[1] It is the consciousness of the rules of dialectic which
make dialectic possible to the individual. These rules have been inhereted from, and are contigent on, the cultural transmission of human lingustics, the development of concepts through the medium of words. I would argue that this is problematic for dialectic, insofar as it demonstrates that there is
something more primitive and necessary to dialectic before dialectic can
be realized. Dialectic presupposes the ability, not only of a
particular level of abstract comprehension, but it also requires a
comprehension of specific categories/concepts and the way they relate to each
other through a specific logical process. This is not straight forward;
one must be educated into dialectic. (In the worst case, if dialectic
proves to be a vacuous abstraction, it means one must be indoctrinated, as opposed to educated into, dialectic).
[2]
Dialectic is a set of categories and rules. A philosophical orthodoxy wants to deny this through the edifice of philosophical jargon, but
this is what dialectic is: it's a series of words pieced together,
attached to concepts, meant to provide us with a more powerful way of approaching and comprehending the world.
[3]
The main authority I see in dialectic is
the authority it achieves for
itself
(through a more careful skepticism)
when it deconstructs the plural nature of identity. The proof of
dialectic is precisely the fact that it goes beyond identity without
stepping outside the bounds of the claims of identity itself. (It claims
to negate identity on the basis of identity itself, showing, not merely asserting,
that the negation of identity proceeds from the axioms and claims of
identity itself). If this doesn't hold, then dialectic falls into the category of a creative logic, as opposed to a logic which contains aspects of neccessity.
[4] I believe
we can simplify what dialectic is in essence: it's a form of skepticism.
The power of dialectic is that it uses the premises of a position
against itself to draw-out and push those premises into their own contradiction. Certainly, orthodox dialecticians will want to protest that dialectic is more than "mere
skepticism" and that it "cannot be reduced" to skepticism. But this is
only true in the sense that dialectic strives to go beyond the negative
moment and merge into positivity, in the form of unity (using and
standing on skepticism to propel itself forward). The power of dialectic
is contained in its particular use of skepticism. Everything that dialectic does is
achieved by means of the power of skepticism.
[5] We
swiftly run into a problem with dialectic; the problem of abstraction.
Just because a human constructs a sophisticated form of logic, that sophisticated form, doesn't automatically become true. Even more, it doesn't automatically mean it has
value just because its form is sophisticated. In order to establish this dialectic must meet its burden
of proof. It should not get a free pass just because its form embodies
complexity or a unique formation in logic. Even if it embodies a
progression within logic, it's altogether possible that this progression
is lacking in value; it's altogether possible that this complexity
merely serves to, unnecessarily overcomplicate things, by adding steps
that are not required. Dialectic has a burden of proof it must meet.
[6]
I believe dialecticians are easily deceived by the form of dialectic
itself, that is to say, by the descriptive idealism of dialectic. This is because, like all reason, it can make the practitioner
believe that progress is merely a matter of comprehending the right articulation of logic. But this ability comes later on down the line of
human development. Many things must first take place before a
comprehension and ability to wield dialectic can be realized in the
human subject. These facts tell us that dialectic is itself contingent,
that its comprehension and mastery of execution, are contingent on
material and psychological factors of cognitive development, as well as
the cultural transmission of symbols and concepts. At the same time, it
is also accurate to say, that dialectic has a kind of independent value
as a logic, by which to approach the world. The future of dialectic might
be the task of understanding these things more clearly and bringing them
together.
[7] My main concern with dialectic is to discern its real world value.
I am suspicious that dialectic may simply turn out to be an eccentric
modality of logic with very limited application, an abstraction that
cannot justify itself beyond itself. One has to do better than merely
claim that dialectic is "a unique formation of logic in relation to a
concept of identity." (And then again, perhaps this is the value of
dialectic! That it offers an expansion of the concept of identity?
Perhaps all its value is derived from its skeptical approach to identity
and what it unearths through this critical process)? Nevertheless, if
this claim has value, then it seems to me that dialectic must, even
more, demonstrate its value beyond this claim, it must have some
real-world application beyond its contrast with identity, and this
real-world application must be able to deliver real-world results, not
just multiply complexity in terms of logical concepts or abstract
determinations.
A
dialectician, claiming that an instance of reasoning has been carried
out “wrongly” because it doesn’t conform to the procedures of dialectic,
must be able to do more than merely make this formal complaint. The
dialectician must be able to show that this lack of formality has
resulted in some kind of error, and not just the error of failing to
conform to the procedure of dialectic.
[8] Is dialectic more than just a consciousness of categories and their
interrelations? Would dialectic still exist without a consciousness of
these categories and the semantics of their logical relations? No one can engage in the process of dialectical thinking without also having a semantical understanding of the skeptical process that resides at its foundation and is the heart of its movement.
[9] Dialectic professes to help us penetrate into reality beyond the veil of
mere appearance, into the plural and contradictory nature of reality
itself. Dialectic claims to be a logic of discovery, or a logic that has
the power to deliver a more accurate knowledge of reality: it claims a higher competence for itself in the form of accurate
representation, a logic that can better capture the diverse and dynamic
nature of reality.
But this
won’t change the ontology of what dialectic is: a consciousness
of categories and their interrelations, or we might more accurately say,
a consciousness of the plural nature of concepts; the
awareness that all concepts are made up of contradictions— this would almost make the logic of dialectic a kind of
linguistic revelation. Dialectics is, perhaps, an indictment against the
lie of the mono-form of our linguistics. We presuppositionally deceive
ourselves by assigning monism to our categories, concepts and symbols. Dialectic comes along
and explodes these presuppositions, casting our categories into
contradiction by following the logical path of their development, by
tracing their movement. Dialectic attacks false assumptions that
lie at the heart of our linguistic and conceptual structures; it
attacks artificial boundaries, idealist boundaries, that we place on
these structures at the subconscious level.
[10] Dialectic
posits rules, and it's these rules that matter and make it unique, more
importantly, that give it its power. How these rules are derived is
most interesting--- but even if they're merely created, arbitrarily, if their result is to
produce a high logicality of power (a powerful process) they would find ample justification
for themselves as a form of logic. Nevertheless, how these rules are
derived, or discovered, could end up being more important than dialectic itself. This is
because it might be possible that such a method contains a higher value
than the rules of dialectic. So what are the rules by which these rules
of dialectic are discovered? Indeed, were such rules even discovered
by rules, or do they stand as the result of an inference from
experience, or something else? (We must always be careful of questions that
deceive us by through their aesthetic complexity, abstract form, while lacking real world application or relevance).
[11]
Dialectic would seem to give us the gift of contradiction-- contradiction as a category of value-- as a concept that can actually be used to make progress and understand the world, not only becoming part of our rational process, but helping us to better understand rationality itself.
[12] Dialectic, if we must get down to the root, is a linguistic and conceptual tool. This tool can be pit against other linguistic and conceptual tools, and we can see what it's possible to build with such a tool. One cannot build a skyscraper without advanced tools, dialectic is a kind of tool; one is meant to do something with it; one is meant to use it as a tool for understanding and criticizing. As Morris R. Cohen has said in his Preface to Logic, "The history of science shows beyond doubt that the vital factor in the growth of any science is not... passive observation but the active questioning of nature..." This speaks of the value of a critical element; it is the critical element, skepticism, that moves science in the direction of progress. Dialectic is indeed a form of skepticism, for this is precisely how dialectic begins. So the question remains open, what value might dialectic bring to the progress of science through the application of its critical process?
[13] We began by saying, 'it is the consciousness of the rules of dialectic which
make dialectic possible to the individual.' What this means is that dialectical thinking takes place only under the right conditions, only in those humans that have been lucky enough to comprehend the culturally transmitted tool of dialectic. The existence of such a rational tool, and the existence of an individual that has come into possession of this tool, is what makes the reality of dialectic possible. In truth the turtle of dialectic is sitting on the turtle of history, and the turtle of history is sitting on the turtle of the material development of human beings. It is only the consciousness of dialectic, which is to say, its rules of process, that makes dialectic possible. Dialectic is a process of logical steps that one goes through when seeking to comprehend a concept, event, object or word. It is a process of logical mediation that stands between the object and the impulse of cognition.
I have tried to be critical of dialectic, to see if I could abolish it or overcome it, but there are things that remain, values that I have not been able to negate. One of these values is dialectic's redemptive use of the category of contradiction, another is dialectic's negation of identity on the basis of identity itself.
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