In the quiet of my study, with the window open to the soft hum of spring, I find myself troubled by a peculiar hardness in the hearts of some who follow Hegel. It’s a hardness not born of malice, but of a deep, unbending certainty—a certainty that shuts the gate to honest inquiry, that bristles at the skeptic’s knock, that turns discourse into a battlefield. I write this not to wound, but to wonder, plain and simple, why such an essay must be written at all. That it’s needed is a sorrowful thing, a sign that the ground for shared understanding has gone fallow through a philosophy that cannot bear it.
Hegel’s thought is a mighty river, no doubt. His dialectic, with its grand sweep of Being and Nothing folding into Becoming, promises a map of all that is. His followers, the Hegelians, hold this map as sacred, a truth so complete it need not bend to question. But when a skeptic comes, asking in good faith, “Does this map fit the land? Does it predict the stars or explain the seed’s growth?”—the response is not an open hand, but a clenched fist. They do not answer with reasons or meet the challenge with evidence. Instead, they turn inward, to a cult-like mindset that guards the system like a fortress.
It’s telling, this reaction. A skeptic’s question is no attack, but an invitation to walk together, to test the ground of claims. Yet Hegelians, so sure of their Absolute Knowing, often meet it with resentment. They dismiss the skeptic as “naïve,” evade the question with abstractions, authoritarian assertions, or gaslight with claims that the fault lies in not grasping the deeper structure (or they insinuate that there's something wrong with a person for even challenging such self-evident truths as those asserted by Hegel). It’s as if they feel privileged, above the labor of doubt, annoyed that their system—grand as it is—must face the same skeptical process as any other system that makes sweeping claims. They act as if Hegel’s dialectic deserves a free pass, as if truth should bow to their certainty rather than earn its keep through rational discourse and critical evaluation, meeting its burden of proof to ground its authority. (The disosition of their evasion evidences a system inferior to science).
When pressed, they don’t engage—they retreat, claiming science misses the “inner concept.” It’s not just wrong; it’s a refusal to meet the world as it is. A farmer knows a seed grows by soil and sun, not by negating itself. A scientist knows DNA builds life through chemistry, not sublation. Yet the Hegelian, rather than face these truths, attacks the skeptic’s “failure to see,” as if doubt itself were a sin, as if skeptical inquiry were heresy.
This dogmatism, this insecurity, is a heavy thing. It’s not the confidence of truth, but the fear of its testing. A true idea welcomes the skeptic, opens the gate, and says, “Come, let’s reason together.” But the Hegelian, locked in their system, sees critique as betrayal. They gaslight, saying the skeptic “doesn’t understand,” or dismiss, claiming the question is “beneath” the dialectic’s grandeur. It’s a cult-like reflex, not a philosopher’s courage—a mindset that consumes the mind it claims to free.
I write this with no joy, for I believe in discourse, in the slow, honest work of shared thought. Philosophy, like farming, needs open fields, not walled gardens. Hegel’s ideas, brilliant as they are, must stand in the light of doubt, not hide in the shadow of dogma. To the Hegelians, I’d say, plain as I can: your system is not above question. No idea is. Meet the skeptic not with scorn, but with reasons. If Hegel's philosophy is so powerful, why the insecurity; why the defensiveness?
A letter like this should never need to be written to philosophers: (the form of this letter is as though it were written to people indoctrinated into a religious cult). Most Hegelians are used to holding the higher ground through obfuscation and layered abstraction. Any skepticism leveled against the system usually doesn't comprehend the system (this I have found to be true). But when the Hegelian finds themselves confronted by one who grasps the system, they suddenly lose all composure, they resent and retreat from the challenge. This is not the mode of a healthy philosophy, it's the mode of an insecure religion. But this makes sense, because Hegel thought that Christianity embodied the highest representation of truth. Hegel merely secularized this form and turned it into a teleology of Reason -- a philosophical religion.
I have come to the tragic conclusion, that when we deal with Hegelians, we're not dealing with open thinkers, but with believers. In this sense, if one reads carefully, they will find that Hegelianism is very much a form of creedalism.
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Hegel’s thought is a mighty river, no doubt. His dialectic, with its grand sweep of Being and Nothing folding into Becoming, promises a map of all that is. His followers, the Hegelians, hold this map as sacred, a truth so complete it need not bend to question. But when a skeptic comes, asking in good faith, “Does this map fit the land? Does it predict the stars or explain the seed’s growth?”—the response is not an open hand, but a clenched fist. They do not answer with reasons or meet the challenge with evidence. Instead, they turn inward, to a cult-like mindset that guards the system like a fortress.
It’s telling, this reaction. A skeptic’s question is no attack, but an invitation to walk together, to test the ground of claims. Yet Hegelians, so sure of their Absolute Knowing, often meet it with resentment. They dismiss the skeptic as “naïve,” evade the question with abstractions, authoritarian assertions, or gaslight with claims that the fault lies in not grasping the deeper structure (or they insinuate that there's something wrong with a person for even challenging such self-evident truths as those asserted by Hegel). It’s as if they feel privileged, above the labor of doubt, annoyed that their system—grand as it is—must face the same skeptical process as any other system that makes sweeping claims. They act as if Hegel’s dialectic deserves a free pass, as if truth should bow to their certainty rather than earn its keep through rational discourse and critical evaluation, meeting its burden of proof to ground its authority. (The disosition of their evasion evidences a system inferior to science).
When pressed, they don’t engage—they retreat, claiming science misses the “inner concept.” It’s not just wrong; it’s a refusal to meet the world as it is. A farmer knows a seed grows by soil and sun, not by negating itself. A scientist knows DNA builds life through chemistry, not sublation. Yet the Hegelian, rather than face these truths, attacks the skeptic’s “failure to see,” as if doubt itself were a sin, as if skeptical inquiry were heresy.
This dogmatism, this insecurity, is a heavy thing. It’s not the confidence of truth, but the fear of its testing. A true idea welcomes the skeptic, opens the gate, and says, “Come, let’s reason together.” But the Hegelian, locked in their system, sees critique as betrayal. They gaslight, saying the skeptic “doesn’t understand,” or dismiss, claiming the question is “beneath” the dialectic’s grandeur. It’s a cult-like reflex, not a philosopher’s courage—a mindset that consumes the mind it claims to free.
I write this with no joy, for I believe in discourse, in the slow, honest work of shared thought. Philosophy, like farming, needs open fields, not walled gardens. Hegel’s ideas, brilliant as they are, must stand in the light of doubt, not hide in the shadow of dogma. To the Hegelians, I’d say, plain as I can: your system is not above question. No idea is. Meet the skeptic not with scorn, but with reasons. If Hegel's philosophy is so powerful, why the insecurity; why the defensiveness?
A letter like this should never need to be written to philosophers: (the form of this letter is as though it were written to people indoctrinated into a religious cult). Most Hegelians are used to holding the higher ground through obfuscation and layered abstraction. Any skepticism leveled against the system usually doesn't comprehend the system (this I have found to be true). But when the Hegelian finds themselves confronted by one who grasps the system, they suddenly lose all composure, they resent and retreat from the challenge. This is not the mode of a healthy philosophy, it's the mode of an insecure religion. But this makes sense, because Hegel thought that Christianity embodied the highest representation of truth. Hegel merely secularized this form and turned it into a teleology of Reason -- a philosophical religion.
I have come to the tragic conclusion, that when we deal with Hegelians, we're not dealing with open thinkers, but with believers. In this sense, if one reads carefully, they will find that Hegelianism is very much a form of creedalism.
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