises which artificially divide and distort the objects of being. Instead of allowing the object to dictate and unfold its properties and attributes, the Aristotelian logic dictates axiomatically how the object should be viewed and divided.” — Jersey Flight

This very clearly demonstrates a misunderstanding of the law of identity. Identity is given to the object itself, and the object is represented in logic as the subject. All contraries are related to what is predicated of the subject, so it makes no sense to say that contradiction is within identity itself. Contradiction is in what is said about the object, but identity is within the object.

If the law of identity were itself contradictory, then you might demonstrate this. But it's not. So it makes no sense to say that contradiction is within identity, because the law of identity puts identity into the object itself, and contradiction is always within what is said about the object.

“It seems to me, and I could be wrong, that there is a kind of strawman posited here. You say, "if the form of the chair is not exact..." this seems problematic, why the criteria of exactitude?” — Jersey Flight

The need for "exactitude" is quite clear. Any difference is a difference, hence two distinct forms. Two similar forms are different forms, not one form.

“What I don't understand is why the movement and transition of an object should preclude its influence on our comprehension of it? It is merely your authoritarian and idealistic assumption that perceptual information taken from the chair must equal exactitude. I do not believe you can sustain this, but I am open to your defense.” — Jersey Flight

I did not preclude influence, that is your straw man. What I insist, is that perceptual information received from, or taken from, the chair, does not mean that the form of the chair in my mind, as an image, is even similar to, let alone the same form, as what inheres within the material chair.

That is the argument. There is a form in the material chair itself, directly related to the chair's identity, and there is a form "of" the chair in my mind, as an image. These two forms, though they might both be called "the form of the chair", are completely distinct. And only the form which inheres within the material chair is directly related to the identity of that object, because the form in my mind "of the chair", is what you called mediated.

“Isn't the actual conclusion simply that you could not say your ideas of the chair were exact, and not that the information you assess from the physical object, has no bearing on your formation of it?” — Jersey Flight

The point is that these are two distinct forms, the form which inheres within the material chair, and the form of the chair which is in my mind.. We could only call them the same form, and thereby claim that the form in my mind is directly related to the identity of the chair, if there was such exactitude. There is not such exactitude, therefore the identity of the chair remains within the chair, and not in my mind.

“I confess that the question of subject and object is one of the most difficult areas in all of philosophy. I do not believe you have conquered it with this simple, idealistic syllogism. The latest discoveries in neuroscience are actually informing us that our perception is the result of our social interaction, it is both mind and the world, what amounts to a most astounding discovery, "action comes before perception." But this is not a dualism, to posit such would be to reduce the plurality of mind and world to idealistic categories.” — Jersey Flight

There is though, a duality of form. How else can you account for the form of the chair in your mind, as an image, and the fact that the material chair has a form itself, which makes it the particular thing that it is? For the reasons explained, we cannot say that these two forms are the same form. Therefore we ought to conclude that each perceived object has a duality of form, the form which is proper to the identity of the object, and the form that is proper to the mind which perceives it which we often call the "form of the object" .

 

----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------

 

Best to begin at the beginning: As a matter of fact, if you had no eyes, no ears, no hands to feel, only your mind to think, you could not arrive at an understanding or form of a chair. But chairs are real things, they exist independent of the human mind, this premise is the swift destruction of your position. This is true because all that you say about the chair and its form hinges on the actual existence of a chair coupled with your sensory ability to detect it. If you remove this premise, if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair. Matter is the substance of mind, remove this and there is nothing left.
   
"To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with matter." – Aristotelian Apologist

The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being. When I thought of this objection by Hegel, it crossed my mind that perhaps he was just engaging in sophistry, trying to artificially attach difference to identity. But the thing is; identity is actually saying this! Hegel is not making it up. To prove it, look what happens if you deny it, surely you will not say that identity is different from itself? This would destroy identity. 

Hegel is correct, identity contains unity and difference. Back to the symbolic form: A = A is an instance of three different symbols. Taken together (unity) they are said to form the law of identity. Everything you need to prove that Hegel's dialectical clarification is correct is contained right in the symbolic form. When I brought this up before your reply was as follows:

"This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from "a thing is the same as itself"." – Aristotelian Apologist

The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another?

One can deduce the same properties from the informal articulation: a thing is the same as itself. Here you have multiple different words combined together to construct the law, and here's the vital point, you cannot construct this law without making use of these different terms combined in unity.  

When you try to bring in the predicate to rescue this law all you are doing is going beyond what is actually contained in the identity premise. You must admit that the predicate introduces negation. Well friend, this is not contained in Aristotle's formulation of the law. Once again, your predicate attempt would imply A = -A.

At every turn you are going beyond the premise of this law in order to rescue it from itself, the only difference is that you are claiming that all your actions are still contained within the premise of the law.  

""Same" and "different" are not proper opposites when "same" is used as it is in the law of identity." – Aristotelian Apologist

The point is not that they are opposites. Same is saying that it is not different from itself, it is also never an isolated word but requires the unity of difference to distinguish itself.

"Difference is included within same, because the same thing has a changing form, and therefore is different from one moment to the next, despite maintaining its identity as the same thing." – Aristotelian Apologist

It does not actually maintain its identity, this is an ideal we project. But that is a different point. We are here discussing the law of identity. Difference is posited in the same instance as you posit "same." It is already contained within the concept, within the very being of sameness. This is Hegel's point. In dialectics contradiction always emerges from being. 

"This is represented as the difference between subject and predicate which I described earlier. The subject may persist as the same subject, despite having predications negated at different times. So the subject remains the same, as in same subject, despite difference being a part of it, due to changing predications, when the subject represents an object." – Aristotelian Apologist

This is just an idealistic formulation of reality. In reality the subject is changing, but more importantly, the subject itself is not separated from difference or unity. If it was, it could not distinguish itself, could not determine itself. 

"Therefore "different" is not applicable when referring to the subject itself, because difference is a feature of what is predicated." – Aristotelian Apologist

This is false, as proven above through the symbolic form, it is already part of the subject's being.

"To represent the law of identity as saying that "a thing is not different from itself" is a mistaken representation, because it is to oppose different with same, and that is to give "same" a formal definition, but the law of identity associates "same" with matter." – Aristotelian Apologist

It is not to oppose "different" with "same," as from the outside, it is merely to draw out what the premise already contains.

It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it.

 

----------ARISTOTELIAN APOLOGIST REPLY-----------

 

It seems like most your points are either repeating a question I've already addressed, or trending toward absurdity. There is however one point where we might have some agreement, so I'll start with that and see if we can find a way to advance.

“It does not actually maintain its identity, this is an ideal we project. But that is a different point. We are here discussing the law of identity.” — Jersey Flight

Yes, it is an ideal we project, but that's exactly what the law of identity is, an ideal. It is very similar, and closely related to the concept of matter, an ideal. We notice that despite the fact that the world is continually changing, there is consistency. The changes are not random, there is continuity of existence from one moment to the next, so Aristotle posited "matter" to account for this continuity. If the forms of things in the world are changing from one moment to the next, there must be something which dictates the possibility of change, this potential is attributed to matter. Why do some aspects of the world appear to persist while others do not? Whatever it is which answers the reason for this, it must be something substantial, and in modern terms it is expressed as mass or inertia. This concept is employed to answer the question of why do some forms change from one moment to the next, while others persist in time. You can see how "matter" is an ideal.

Likewise, you can see how the law of identity is an ideal. Suppose one were to describe the world (its form) at each moment in time. Each moment it would be a different form. However, we can name a particular aspect, and say that this aspect is not changing. So we might say that this aspect has identity, as a temporally extended thing. But this is just a projected ideal, because parts of this thing (accidentals) are changing, and we must overlook these changing parts in order to say that this thing is not changing. The point is, that we observe consistency, and see very clearly that some aspects of the world are not changing as time passes, but when we try to formalize this, state the form that is not changing, we cannot accurately represent this because there is always aspects of that thing, which the formalized statement refers to, which are changing. So these are said to be accidentals, but we still haven't accurately isolated the thing which is not changing, because we just disregard the accidentals. So Aristotle posited matter, and matter as an ideal, is supposed to account for those temporally extended, unchanging aspects of the world, which we give identity to as existing things.

Having said that, let me proceed to the rest of your points.

“Best to begin at the beginning: As a matter of fact, if you had no eyes, no ears, no hands to feel, only your mind to think, you could not arrive at an understanding or form of a chair. But chairs are real things, they exist independent of the human mind, this premise is the swift destruction of your position. This is true because all that you say about the chair and its form hinges on the actual existence of a chair coupled with your sensory ability to detect it. If you remove this premise, if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair. Matter is the substance of mind, remove this and there is nothing left.” — Jersey Flight

This claim is unsupported, and actually sort of absurd. You have no way of saying what type of form a mind with no senses could come up with. So if such a mind created a form, and called it a chair, then just because it's not the same form of a chair that your mind would come up with, does not mean that it's not the form of a chair. What validates your understanding of "a chair" as better than this mind's understanding of "a chair". All you are doing is denying Descartes' "brain in a vat", as incapable of creating forms without sensing, but you have no principles to support such a denial.

“The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being. When I thought of this objection by Hegel, it crossed my mind that perhaps he was just engaging in sophistry, trying to artificially attach difference to identity. But the thing is, identity is actually saying this! Hegel is not making it up. To prove it, look what happens if you deny it, surely you will not say that identity is different from itself? This would destroy identity.” — Jersey Flight

This is an absurdity as well. We are not talking about whether identity is the same as itself, we are talking about whether a thing is the same as itself. So you just go off on an unintelligible tangent here, assuming that identity is a thing. But identity is not a thing, it is something that we say a thing has, a thing has identity. And, the law of identity states that the thing is the same as itself. We are not saying that the thing's identity is the same as the thing's identity, that would be redundant. We are saying that the thing's identity is such that the thing is the same as itself. The law of identity is something (a law) which is applied to things by human beings. To ask whether identity is the same as itself is to reify identity, making identity the thing rather than something the thing has.

“The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another?” — Jersey Flight

There is another structure. It's the proposition "A thing is the same as itself". There's more than three different symbols here. The fact that Hegel can represent this as A=A does not mean that A=A is the only way that the law of identity can be represented. I'm sure that other people can think of other ways to represent it. Suppose I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself. Then I've represented the law of identity with one symbol, no different symbols with unity. Hegel's decision to represent the law of identity with three symbols is simply arbitrary. So this argument of Hegel's is against a straw man. And all that babble about difference and unity is just an irrelevant distraction. What needs to be done is to address the meaning of the law, not the symbolization of it. What the law talks about is identity, and it defines identity as a thing being the same as itself. This talk about unity and difference is irrelevant, having no real bearing on the issue.

“At every turn you are going beyond the premise of this law in order to rescue it from itself, the only difference is that you are claiming that all your actions are still contained within the premise of the law.” — Jersey Flight

Actually, it's you and Hegel who went beyond the premise of the law, by bringing in negation. I only pointed out that negation is relative to predication, not to the subject itself. So I pointed out how Hegel has gone beyond the premise, just like he does in talking about the three symbols, difference and unity. He brings in all sorts of irrelevancies, to cloud the issue, in a ploy of sophistry, instead of addressing the meaning of the proposition itself.

“The point is not that they are opposites. Same is saying that it is not different from itself, it is also never an isolated word but requires the unity of difference to distinguish itself.” — Jersey Flight

Here you go, beyond the stated proposition. There is nothing within the law of identity which indicates that "different" is opposite to "same". And, as I already explained to you more than once, as "same" is used in the law of identity, "different" is necessarily included within same, and therefore cannot be opposite. A thing is different from how it was, from one minute to the next, therefore it is different from itself. Yet it maintains its identity as being the same as itself. Therefore being different from itself is included within being the same as itself, such that a thing is both different from itself, and the same as itself. It is very clear that different is not opposed to same, as "same" is used in the law of identity.

“This is just an idealistic formulation of reality. In reality the subject is changing, but more importantly, the subject itself is not separated from difference or unity. If it was, it could not distinguish itself, could not determine itself.” — Jersey Flight

Yes, for sure, it is an idealistic formulation of reality, as explained at the beginning of the post. The problem though, is that we have no other way to account for the consistency and temporal continuity of existence, so we posit ideals such as "matter", and "identity", to fill that void in our understanding of reality.

“It is not to oppose "different" with "same," as from the outside, it is merely to draw out what the premise already contains.” — Jersey Flight

That's absurd. The premise says nothing about difference. I "draw out" the premise in the way that it was meant to be drawn out, to show that difference is included within the identity of the changing thing. You "draw out" the premise by defining different as opposed to same, with the intent of rejecting the premise. Obviously it is you who draws out the premise in the wrong direction, because opposing same and different is unnecessary. Clearly observation shows us how one thing can be both the same as itself and different from itself, due to the nature of change and temporal extension.

“It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it.” — Jersey Flight

Right, and this law contains nothing about difference or unity. Therefore your attempt to relate these concepts to that law, in a way which is inconsistent with the law, is nothing but an attempt to reject the law through the use of semantics. But we can define words in such a way so as to make any law or proposition appear as if it ought to be rejected. However, what is at issue here is the law itself, and the meaning of it. And we need to understand its meaning before determining whether we ought or ought not reject it, and then we may proceed to define words consistent with it, to uphold it, or inconsistent with it to uphold the intent to reject it. Defining words with the intent of proving a proposition wrong is a pointless exercise. Understanding the proposition so that you can decide whether it ought or ought not be proven wrong is something more meaningful.

 

----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------

 

Yes, it is an ideal we project, but that's exactly what the law of identity is, an ideal." – Aristotelian Apologist

Even as an ideal the concept is not merely made up of a one-sided determination. In order to make sense of a 'part' one must make use of the concept 'whole.' What, after all, would the 'inner' be without the 'outer'? This is Hegel's reasoning when it comes to identity.    

I said: 'if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair.'

You said: "This claim is unsupported, and actually sort of absurd. You have no way of saying what type of form a mind with no senses could come up with." – Aristotelian Apologist

My claim is that your concept of a chair presupposes, not only the existence of a chair independent of your mind, but also your senses. I would go even further and claim that this is self-evident, if you went deaf and blind tomorrow your ability to form concepts would immediately be restricted because it would be much harder to take in information. 

I said: 'The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being.'

You replied: "We are not talking about whether identity is the same as itself, we are talking about whether a thing is the same as itself. So you just go off on an unintelligible tangent here, assuming that identity is a thing. But identity is not a thing, it is something that we say a thing has, a thing has identity. And, the law of identity states that the thing is the same as itself. We are not saying that the thing's identity is the same as the thing's identity, that would be redundant. We are saying that the thing's identity is such that the thing is the same as itself. The law of identity is something (a law) which is applied to things by human beings. To ask whether identity is the same as itself is to reify identity, making identity the thing rather than something the thing has." – Aristotelian Apologist

In the first instance identity is a formal claim. It is a statement about an object. The problem with this statement is that it is very specific and very narrow; the problem is that it negates itself. You are claiming that a thing is not different from itself, which is just the negative side of the identity position. Hegel puts it this way: "It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different. They do not see that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different."

He is correct, the identity position is, and must say this, in order to protect itself from the difference it is saying it is not. When you say a thing is itself you are at the same time saying that it is not different from itself, this is Hegel's masterful point, the contradiction emerges from identity itself.

I said: 'The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another?'

You replied: "There is another structure. It's the proposition "A thing is the same as itself". There's more than three different symbols here. The fact that Hegel can represent this as A=A does not mean that A=A is the only way that the law of identity can be represented. I'm sure that other people can think of other ways to represent it. Suppose I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself. Then I've represented the law of identity with one symbol, no different symbols with unity." – Aristotelian Apologist 

This is where our exchange finally begins to narrow. Here you failed to comprehend the literalness of Hegel's argument. You, as a matter of fact, cannot bring the law of identity into being with the symbol of Z, this solitary symbol articulates nothing. In order to bring the law of identity into conceptual being you must make use of identity, difference and unity. In every occurrence of identity you must make use of... must identify... different symbols that are taken together in unity. This is a material fact regarding the existence of the concept of identity. Try to articulate the law of identity without making use of unity and difference; you will not be able to do it. I hope you will not kick against this my friend but join me in celebrating the genius of Hegel's discovery. What mind could go up against Aristotle in this sense? No one! He held his ground for two thousand years. But Hegel, how did he do it (!), comes along and breaks down Aristotle's thoughts into their finer dialectical components, not fallaciously, but on Aristotle's own terms. This is truly astounding and it marks a turning point in philosophical history!  

"What needs to be done is to address the meaning of the law, not the symbolization of it." – Aristotelian Apologist

Of course, but its meaning is derived from its formation. The premise is not supposed to violate itself. Hegel proves that its determination inevitably casts it into negation.

"Actually, it's you and Hegel who went beyond the premise of the law, by bringing in negation." – Aristotelian Apologist

Hegel is not bringing negation from the outside; he is demonstrating that it is already contained in the law. This is proven by the fact that the Aristotelian formation states that identity and difference are different, that is, a thing is not different from itself.

" Clearly observation shows us how one thing can be both the same as itself and different from itself, due to the nature of change and temporal extension." – Aristotelian Apologist

As Hegel says: "...the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself."

I said: 'It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it.'

You said: "Right, and this law contains nothing about difference or unity. Therefore your attempt to relate these concepts to that law, in a way which is inconsistent with the law, is nothing but an attempt to reject the law through the use of semantics."

The point I'm about to make is exceedingly important. It was my hunch that Aristotelians would reply to Hegel's position by claiming that it was 'just semantics.' But this doesn't work because the law of identity is itself semantical! There is no way around this; logic is perhaps the most vital part of semantics. One cannot state a semantical law and then complain when it is refuted by semantics. Hegel's genius on essence has yet to be discovered by our species, it's a beautiful, untapped area of philosophy that carries philosophy into the future.

As Hegel said about those who hold to the Aristotelian position on identity: "Thinking that keeps to external reflection and knows of no other thinking but external reflection, fails to attain to a grasp of identity in the form just expounded, or of essence, which is the same thing. Such thinking always has before it only abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it, difference. In its opinion, reason is nothing more than a loom on which it externally combines and interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the woof of difference; or, also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts especially identity and then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness when abstraction is made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing of likeness. These assertions and opinions about what reason does must be completely set aside, since they are in a certain measure merely historical; the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself. The Notion of identity, that it is simple self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection but has come from being itself. Whereas, on the contrary, that identity that is aloof from difference, and difference that is aloof from identity, are products of external reflection and abstraction, which arbitrarily clings to this point of indifferent difference."

 

----------ARISTOTELIAN APOLOGIST REPLY----------

 

“My claim is that your concept of a chair presupposes, not only the existence of a chair independent of your mind, but also your senses. I would go even further and claim that this is self-evident, if you went deaf and blind tomorrow your ability to form concepts would immediately be restricted because it would be much harder to take in information.” — Jersey Flight

This is a false assumption you make. You could explain what a chair is, to a person who has never sensed a chair, and that person could have a concept of a chair without sensing a chair.. Furthermore, the fact that architects, designers, and creators, produce conceptions prior to the material existence of the thing conceived, indicates that what appears to you as "self-evident", is actually a falsity.

“In the first instance identity is a formal claim. It is a statement about an object. The problem with this statement is that it is very specific and very narrow; the problem is that it negates itself.” — Jersey Flight

Again, this is a falsity. The law of identity is a universal statement, a generality. It states that a thing is the same as itself. This applies to all things. It is not a statement about an object, it is a statement about all objects.

“You are claiming that a thing is not different from itself, which is just the negative side of the identity position.” — Jersey Flight

I've already dealt with this objection. A thing is the same as itself, but it is also different from itself. It changes with the passage of time, therefore it is different from how it was. Your proposal, to oppose or negate, "same" with "different" is unjustified in this context. The thrust of your argument seems to be to say that "different" is the opposite of "same", but this is not true in the context of the law of identity. Clearly a thing is both the same as itself, and different from itself, so we have no premise to allow us to say that "same as itself" means "not different from itself". You are just adding this premise, that different is the opposite of same, to create a straw man.

"It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different. They do not see that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different." —Hegel

See, Hegel demonstrates in this passage, that he sort of grasps what you are missing. Difference inheres within identity. To be the same is also to be different. Therefore it is a misrepresentation to represent difference as the negation of same, difference is a part of being the same.

Let me try another approach for you. I'm sure you are aware of the concept of "similar" What does it mean to you, if two things are said to be similar? To me, it means that some aspects of the things are the same, and some aspects are different. We cannot say that the two things are different, in an unqualified or absolute sense, because we need to account for why we are calling them "similar". So in some way, they appear to have aspects which are the same, yet also aspects which are different. This is why difference cannot be used to negate sameness, they are both distinct aspects of the same concept, "similar". They are not the opposites of each other though because the aspects which are same cannot be the aspect which are different. Therefore "same" and "different" represent two distinct categories within the concept "similar".

“He is correct, the identity position is, and must say this, in order to protect itself from the difference it is saying it is not. When you say a thing is itself you are at the same time saying that it is not different from itself, this is Hegel's masterful point, the contradiction emerges from identity itself.” — Jersey Flight

As I've explained, many times now, this is a false assumption. When someone says that a thing is the same as itself, they are not saying that it is not different from itself. I am a thing, and I am the same as myself. But clearly I am different from the way I was last year, despite being the same person last year and this year. So when I say that I am the same person that I was last year, I am not saying that I am not different from how I was last year. Clearly I am different, yet the same. So it is just your unwarranted, and unjustified straw man, which represents being the same as being not different, this is not consistent with the law of identity.

“You, as a matter of fact, cannot bring the law of identity into being with the symbol of Z, this solitary symbol articulates nothing.” — Jersey Flight

This again is false. Why can't I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself", just like Hegel says A=A represents "a thing is the same as itself"? The symbols used to represent a proposition can be arbitrary.

“In order to bring the law of identity into conceptual being you must make use of identity, difference and unity. In every occurrence of identity you must make use of... must identify... different symbols that are taken together in unity. This is a material fact regarding the existence of the concept of identity.” — Jersey Flight

This is not true at all. "A thing is the same as itself" represents one idea which can be represented with one symbol, just like the single word "square" represents "equilateral rectangle". The fact that the idea represented by the symbol is a complex idea does not necessitate that the idea requires more than one symbol to represent it. This is not a matter of me trying to wiggle out of Hegel's criticism, it is simply the way that symbols and ideas relate to each other. One symbol may represent a vast complexity of ideas, structured and existing as one idea represented by that symbol. Take a word (one symbol) which is an acronym, like radar, for example. The one word stands for a whole complexity of ideas, represented as one idea, by that one word. So this whole talk about "different symbols which are taken together in unity" is irrelevant speculation. It's like arguing that each letter within a word must stand for something on its own. Hegel's claims here have no basis in reality, and his insertion of "difference" and "unity" into the concept of identity through an analysis of those symbols which he uses to represent the law of identity, is just unsupported speculation.

Imagine if I represented the law of identity with Z. Then I proceeded to argue that because the law of identity is represented with Z, and Z is the final letter in the alphabet, then there must be finality within the concept. You cannot draw a conclusion about the meaning of the concept represented, by doing a physical analysis of the symbols used to represent it. Plato demonstrated this with an extensive analysis of the sounds of many different words, in one of his dialogues. He tried to show how the sound of the word is correlated to the idea represented by the word. But he didn't get very far, and it was demonstrated that it's very unreliable to attempt to determine anything useful about what is represented by a symbol through a physical analysis of the symbol.

“Try to articulate the law of identity without making use of unity and difference, you will not be able to do it.” — Jersey Flight

This is blatantly false. "A thing is the same as itself" says nothing about difference or unity. How can you even make such a statement and try to maintain some semblance of honesty?

“But Hegel, how did he do it (!), comes along and breaks down Aristotle's thoughts into their finer dialectical components, not fallaciously, but on Aristotle's own terms.” — Jersey Flight

Sorry, but unity and difference do not enter into the law of identity, so these are Hegel's terms for identity, and clearly a straw man.

“Of course, but its meaning is derived from its formation.” — Jersey Flight

The meaning is not derived from the symbolic formation, as you've represented, it is derived from the complex formation of ideas. It is pointless to attack the symbolic structure, rather than the structure of ideas.

“Hegel is not bringing negation from the outside; he is demonstrating that it is already contained in the law. This is proven by the fact that the Aristotelian formation states that identity and difference are different, that is, a thing is not different from itself.” — Jersey Flight

That two things are different doesn't mean that one is the opposite of the other, they might be different categories. Yes, identity is different from difference, but this does not mean that same is defined as "not different". Colour is different from sound, but this does not mean that colour is defined as "not sound". It is only when you define "same" as "not different", which is a definition not supported by the law of identity, that negation is produced. So, the negation is brought in from outside, with this faulty definition of "same" (as not different), a definition which is inconsistent with the way that "same" is used in the law of identity.

As Hegel says: "...the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself."

Nice quote, this is a fine example. Notice, "everything is in its self-sameness different from itself". That's exactly what I've been saying, difference is included within identity, so that the thing is the same as itself and also different from itself. Now, Hegel claims that this is contradiction, but it is not contradictory. It is only contradictory if you define "same" as "not different". But nothing necessitates this definition. In fact it is very clear that this definition is unacceptable, because it would create contradiction in this way. Therefore it is quite evident that Hegel introduces this definition for the purpose of creating contradiction, so that he can refer to the law of identity as "self-contradictory". It is not though, Hegel creates that contradiction by defining "same" as "not-different", when same and different are actually different categories and cannot be directly related to each other in this way.

Hegel might even recognize that same and different belong to distinct categories, as he says " this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other". So he also ought to recognize that to bring same and different into the same category, so that they become contraries, is to make a category mistake.

“The point I'm about to make is exceedingly important. It was my hunch that Aristotelians would reply to Hegel's position by claiming that it was 'just semantics.' But this doesn't work because the law of identity is itself semantical! There is no way around this, logic is perhaps the most vital part of semantics. One cannot state a semantical law and then complain when it is refuted by semantics. Hegel's genius on essence has yet to be discovered by our species, it's a beautiful, untapped area of philosophy that carries philosophy into the future.” — Jersey Flight

Hegel's argument is not semantics at all. It is a matter of analyzing the physical structure of the proposition, its symbols, and attempting to make a conclusion about the meaning from this physical analysis of the symbols. I'm sure you must recognize the fault here. One cannot take a word like "word", and analyze the constituent parts individually, "w", "o", "r", "d", and their relations to each other within that word expecting to determine something useful about the meaning. Nor can you do as Plato tried, and analyze the individual syllables within a word, expecting to determine the meaning this way. Likewise, you cannot represent a proposition with symbols, then expect to determine something meaningful about the proposition by analyzing the relations between those symbols.

As Hegel said about those who hold to the Aristotelian position on identity: "Thinking that keeps to external reflection and knows of no other thinking but external reflection, fails to attain to a grasp of identity in the form just expounded, or of essence, which is the same thing. Such thinking always has before it only abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it, difference. In its opinion, reason is nothing more than a loom on which it externally combines and interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the woof of difference; or, also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts especially identity and then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness when abstraction is made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing of likeness. These assertions and opinions about what reason does must be completely set aside, since they are in a certain measure merely historical; the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself. The Notion of identity, that it is simple self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection but has come from being itself. Whereas, on the contrary, that identity that is aloof from difference, and difference that is aloof from identity, are products of external reflection and abstraction, which arbitrarily clings to this point of indifferent difference."

See Hegel understands the Aristotelian notion of identity. The category mistake he makes though, is to allow difference to move into the category of same, making these two opposite of each other, rather than categorically distinct. This category mistake is what allows the self-sameness which is different from itself to be called self-contradictory.

 

----------JERSEY FLIGHT REPLY----------

 

" You could explain what a chair is, to a person who has never sensed a chair, and that person could have a concept of a chair without sensing a chair." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

This is correct, you can use another person's senses to obtain the information and then relay it through restricted sensory means, but this seeks to solve the problem by 1) validating my point, as the person that is relaying the information is doing so because there is a chair that they can sense and 2) this would still require some kind of sensory capacity on the part of the blind-deaf person, in this case, the sense of touch.

 

"Furthermore, the fact that architects, designers, and creators, produce conceptions prior to the material existence of the thing conceived, indicates that what appears to you as "self-evident", is actually a falsity." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

That they produce concepts prior to the material existence of the thing is not what is up for debate, that they could do this (as pure mind) without some kind of sensory capacity, social orientation or experience of the world; that is the context of the debate. If there is damage to the brain they will likely not be able to do this. 

 

"Again, this is a falsity. The law of identity is a universal statement, a generality. It states that a thing is the same as itself. This applies to all things. It is not a statement about an object, it is a statement about all objects." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

I accept this. Just like the argument I am making against the Aristotelian position; it's not that what I said is false, it's just too narrow.

 

"The thrust of your argument seems to be to say that "different" is the opposite of "same", but this is not true in the context of the law of identity." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

No, the argument is that identity always makes use of difference in order to distinguish itself as identity. More directly, difference is contained within the category of identity.    

 

"Clearly a thing is both the same as itself, and different from itself, so we have no premise to allow us to say that "same as itself" means "not different from itself"." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

Identity is and must say that it is not different from itself that's why it claims identity with itself.

 

"Difference inheres within identity. To be the same is also to be different. Therefore it is a misrepresentation to represent difference as the negation of same, difference is a part of being the same." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

Unless I'm misunderstanding you, what you have here articulated is Hegel's position: difference inheres within identity. The argument is not that difference negates "same," but that the plural attributes that make up identity as a concept of knowledge, negate the formal position of identity, thereby casting the positive determination into negation. The conclusion is that the so-called law of identity negates itself the very moment it posits its determinateness.

 

Giovanni has coined a term here to simplify Hegel's position; he calls it "significant determination." 

 

"The conclusion is that significant determination – as contrasted with the mere stringing together in an object of determinations that remain external both to each other and to the object itself – requires that one say, in one and the same respect, opposing things of the one object. This, however, is to court contradiction."  Identity and Contradiction, George di Giovanni, contained in, The Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel 2013, pg.262

 

Further, it's exceedingly difficult for me to see how you are still talking about the law of identity within the Aristotelian formation? I have cited Hegel affirming this position that difference is contained within identity, it's time for you to cite Aristotle; it must be known that you are not presenting your own idiosyncratic formation. 

 

"So in some way, they appear to have aspects which are the same, yet also aspects which are different. This is why difference cannot be used to negate sameness, they are both distinct aspects of the same concept, "similar". They are not the opposites of each other though because the aspects which are same cannot be the aspect which are different. Therefore "same" and "different" represent two distinct categories within the concept "similar"." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

Hegel has demonstrated the exact opposite, this is why he said, "Such thinking always has before it only abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it, difference. In its opinion, reason is nothing more than a loom on which it externally combines and interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the woof of difference; or, also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts especially identity and then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness when abstraction is made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing of likeness."

 

"When someone says that a thing is the same as itself, they are not saying that it is not different from itself." – Aristotelian Apologist

This is because you are stuck in a one-sided determination. You are not actually thinking about what is entailed in the concept of "itself," in identity. You are only considering the positive formation, the negative side is also part of the concept, if you deny this you destroy the law. A one-sided determination is incomplete and does not qualify as knowledge.

 

But something more important occurs to me here: you are equivocating because you are talking about a specific thing as opposed to the general law, which is the very distinction you made above. Equivocating back and forth this way allows you to evade the force of the criticism against it.

 

"When someone says that a thing is the same as itself, they are not saying that it is not different from itself." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

You are correct, they are saying it is the same as itself, but this means that it cannot be different from itself. One doesn't have to formally assert the negative for it to be contained within the completeness of the concept. 

 

"I am a thing, and I am the same as myself. But clearly I am different from the way I was last year, despite being the same person last year and this year. So when I say that I am the same person that I was last year, I am not saying that I am not different from how I was last year." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

This is an equivocation; we are talking about a general law. Nevertheless, even here you are still saying that you are not different from yourself. You are confusing Hegel's critique of identity by mistaking it as something external to identity. The difference is not contained in the fact that you change, but in the fact that difference must be present in the identity you make of yourself, in order to make a significant determination of yourself.

 

"Why can't I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself", just like Hegel says A=A represents "a thing is the same as itself"?" – Aristotelian Apologist

 

You failed to comprehend my argument; my argument was that you cannot 'bring identity into being' with the solitary symbol of Z. You are failing to grasp the fact that Z only makes sense because you have articulated the law using different symbols. My reply to you is, show me how you can bring the law of identity into being with the symbol Z? You cannot do it, because, as a matter of fact, you need many different symbols to articulate the law! You can only say that Z represents the law because you have articulated it with more symbols than Z, if this was not the case, you would not be able to say what Z represents. I don't think you are following this argument. We are not talking about representation of the law; we are talking about what is required to bring the law into being!

 

"A thing is the same as itself" says nothing about difference or unity. How can you even make such a statement and try to maintain some semblance of honesty?" –  Aristotelian Apologist

 

My friend, please pay attention: "(1) A (2) thing (3) is (4) the (5) same (6) as (7) itself."

 

Is (1) the same symbol as (2), is (3) the same symbol as (4)? Can you articulate the law without using different symbols? Further you are not saying that these symbols are articulating many things, you take them together in unity to form a concept.

 

"It is pointless to attack the symbolic structure, rather than the structure of ideas." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

Not in the case of identity, it is claiming the highest authority of truth for itself; therefore it incurs the highest burden of proof for itself. More to the point, identity is made up of its symbolic structure in the most precise way, the articulation is crucial as evidenced by this exchange. What we find, when we examine the symbolic structure of identity, is that identity is itself made up of more determinations than identity. We find that the Aristotelian formation of identity is a misrepresentation of identity's dialectical being. This was Hegel's genius discovery.  

 

"That two things are different doesn't mean that one is the opposite of the other, they might be different categories." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

Disassociated categories are what Kant contrives to deal with the reality of contradiction.

 

It seems to me that this is the heart of your objection. You are claiming that Hegel's position is accurate, which is most interesting, you are just saying that he is making a categorical mistake. This doesn't work because (Hegel's discovery) a category cannot consist, and does not consist, in a one-sided determination. All of the attributes that form the concept must be contained within the category in order for it to be a concept of knowledge, otherwise it is nothing but a one-sided determination lacking in totality.     

 

"Yes, identity is different from difference, but this does not mean that same is defined as "not different"." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

This argument is literally a straw man. Hegel does not discuss the term “same” in the context of identity. You are trying to introduce a new point (Red Herring) to create more space for the ever encroaching collapse of your position. You are attempting to argue that the concept “same” saves Aristotle’s position of identity; you are trying to walk two paths; one where you affirm Hegel’s point that identity is different from difference, but then try to save identity by making use of the concept “same.” However, once you admit that identity is different from difference you cannot simply save identity by introducing the term, “same.”

 

"Colour is different from sound, but this does not mean that colour is defined as "not sound". " -- Aristotelian Apologist

 

What you are missing here is that sound is not part of the significant determination of color. This cannot be said in the case of identity and difference.  

 

"That's exactly what I've been saying, difference is included within identity, so that the thing is the same as itself and also different from itself. Now, Hegel claims that this is contradiction, but it is not contradictory. It is only contradictory if you define "same" as "not different". But nothing necessitates this definition." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

Friend, are you truly thinking about this, specifically in relation to the so-called law of identity? Here you admit that difference is included in identity and then have the audacity to assert (and we need to be very specific here) that this does not contradict the law of identity! This is because you hold it to be a category outside of identity, but this is Hegel's point, as he says, you "do not see" that difference is part of identity, you do not have one without the other.  

 

"... same and different are actually different categories and cannot be directly related to each other in this way." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

Same would not be a significant determination without difference. What you are again doing is asserting the error of a one-sided determination which is incompetent to produce knowledge.

 

"Hegel might even recognize that same and different belong to distinct categories, as he says " this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other". " – Aristotelian Apologist

 

Category in this sense does not mean knowledge; it simply means a part that is in need of further determination.

 

"One cannot take a word like "word", and analyze the constituent parts individually, "w", "o", "r", "d", and their relations to each other within that word expecting to determine something useful about the meaning." – Aristotelian Apologist

 

That would depend on what kind of authority you were trying to deduce from the use of this word and how you were trying to deduce it. In the case of the law of identity it is not a refutation of Hegel's argument to merely say, 'you cannot do this.' Tell me, what happens if the argument is accurate? This is where we locate the motivation for the prohibition against the argument. However, the law of identity is precisely the kind of semantical thing that validates the use of this kind of argument. Further, we do learn something by noting that a word is not a solitary unit but is made up of different syllables. This fact speaks to the accuracy of Hegel's position: identity is made up of difference taken in unity.     

"The category mistake he makes though, is to allow difference to move into the category of same, making these two opposite of each other, rather than categorically distinct." – Aristotelian Apologist 

This new law of category you are stating is not the law of identity and you must substantiate it. At present you are making an authoritarian claim, Hegel in contrast, is making an argument that transcends the artificial construction of a category that ends up distorting reality. You have yourself confessed many times that the law of identity is just an ideal, you have confessed that reality is in flux, how then can you say his logic is wrong because it defies your static idealism, and instead, more carefully organizes itself along the lines of reality? 

You do not refute Hegel by merely asserting that "identity," "difference" and "same" are three distinct categories, and this is because Hegel proves that identity contains difference within itself, not merely as something from the outside. The contradiction that emerges cannot simply be resolved by arbitrarily creating categories that allow you to retain your idealism as a form of denial against reality.

 This is what's going on here:

 You are holding reality hostage to your logical categories, imposing your presuppositions on reality, or to state it another way, you are denying reality on the basis of idealism. You are saying that Hegel's position must be wrong "because it would refute my ideals about reality." Hegel’s thought is the exact opposite of this kind of biased procedure; it’s a courageous attempt to allow reality to speak for itself, even if it results in the negation of one’s desired ideals. That identity negates itself, that Aristotle is wrong, is not Hegel’s psychological desire, but the conclusion one is forced to embrace through a more complete dialectical analysis of Aristotle’s dogmatic categories.       

 

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